Merge branch 'linux-linaro-lsk-v4.4' of git://git.linaro.org/kernel/linux-linaro-stable.git

* linux-linaro-lsk-v4.4: (519 commits)
  Linux 4.4.154
  cdrom: Fix info leak/OOB read in cdrom_ioctl_drive_status
  iscsi target: fix session creation failure handling
  scsi: core: Avoid that SCSI device removal through sysfs triggers a deadlock
  scsi: sysfs: Introduce sysfs_{un,}break_active_protection()
  MIPS: lib: Provide MIPS64r6 __multi3() for GCC < 7
  MIPS: Correct the 64-bit DSP accumulator register size
  kprobes: Make list and blacklist root user read only
  s390/pci: fix out of bounds access during irq setup
  s390/qdio: reset old sbal_state flags
  s390: fix br_r1_trampoline for machines without exrl
  x86/spectre: Add missing family 6 check to microcode check
  x86/irqflags: Mark native_restore_fl extern inline
  pinctrl: freescale: off by one in imx1_pinconf_group_dbg_show()
  ASoC: sirf: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
  ASoC: dpcm: don't merge format from invalid codec dai
  udl-kms: fix crash due to uninitialized memory
  udl-kms: handle allocation failure
  udl-kms: change down_interruptible to down
  fuse: Add missed unlock_page() to fuse_readpages_fill()
  ...

Conflicts:
	Makefile
	arch/arm64/mm/init.c
	fs/squashfs/block.c
	include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
	kernel/sys.c

Change-Id: Ie03b5adfbbb4ab2bf16bc55d99f0d8a9c540a53b
This commit is contained in:
Tao Huang 2018-09-07 17:34:34 +08:00
commit 75654db877
453 changed files with 5123 additions and 1719 deletions

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@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
Date: January 2018
Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities

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@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ o GNU C 3.2 # gcc --version
o GNU make 3.80 # make --version
o binutils 2.12 # ld -v
o util-linux 2.10o # fdformat --version
o module-init-tools 0.9.10 # depmod -V
o kmod 13 # depmod -V
o e2fsprogs 1.41.4 # e2fsck -V
o jfsutils 1.1.3 # fsck.jfs -V
o reiserfsprogs 3.6.3 # reiserfsck -V
@ -132,12 +132,6 @@ is not build with CONFIG_KALLSYMS and you have no way to rebuild and
reproduce the Oops with that option, then you can still decode that Oops
with ksymoops.
Module-Init-Tools
-----------------
A new module loader is now in the kernel that requires module-init-tools
to use. It is backward compatible with the 2.4.x series kernels.
Mkinitrd
--------
@ -319,14 +313,15 @@ Util-linux
----------
o <ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/util-linux/>
Kmod
----
o <https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/kernel/kmod/>
o <https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/utils/kernel/kmod/kmod.git>
Ksymoops
--------
o <ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/kernel/ksymoops/v2.4/>
Module-Init-Tools
-----------------
o <ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/rusty/modules/>
Mkinitrd
--------
o <https://code.launchpad.net/initrd-tools/main>

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@ -2520,6 +2520,9 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
to spectre_v2=off.
nospec_store_bypass_disable
[HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability
noxsave [BUGS=X86] Disables x86 extended register state save
and restore using xsave. The kernel will fallback to
enabling legacy floating-point and sse state.
@ -3693,6 +3696,48 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
spectre_v2=auto.
spec_store_bypass_disable=
[HW] Control Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Disable mitigation
(Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability)
Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against a
a common industry wide performance optimization known
as "Speculative Store Bypass" in which recent stores
to the same memory location may not be observed by
later loads during speculative execution. The idea
is that such stores are unlikely and that they can
be detected prior to instruction retirement at the
end of a particular speculation execution window.
In vulnerable processors, the speculatively forwarded
store can be used in a cache side channel attack, for
example to read memory to which the attacker does not
directly have access (e.g. inside sandboxed code).
This parameter controls whether the Speculative Store
Bypass optimization is used.
on - Unconditionally disable Speculative Store Bypass
off - Unconditionally enable Speculative Store Bypass
auto - Kernel detects whether the CPU model contains an
implementation of Speculative Store Bypass and
picks the most appropriate mitigation. If the
CPU is not vulnerable, "off" is selected. If the
CPU is vulnerable the default mitigation is
architecture and Kconfig dependent. See below.
prctl - Control Speculative Store Bypass per thread
via prctl. Speculative Store Bypass is enabled
for a process by default. The state of the control
is inherited on fork.
seccomp - Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp threads
will disable SSB unless they explicitly opt out.
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
spec_store_bypass_disable=auto.
Default mitigations:
X86: If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
spia_io_base= [HW,MTD]
spia_fio_base=
spia_pedr=

