ASoC: SOF: ipc3-control: Use overflow checks in control_update size calc

In sof_ipc3_control_update(), the expected_size calculation uses
firmware-provided cdata->num_elems in arithmetic that could overflow
on 32-bit platforms, wrapping to a small value. This would allow the
cdata->rhdr.hdr.size comparison to pass with mismatched sizes,
potentially leading to out-of-bounds access in snd_sof_update_control.

Use check_mul_overflow() and check_add_overflow() to detect and reject
overflowed size calculations.

Fixes: 10f461d79c ("ASoC: SOF: Add IPC3 topology control ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam Girdwood <liam.r.girdwood@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260609083458.31193-4-peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Peter Ujfalusi 2026-06-09 11:34:55 +03:00 committed by Mark Brown
parent 5bdfeccb7f
commit 8791977d72
No known key found for this signature in database
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@ -626,16 +626,28 @@ static void sof_ipc3_control_update(struct snd_sof_dev *sdev, void *ipc_control_
return;
}
expected_size = sizeof(struct sof_ipc_ctrl_data);
switch (cdata->type) {
case SOF_CTRL_TYPE_VALUE_CHAN_GET:
case SOF_CTRL_TYPE_VALUE_CHAN_SET:
expected_size += cdata->num_elems *
sizeof(struct sof_ipc_ctrl_value_chan);
if (check_mul_overflow((size_t)cdata->num_elems,
sizeof(struct sof_ipc_ctrl_value_chan),
&expected_size))
return;
if (check_add_overflow(expected_size,
sizeof(struct sof_ipc_ctrl_data),
&expected_size))
return;
break;
case SOF_CTRL_TYPE_DATA_GET:
case SOF_CTRL_TYPE_DATA_SET:
expected_size += cdata->num_elems + sizeof(struct sof_abi_hdr);
if (check_add_overflow((size_t)cdata->num_elems,
sizeof(struct sof_abi_hdr),
&expected_size))
return;
if (check_add_overflow(expected_size,
sizeof(struct sof_ipc_ctrl_data),
&expected_size))
return;
break;
default:
return;