From 77933e22adfe813be2bd10be08d6e950103c3967 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Bommarito Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2026 14:05:58 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] ceph: bound MDSCapAuth path and fs_name decode in handle_session() handle_session() decodes the MDSCapAuth records carried by a CEPH_SESSION_OPEN message (msg_version >= 6). For each record the match.path and match.fs_name byte strings are read by first decoding a 32-bit length and then copying that many bytes with the bare ceph_decode_copy(). Unlike the surrounding fields, which all use the _safe decode variants, these two copies are not preceded by a ceph_decode_need() bounds check, and the enclosing MDSCapAuth and MDSCapMatch struct_len fields are skipped rather than enforced as an upper bound. A length larger than the bytes remaining in the message front makes ceph_decode_copy() read past the end of the front buffer. The message front is a dedicated allocation (ceph_msg_new2() -> kvmalloc), so the over-read runs off that object. A malicious or compromised MDS can trigger this with the first post-connect message on mount, with no client-side user interaction; under KASAN it is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read in handle_session(). Impact: a malicious MDS can force the kernel client to read up to 4 GiB past the message front allocation during session setup, crashing the client (out-of-bounds read). Switch both copies to ceph_decode_copy_safe(), which performs the ceph_decode_need() bounds check before the copy and branches to the existing bad label, matching the rest of the decoder and the error path that frees the partially decoded cap_auths array. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1d17de9534cb ("ceph: save cap_auths in MDS client when session is opened") Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov --- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c index c7b47c98b777..313281197ff4 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c @@ -4446,7 +4446,9 @@ static void handle_session(struct ceph_mds_session *session, pr_err_client(cl, "No memory for path\n"); goto fail; } - ceph_decode_copy(&p, cap_auths[i].match.path, _len); + ceph_decode_copy_safe(&p, end, + cap_auths[i].match.path, + _len, bad); /* Remove the tailing '/' */ while (_len && cap_auths[i].match.path[_len - 1] == '/') { @@ -4463,7 +4465,9 @@ static void handle_session(struct ceph_mds_session *session, pr_err_client(cl, "No memory for fs_name\n"); goto fail; } - ceph_decode_copy(&p, cap_auths[i].match.fs_name, _len); + ceph_decode_copy_safe(&p, end, + cap_auths[i].match.fs_name, + _len, bad); } ceph_decode_8_safe(&p, end, cap_auths[i].match.root_squash, bad);