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@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
===================
Speculation Control
===================
Quite some CPUs have speculation-related misfeatures which are in
fact vulnerabilities causing data leaks in various forms even across
privilege domains.
The kernel provides mitigation for such vulnerabilities in various
forms. Some of these mitigations are compile-time configurable and some
can be supplied on the kernel command line.
There is also a class of mitigations which are very expensive, but they can
be restricted to a certain set of processes or tasks in controlled
environments. The mechanism to control these mitigations is via
:manpage:`prctl(2)`.
There are two prctl options which are related to this:
* PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL
* PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL
-----------------------
PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bits 0-3 with
the following meaning:
==== ===================== ===================================================
Bit Define Description
==== ===================== ===================================================
0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL.
1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
disabled.
2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
enabled.
3 PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE Same as PR_SPEC_DISABLE, but cannot be undone. A
subsequent prctl(..., PR_SPEC_ENABLE) will fail.
==== ===================== ===================================================
If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.
If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per-task control of the mitigation is
available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
misfeature will fail.
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
-----------------------
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
is selected by arg2 of :manpage:`prctl(2)` per task. arg3 is used to hand
in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE or
PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE.
Common error codes
------------------
======= =================================================================
Value Meaning
======= =================================================================
EINVAL The prctl is not implemented by the architecture or unused
prctl(2) arguments are not 0.
ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature.
======= =================================================================
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL error codes
-----------------------------------
======= =================================================================
Value Meaning
======= =================================================================
0 Success
ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's neither PR_SPEC_ENABLE nor
PR_SPEC_DISABLE nor PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE.
ENXIO Control of the selected speculation misfeature is not possible.
See PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL.
EPERM Speculation was disabled with PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE and caller
tried to enable it again.
======= =================================================================
Speculation misfeature controls
-------------------------------
- PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: Speculative Store Bypass
Invocations:
* prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, 0, 0, 0);
* prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
* prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
* prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
VERSION = 4
PATCHLEVEL = 4
SUBLEVEL = 143
SUBLEVEL = 154
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Blurry Fish Butt
@ -442,7 +442,9 @@ export MAKE AWK GENKSYMS INSTALLKERNEL PERL PYTHON UTS_MACHINE
export HOSTCXX HOSTCXXFLAGS LDFLAGS_MODULE CHECK CHECKFLAGS
export KBUILD_CPPFLAGS NOSTDINC_FLAGS LINUXINCLUDE OBJCOPYFLAGS LDFLAGS
export KBUILD_CFLAGS CFLAGS_KERNEL CFLAGS_MODULE CFLAGS_GCOV CFLAGS_KCOV CFLAGS_KASAN
export KBUILD_CFLAGS CFLAGS_KERNEL CFLAGS_MODULE CFLAGS_GCOV
export CFLAGS_KASAN CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE
export CFLAGS_KCOV
export KBUILD_AFLAGS AFLAGS_KERNEL AFLAGS_MODULE
export KBUILD_AFLAGS_MODULE KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE KBUILD_LDFLAGS_MODULE
export KBUILD_AFLAGS_KERNEL KBUILD_CFLAGS_KERNEL
@ -648,6 +650,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning,frame-address,)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, format-truncation)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, format-overflow)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, int-in-bool-context)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, attribute-alias)
ifdef CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Oz,-Os)

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@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ endif
KBUILD_DEFCONFIG := nsim_700_defconfig
cflags-y += -fno-common -pipe -fno-builtin -D__linux__
cflags-y += -fno-common -pipe -fno-builtin -mmedium-calls -D__linux__
cflags-$(CONFIG_ISA_ARCOMPACT) += -mA7
cflags-$(CONFIG_ISA_ARCV2) += -mcpu=archs
@ -137,16 +137,3 @@ dtbs: scripts
archclean:
$(Q)$(MAKE) $(clean)=$(boot)
# Hacks to enable final link due to absence of link-time branch relexation
# and gcc choosing optimal(shorter) branches at -O3
#
# vineetg Feb 2010: -mlong-calls switched off for overall kernel build
# However lib/decompress_inflate.o (.init.text) calls
# zlib_inflate_workspacesize (.text) causing relocation errors.
# Thus forcing all exten calls in this file to be long calls
export CFLAGS_decompress_inflate.o = -mmedium-calls
export CFLAGS_initramfs.o = -mmedium-calls
ifdef CONFIG_SMP
export CFLAGS_core.o = -mmedium-calls
endif

