drm/amdkfd: fix a vulnerability of integer overflow in kfd debugger

get_queue_ids() computes array_size = num_queues * sizeof(uint32_t),
which could overflow on 32-bit size_t build. using array_size()
instead, it saturates to SIZE_MAX on overflow.

Signed-off-by: Eric Huang <jinhuieric.huang@amd.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2d57a0475f085c08b49312dfd8edcb461845f285)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
This commit is contained in:
Eric Huang 2026-05-12 10:19:52 -04:00 committed by Alex Deucher
parent ca8e7a119a
commit 93f5534b35

View File

@ -3308,12 +3308,14 @@ static void copy_context_work_handler(struct work_struct *work)
static uint32_t *get_queue_ids(uint32_t num_queues, uint32_t *usr_queue_id_array)
{
size_t array_size = num_queues * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (!usr_queue_id_array)
return NULL;
return memdup_user(usr_queue_id_array, array_size);
if (num_queues > KFD_MAX_NUM_OF_QUEUES_PER_PROCESS)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
return memdup_user(usr_queue_id_array,
array_size(num_queues, sizeof(uint32_t)));
}
int resume_queues(struct kfd_process *p,