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KVM: x86: Don't emulate task switches when IBT or SHSTK is enabled

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Exit to userspace with KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION if the guest triggers
task switch emulation with Indirect Branch Tracking or Shadow Stacks
enabled, as attempting to do the right thing would require non-trivial
effort and complexity, KVM doesn't support emulating CET generally, and
it's extremely unlikely that any guest will do task switches while also
utilizing CET.  Defer taking on the complexity until someone cares enough
to put in the time and effort to add support.

Per the SDM:

  If shadow stack is enabled, then the SSP of the task is located at the
  4 bytes at offset 104 in the 32-bit TSS and is used by the processor to
  establish the SSP when a task switch occurs from a task associated with
  this TSS. Note that the processor does not write the SSP of the task
  initiating the task switch to the TSS of that task, and instead the SSP
  of the previous task is pushed onto the shadow stack of the new task.

Note, per the SDM's pseudocode on TASK SWITCHING, IBT state for the new
privilege level is updated.  To keep things simple, check both S_CET and
U_CET (again, anyone that wants more precise checking can have the honor
of implementing support).

Reported-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/819bd98b-2a60-4107-8e13-41f1e4c706b1@linux.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250919223258.1604852-20-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
This commit is contained in:
Sean Christopherson 2025-09-19 15:32:26 -07:00
parent 57c3db7e2e
commit 82c0ec0282
1 changed files with 28 additions and 7 deletions
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35
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
View File

@ -12175,6 +12175,25 @@ int kvm_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u16 tss_selector, int idt_index,
struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
int ret;
if (kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_CET)) {
u64 u_cet, s_cet;
/*
* Check both User and Supervisor on task switches as inter-
* privilege level task switches are impacted by CET at both
* the current privilege level and the new privilege level, and
* that information is not known at this time. The expectation
* is that the guest won't require emulation of task switches
* while using IBT or Shadow Stacks.
*/
if (__kvm_emulate_msr_read(vcpu, MSR_IA32_U_CET, &u_cet) ||
__kvm_emulate_msr_read(vcpu, MSR_IA32_S_CET, &s_cet))
goto unhandled_task_switch;
if ((u_cet | s_cet) & (CET_ENDBR_EN | CET_SHSTK_EN))
goto unhandled_task_switch;
}
init_emulate_ctxt(vcpu);
ret = emulator_task_switch(ctxt, tss_selector, idt_index, reason,
@ -12184,17 +12203,19 @@ int kvm_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u16 tss_selector, int idt_index,
* Report an error userspace if MMIO is needed, as KVM doesn't support
* MMIO during a task switch (or any other complex operation).
*/
if (ret || vcpu->mmio_needed) {
vcpu->mmio_needed = false;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
return 0;
}
if (ret || vcpu->mmio_needed)
goto unhandled_task_switch;
kvm_rip_write(vcpu, ctxt->eip);
kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, ctxt->eflags);
return 1;
unhandled_task_switch:
vcpu->mmio_needed = false;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_task_switch);