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@ -17,8 +17,11 @@
#ifndef __ASM_ARC_UDELAY_H
#define __ASM_ARC_UDELAY_H
#include <asm-generic/types.h>
#include <asm/param.h> /* HZ */
extern unsigned long loops_per_jiffy;
static inline void __delay(unsigned long loops)
{
__asm__ __volatile__(

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@ -34,9 +34,7 @@ struct machine_desc {
const char *name;
const char **dt_compat;
void (*init_early)(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
void (*init_per_cpu)(unsigned int);
#endif
void (*init_machine)(void);
void (*init_late)(void);

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@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ typedef pte_t * pgtable_t;
#define virt_addr_valid(kaddr) pfn_valid(__pa(kaddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
/* Default Permissions for stack/heaps pages (Non Executable) */
#define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE)
#define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
#define WANT_PAGE_VIRTUAL 1

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@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ void update_mmu_cache(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
/* Decode a PTE containing swap "identifier "into constituents */
#define __swp_type(pte_lookalike) (((pte_lookalike).val) & 0x1f)
#define __swp_offset(pte_lookalike) ((pte_lookalike).val << 13)
#define __swp_offset(pte_lookalike) ((pte_lookalike).val >> 13)
/* NOPs, to keep generic kernel happy */
#define __pte_to_swp_entry(pte) ((swp_entry_t) { pte_val(pte) })

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@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ void __init init_IRQ(void)
/* a SMP H/w block could do IPI IRQ request here */
if (plat_smp_ops.init_per_cpu)
plat_smp_ops.init_per_cpu(smp_processor_id());
#endif
if (machine_desc->init_per_cpu)
machine_desc->init_per_cpu(smp_processor_id());
#endif
}
/*

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@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ void flush_cache_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
void flush_cache_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long u_vaddr,
unsigned long pfn)
{
unsigned int paddr = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
phys_addr_t paddr = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
u_vaddr &= PAGE_MASK;
@ -841,8 +841,9 @@ void flush_anon_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct page *page,
unsigned long u_vaddr)
{
/* TBD: do we really need to clear the kernel mapping */
__flush_dcache_page(page_address(page), u_vaddr);
__flush_dcache_page(page_address(page), page_address(page));
__flush_dcache_page((phys_addr_t)page_address(page), u_vaddr);
__flush_dcache_page((phys_addr_t)page_address(page),
(phys_addr_t)page_address(page));
}

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@ -74,6 +74,11 @@ omap3_pmx_core2: pinmux@480025d8 {
};
};
/* Table Table 5-79 of the TRM shows 480ab000 is reserved */
&usb_otg_hs {
status = "disabled";
};
&iva {
status = "disabled";
};

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@ -508,6 +508,8 @@ edt-ft5306@38 {
touchscreen-size-x = <480>;
touchscreen-size-y = <272>;
wakeup-source;
};
tlv320aic3106: tlv320aic3106@1b {

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@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ i2c0: i2c@18008000 {
reg = <0x18008000 0x100>;
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 85 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 85 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clock-frequency = <100000>;
status = "disabled";
};
@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ i2c1: i2c@1800b000 {
reg = <0x1800b000 0x100>;
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 86 IRQ_TYPE_NONE>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 86 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clock-frequency = <100000>;
status = "disabled";
};

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@ -267,11 +267,7 @@ gpio: gpio@1e26000 {
compatible = "ti,dm6441-gpio";
gpio-controller;
reg = <0x226000 0x1000>;
interrupts = <42 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH
43 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH 44 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH
45 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH 46 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH
47 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH 48 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH
49 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH 50 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH>;
interrupts = <42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50>;
ti,ngpio = <144>;
ti,davinci-gpio-unbanked = <0>;
status = "disabled";

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@ -1250,7 +1250,7 @@ pcie: pcie@0x08000000 {
/* non-prefetchable memory */
0x82000000 0 0x08000000 0x08000000 0 0x00f00000>;
num-lanes = <1>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 123 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 120 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clks IMX6SX_CLK_PCIE_REF_125M>,
<&clks IMX6SX_CLK_PCIE_AXI>,
<&clks IMX6SX_CLK_LVDS1_OUT>,

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@ -145,9 +145,11 @@ CONFIG_USB_STORAGE=y
CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA=y
CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA_UDC=y
CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA_HOST=y
CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA_ULPI=y
CONFIG_NOP_USB_XCEIV=y
CONFIG_USB_GADGET=y
CONFIG_USB_ETH=m
CONFIG_USB_ULPI_BUS=y
CONFIG_MMC=y
CONFIG_MMC_SDHCI=y
CONFIG_MMC_SDHCI_PLTFM=y

