KVM: riscv: Fix Spectre-v1 in vector register access

User-controlled register indices from the ONE_REG ioctl are used to
index into the vector register buffer (v0..v31). Sanitize the calculated
offset with array_index_nospec() to prevent speculative out-of-bounds
access.

Signed-off-by: Zongmin Zhou <zhouzongmin@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260715030818.75657-1-min_halo@163.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
This commit is contained in:
Zongmin Zhou 2026-07-15 11:08:18 +08:00 committed by Anup Patel
parent d024a0a787
commit 8d9c9b135b

View File

@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/kvm_isa.h>
@ -129,11 +130,20 @@ static int kvm_riscv_vcpu_vreg_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return -ENOENT;
}
} else if (reg_num <= KVM_REG_RISCV_VECTOR_REG(31)) {
unsigned long reg_offset;
if (reg_size != vlenb)
return -EINVAL;
WARN_ON(!cntx->vector.datap);
*reg_addr = cntx->vector.datap +
(reg_num - KVM_REG_RISCV_VECTOR_REG(0)) * vlenb;
/*
* The reg_num is derived from the userspace-provided ONE_REG
* id. Sanitize it with array_index_nospec() to prevent
* speculative out-of-bounds access to the vector register
* buffer (32 vector registers: v0..v31).
*/
reg_offset = array_index_nospec(
reg_num - KVM_REG_RISCV_VECTOR_REG(0), 32);
*reg_addr = cntx->vector.datap + reg_offset * vlenb;
} else {
return -ENOENT;
}