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@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ CONFIG_USB_STORAGE=y
CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA=y
CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA_UDC=y
CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA_HOST=y
CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA_ULPI=y
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_GENERIC=y
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_FTDI_SIO=m
@ -287,6 +288,7 @@ CONFIG_USB_G_NCM=m
CONFIG_USB_GADGETFS=m
CONFIG_USB_MASS_STORAGE=m
CONFIG_USB_G_SERIAL=m
CONFIG_USB_ULPI_BUS=y
CONFIG_MMC=y
CONFIG_MMC_SDHCI=y
CONFIG_MMC_SDHCI_PLTFM=y

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@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ extern int __put_user_8(void *, unsigned long long);
({ \
unsigned long __limit = current_thread_info()->addr_limit - 1; \
const typeof(*(p)) __user *__tmp_p = (p); \
register const typeof(*(p)) __r2 asm("r2") = (x); \
register typeof(*(p)) __r2 asm("r2") = (x); \
register const typeof(*(p)) __user *__p asm("r0") = __tmp_p; \
register unsigned long __l asm("r1") = __limit; \
register int __e asm("r0"); \

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@ -899,19 +899,35 @@ static int stage2_set_pmd_huge(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache
pmd = stage2_get_pmd(kvm, cache, addr);
VM_BUG_ON(!pmd);
/*
* Mapping in huge pages should only happen through a fault. If a
* page is merged into a transparent huge page, the individual
* subpages of that huge page should be unmapped through MMU
* notifiers before we get here.
*
* Merging of CompoundPages is not supported; they should become
* splitting first, unmapped, merged, and mapped back in on-demand.
*/
VM_BUG_ON(pmd_present(*pmd) && pmd_pfn(*pmd) != pmd_pfn(*new_pmd));
old_pmd = *pmd;
if (pmd_present(old_pmd)) {
/*
* Multiple vcpus faulting on the same PMD entry, can
* lead to them sequentially updating the PMD with the
* same value. Following the break-before-make
* (pmd_clear() followed by tlb_flush()) process can
* hinder forward progress due to refaults generated
* on missing translations.
*
* Skip updating the page table if the entry is
* unchanged.
*/
if (pmd_val(old_pmd) == pmd_val(*new_pmd))
return 0;
/*
* Mapping in huge pages should only happen through a
* fault. If a page is merged into a transparent huge
* page, the individual subpages of that huge page
* should be unmapped through MMU notifiers before we
* get here.
*
* Merging of CompoundPages is not supported; they
* should become splitting first, unmapped, merged,
* and mapped back in on-demand.
*/
VM_BUG_ON(pmd_pfn(old_pmd) != pmd_pfn(*new_pmd));
pmd_clear(pmd);
kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_ipa(kvm, addr);
} else {
@ -968,6 +984,10 @@ static int stage2_set_pte(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *cache,
/* Create 2nd stage page table mapping - Level 3 */
old_pte = *pte;
if (pte_present(old_pte)) {
/* Skip page table update if there is no change */
if (pte_val(old_pte) == pte_val(*new_pte))
return 0;
kvm_set_pte(pte, __pte(0));
kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_ipa(kvm, addr);
} else {

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@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static int pxa_irq_suspend(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < pxa_internal_irq_nr / 32; i++) {
for (i = 0; i < DIV_ROUND_UP(pxa_internal_irq_nr, 32); i++) {
void __iomem *base = irq_base(i);
saved_icmr[i] = __raw_readl(base + ICMR);
@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static void pxa_irq_resume(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < pxa_internal_irq_nr / 32; i++) {
for (i = 0; i < DIV_ROUND_UP(pxa_internal_irq_nr, 32); i++) {
void __iomem *base = irq_base(i);
__raw_writel(saved_icmr[i], base + ICMR);

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@ -716,19 +716,28 @@ int __mark_rodata_ro(void *unused)
return 0;
}
static int kernel_set_to_readonly __read_mostly;
void mark_rodata_ro(void)
{
kernel_set_to_readonly = 1;
stop_machine(__mark_rodata_ro, NULL, NULL);
}
void set_kernel_text_rw(void)
{
if (!kernel_set_to_readonly)
return;
set_section_perms(ro_perms, ARRAY_SIZE(ro_perms), false,
current->active_mm);
}
void set_kernel_text_ro(void)
{
if (!kernel_set_to_readonly)
return;
set_section_perms(ro_perms, ARRAY_SIZE(ro_perms), true,
current->active_mm);
}

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@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static void smp_store_cpu_info(unsigned int cpuid)
* This is the secondary CPU boot entry. We're using this CPUs
* idle thread stack, but a set of temporary page tables.
*/
asmlinkage void secondary_start_kernel(void)
asmlinkage notrace void secondary_start_kernel(void)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = &init_mm;
unsigned int cpu;

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@ -267,11 +267,13 @@ static void __init zone_sizes_init(unsigned long min, unsigned long max)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID
#define PFN_MASK ((1UL << (64 - PAGE_SHIFT)) - 1)
int pfn_valid(unsigned long pfn)
{
return (pfn & PFN_MASK) == pfn && memblock_is_map_memory(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
phys_addr_t addr = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
if ((addr >> PAGE_SHIFT) != pfn)
return 0;
return memblock_is_map_memory(addr);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(pfn_valid);
#endif

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@ -882,12 +882,12 @@ int pmd_clear_huge(pmd_t *pmd)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP
int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pud)
int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr)
{
return pud_none(*pud);
}
int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd)
int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr)
{
return pmd_none(*pmd);
}

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@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ extern inline pmd_t *pmd_alloc_kernel(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address)
static inline void __pte_free_tlb(struct mmu_gather *tlb, pgtable_t page,
unsigned long address)
{
pgtable_page_dtor(page);
__free_page(page);
}
@ -73,8 +74,9 @@ static inline struct page *pte_alloc_one(struct mm_struct *mm,
return page;
}
extern inline void pte_free(struct mm_struct *mm, struct page *page)
static inline void pte_free(struct mm_struct *mm, struct page *page)
{
pgtable_page_dtor(page);
__free_page(page);
}

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@ -21,17 +21,19 @@ $(obj)/linux.bin.gz: $(obj)/linux.bin FORCE
quiet_cmd_cp = CP $< $@$2
cmd_cp = cat $< >$@$2 || (rm -f $@ && echo false)
quiet_cmd_strip = STRIP $@
quiet_cmd_strip = STRIP $< $@$2
cmd_strip = $(STRIP) -K microblaze_start -K _end -K __log_buf \
-K _fdt_start vmlinux -o $@
-K _fdt_start $< -o $@$2
UIMAGE_LOADADDR = $(CONFIG_KERNEL_BASE_ADDR)
UIMAGE_IN = $@
UIMAGE_OUT = $@.ub
$(obj)/simpleImage.%: vmlinux FORCE
$(call if_changed,cp,.unstrip)
$(call if_changed,objcopy)
$(call if_changed,uimage)
$(call if_changed,strip)
@echo 'Kernel: $@ is ready' ' (#'`cat .version`')'
$(call if_changed,strip,.strip)
@echo 'Kernel: $(UIMAGE_OUT) is ready' ' (#'`cat .version`')'
clean-files += simpleImage.*.unstrip linux.bin.ub dts/*.dtb

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@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ath79_ddr_ctrl_init);
void ath79_ddr_wb_flush(u32 reg)
{
void __iomem *flush_reg = ath79_ddr_wb_flush_base + reg;
void __iomem *flush_reg = ath79_ddr_wb_flush_base + (reg * 4);
/* Flush the DDR write buffer. */
__raw_writel(0x1, flush_reg);

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@ -249,12 +249,6 @@ static int __init bcm47xx_cpu_fixes(void)
*/
if (bcm47xx_bus.bcma.bus.chipinfo.id == BCMA_CHIP_ID_BCM4706)
cpu_wait = NULL;
/*
* BCM47XX Erratum "R10: PCIe Transactions Periodically Fail"
* Enable ExternalSync for sync instruction to take effect
*/
set_c0_config7(MIPS_CONF7_ES);
break;
#endif
}

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@ -606,8 +606,6 @@
#define MIPS_CONF7_WII (_ULCAST_(1) << 31)
#define MIPS_CONF7_RPS (_ULCAST_(1) << 2)
/* ExternalSync */
#define MIPS_CONF7_ES (_ULCAST_(1) << 8)
#define MIPS_CONF7_IAR (_ULCAST_(1) << 10)
#define MIPS_CONF7_AR (_ULCAST_(1) << 16)
@ -2015,7 +2013,6 @@ __BUILD_SET_C0(status)
__BUILD_SET_C0(cause)
__BUILD_SET_C0(config)
__BUILD_SET_C0(config5)
__BUILD_SET_C0(config7)
__BUILD_SET_C0(intcontrol)
__BUILD_SET_C0(intctl)
__BUILD_SET_C0(srsmap)

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@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static inline void pci_resource_to_user(const struct pci_dev *dev, int bar,
phys_addr_t size = resource_size(rsrc);
*start = fixup_bigphys_addr(rsrc->start, size);
*end = rsrc->start + size;
*end = rsrc->start + size - 1;
}
/*

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@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ struct mips_fpu_struct {
#define NUM_DSP_REGS 6
typedef __u32 dspreg_t;
typedef unsigned long dspreg_t;
struct mips_dsp_state {
dspreg_t dspr[NUM_DSP_REGS];

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@ -878,7 +878,7 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
goto out;
}
dregs = __get_dsp_regs(child);
tmp = (unsigned long) (dregs[addr - DSP_BASE]);
tmp = dregs[addr - DSP_BASE];
break;
}
case DSP_CONTROL:

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@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
goto out;
}
dregs = __get_dsp_regs(child);
tmp = (unsigned long) (dregs[addr - DSP_BASE]);
tmp = dregs[addr - DSP_BASE];
break;
}
case DSP_CONTROL:

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@ -4,12 +4,12 @@
#include "libgcc.h"
/*
* GCC 7 suboptimally generates __multi3 calls for mips64r6, so for that
* specific case only we'll implement it here.
* GCC 7 & older can suboptimally generate __multi3 calls for mips64r6, so for
* that specific case only we implement that intrinsic here.
*
* See https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=82981
*/
#if defined(CONFIG_64BIT) && defined(CONFIG_CPU_MIPSR6) && (__GNUC__ == 7)
#if defined(CONFIG_64BIT) && defined(CONFIG_CPU_MIPSR6) && (__GNUC__ < 8)
/* multiply 64-bit values, low 64-bits returned */
static inline long long notrace dmulu(long long a, long long b)

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@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ config PREFETCH
config MLONGCALLS
bool "Enable the -mlong-calls compiler option for big kernels"
def_bool y if (!MODULES)
default y
depends on PA8X00
help
If you configure the kernel to include many drivers built-in instead

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@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef __ASM_BARRIER_H
#define __ASM_BARRIER_H
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
/* The synchronize caches instruction executes as a nop on systems in
which all memory references are performed in order. */
#define synchronize_caches() __asm__ __volatile__ ("sync" : : : "memory")
#if defined(CONFIG_SMP)
#define mb() do { synchronize_caches(); } while (0)
#define rmb() mb()
#define wmb() mb()
#define dma_rmb() mb()
#define dma_wmb() mb()
#else
#define mb() barrier()
#define rmb() barrier()
#define wmb() barrier()
#define dma_rmb() barrier()
#define dma_wmb() barrier()
#endif
#define __smp_mb() mb()
#define __smp_rmb() mb()
#define __smp_wmb() mb()
#include <asm-generic/barrier.h>
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* __ASM_BARRIER_H */

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@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ static inline void arch_spin_lock_flags(arch_spinlock_t *x,
{
volatile unsigned int *a;
mb();
a = __ldcw_align(x);
while (__ldcw(a) == 0)
while (*a == 0)
@ -31,16 +30,15 @@ static inline void arch_spin_lock_flags(arch_spinlock_t *x,
local_irq_disable();
} else
cpu_relax();
mb();
}
static inline void arch_spin_unlock(arch_spinlock_t *x)
{
volatile unsigned int *a;
mb();
a = __ldcw_align(x);
*a = 1;
mb();
*a = 1;
}
static inline int arch_spin_trylock(arch_spinlock_t *x)
@ -48,10 +46,8 @@ static inline int arch_spin_trylock(arch_spinlock_t *x)
volatile unsigned int *a;
int ret;
mb();
a = __ldcw_align(x);
ret = __ldcw(a) != 0;
mb();
return ret;
}

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@ -481,6 +481,8 @@
/* Release pa_tlb_lock lock without reloading lock address. */
.macro tlb_unlock0 spc,tmp
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
or,COND(=) %r0,\spc,%r0
sync
or,COND(=) %r0,\spc,%r0
stw \spc,0(\tmp)
#endif

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@ -354,6 +354,7 @@ ENDPROC(flush_data_cache_local)
.macro tlb_unlock la,flags,tmp
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
ldi 1,\tmp
sync
stw \tmp,0(\la)
mtsm \flags
#endif

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@ -627,11 +627,12 @@ cas_action:
stw %r1, 4(%sr2,%r20)
#endif
/* The load and store could fail */
1: ldw,ma 0(%r26), %r28
1: ldw 0(%r26), %r28
sub,<> %r28, %r25, %r0
2: stw,ma %r24, 0(%r26)
2: stw %r24, 0(%r26)
/* Free lock */
stw,ma %r20, 0(%sr2,%r20)
sync
stw %r20, 0(%sr2,%r20)
#if ENABLE_LWS_DEBUG
/* Clear thread register indicator */
stw %r0, 4(%sr2,%r20)
@ -645,6 +646,7 @@ cas_action:
3:
/* Error occurred on load or store */
/* Free lock */
sync
stw %r20, 0(%sr2,%r20)
#if ENABLE_LWS_DEBUG
stw %r0, 4(%sr2,%r20)
@ -794,30 +796,30 @@ cas2_action:
ldo 1(%r0),%r28
/* 8bit CAS */
13: ldb,ma 0(%r26), %r29
13: ldb 0(%r26), %r29
sub,= %r29, %r25, %r0
b,n cas2_end
14: stb,ma %r24, 0(%r26)
14: stb %r24, 0(%r26)
b cas2_end
copy %r0, %r28
nop
nop
/* 16bit CAS */
15: ldh,ma 0(%r26), %r29
15: ldh 0(%r26), %r29
sub,= %r29, %r25, %r0
b,n cas2_end
16: sth,ma %r24, 0(%r26)
16: sth %r24, 0(%r26)
b cas2_end
copy %r0, %r28
nop
nop
/* 32bit CAS */
17: ldw,ma 0(%r26), %r29
17: ldw 0(%r26), %r29
sub,= %r29, %r25, %r0
b,n cas2_end
18: stw,ma %r24, 0(%r26)
18: stw %r24, 0(%r26)
b cas2_end
copy %r0, %r28
nop
@ -825,10 +827,10 @@ cas2_action:
/* 64bit CAS */
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
19: ldd,ma 0(%r26), %r29
19: ldd 0(%r26), %r29
sub,*= %r29, %r25, %r0
b,n cas2_end
20: std,ma %r24, 0(%r26)
20: std %r24, 0(%r26)
copy %r0, %r28
#else
/* Compare first word */
@ -846,7 +848,8 @@ cas2_action:
cas2_end:
/* Free lock */
stw,ma %r20, 0(%sr2,%r20)
sync
stw %r20, 0(%sr2,%r20)
/* Enable interrupts */
ssm PSW_SM_I, %r0
/* Return to userspace, set no error */
@ -856,6 +859,7 @@ cas2_end:
22:
/* Error occurred on load or store */
/* Free lock */
sync
stw %r20, 0(%sr2,%r20)
ssm PSW_SM_I, %r0
ldo 1(%r0),%r28

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@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ start_here:
tovirt(r6,r6)
lis r5, abatron_pteptrs@h
ori r5, r5, abatron_pteptrs@l
stw r5, 0xf0(r0) /* Must match your Abatron config file */
stw r5, 0xf0(0) /* Must match your Abatron config file */
tophys(r5,r5)
stw r6, 0(r5)

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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/bootmem.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/irq.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/of.h>

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@ -69,14 +69,14 @@ static inline void slb_shadow_update(unsigned long ea, int ssize,
* updating it. No write barriers are needed here, provided
* we only update the current CPU's SLB shadow buffer.
*/
p->save_area[index].esid = 0;
p->save_area[index].vsid = cpu_to_be64(mk_vsid_data(ea, ssize, flags));
p->save_area[index].esid = cpu_to_be64(mk_esid_data(ea, ssize, index));
WRITE_ONCE(p->save_area[index].esid, 0);
WRITE_ONCE(p->save_area[index].vsid, cpu_to_be64(mk_vsid_data(ea, ssize, flags)));
WRITE_ONCE(p->save_area[index].esid, cpu_to_be64(mk_esid_data(ea, ssize, index)));
}
static inline void slb_shadow_clear(enum slb_index index)
{
get_slb_shadow()->save_area[index].esid = 0;
WRITE_ONCE(get_slb_shadow()->save_area[index].esid, 0);
}
static inline void create_shadowed_slbe(unsigned long ea, int ssize,

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@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include <asm/time.h>
#include <platforms/chrp/chrp.h>
extern spinlock_t rtc_lock;
#define NVRAM_AS0 0x74
@ -62,7 +64,7 @@ long __init chrp_time_init(void)
return 0;
}
int chrp_cmos_clock_read(int addr)
static int chrp_cmos_clock_read(int addr)
{
if (nvram_as1 != 0)
outb(addr>>8, nvram_as1);
@ -70,7 +72,7 @@ int chrp_cmos_clock_read(int addr)
return (inb(nvram_data));
}
void chrp_cmos_clock_write(unsigned long val, int addr)
static void chrp_cmos_clock_write(unsigned long val, int addr)
{
if (nvram_as1 != 0)
outb(addr>>8, nvram_as1);

View File

@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
*/
#define HW_BROADWAY_ICR 0x00
#define HW_BROADWAY_IMR 0x04
#define HW_STARLET_ICR 0x08
#define HW_STARLET_IMR 0x0c
/*
@ -74,6 +76,9 @@ static void hlwd_pic_unmask(struct irq_data *d)
void __iomem *io_base = irq_data_get_irq_chip_data(d);
setbits32(io_base + HW_BROADWAY_IMR, 1 << irq);
/* Make sure the ARM (aka. Starlet) doesn't handle this interrupt. */
clrbits32(io_base + HW_STARLET_IMR, 1 << irq);
}

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@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ void __init bootx_init(unsigned long r3, unsigned long r4)
boot_infos_t *bi = (boot_infos_t *) r4;
unsigned long hdr;
unsigned long space;
unsigned long ptr, x;
unsigned long ptr;
char *model;
unsigned long offset = reloc_offset();
@ -561,6 +561,8 @@ void __init bootx_init(unsigned long r3, unsigned long r4)
* MMU switched OFF, so this should not be useful anymore.
*/
if (bi->version < 4) {
unsigned long x __maybe_unused;
bootx_printf("Touching pages...\n");
/*

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@ -359,6 +359,7 @@ static int pmac_late_init(void)
}
machine_late_initcall(powermac, pmac_late_init);
void note_bootable_part(dev_t dev, int part, int goodness);
/*
* This is __init_refok because we check for "initializing" before
* touching any of the __init sensitive things and "initializing"

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@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ struct hws_basic_entry {
struct hws_diag_entry {
unsigned int def:16; /* 0-15 Data Entry Format */
unsigned int R:14; /* 16-19 and 20-30 reserved */
unsigned int R:15; /* 16-19 and 20-30 reserved */
unsigned int I:1; /* 31 entry valid or invalid */
u8 data[]; /* Machine-dependent sample data */
} __packed;
@ -129,7 +129,9 @@ struct hws_trailer_entry {
unsigned int f:1; /* 0 - Block Full Indicator */
unsigned int a:1; /* 1 - Alert request control */
unsigned int t:1; /* 2 - Timestamp format */
unsigned long long:61; /* 3 - 63: Reserved */
unsigned int :29; /* 3 - 31: Reserved */
unsigned int bsdes:16; /* 32-47: size of basic SDE */
unsigned int dsdes:16; /* 48-63: size of diagnostic SDE */
};
unsigned long long flags; /* 0 - 63: All indicators */
};

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@ -261,7 +261,6 @@ struct qdio_outbuf_state {
void *user;
};
#define QDIO_OUTBUF_STATE_FLAG_NONE 0x00
#define QDIO_OUTBUF_STATE_FLAG_PENDING 0x01
#define CHSC_AC1_INITIATE_INPUTQ 0x80

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@ -459,6 +459,8 @@ static inline int do_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int access)
/* No reason to continue if interrupted by SIGKILL. */
if ((fault & VM_FAULT_RETRY) && fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
fault = VM_FAULT_SIGNAL;
if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT)
goto out_up;
goto out;
}
if (unlikely(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR))

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@ -522,8 +522,6 @@ static void bpf_jit_epilogue(struct bpf_jit *jit)
/* br %r1 */
_EMIT2(0x07f1);
} else {
/* larl %r1,.+14 */
EMIT6_PCREL_RILB(0xc0000000, REG_1, jit->prg + 14);
/* ex 0,S390_lowcore.br_r1_tampoline */
EMIT4_DISP(0x44000000, REG_0, REG_0,
offsetof(struct _lowcore, br_r1_trampoline));

View File

@ -412,6 +412,8 @@ int arch_setup_msi_irqs(struct pci_dev *pdev, int nvec, int type)
hwirq = 0;
for_each_pci_msi_entry(msi, pdev) {
rc = -EIO;
if (hwirq >= msi_vecs)
break;
irq = irq_alloc_desc(0); /* Alloc irq on node 0 */
if (irq < 0)
goto out_msi;

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@ -79,24 +79,33 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_compat)
ASM_CLAC /* Clear AC after saving FLAGS */
pushq $__USER32_CS /* pt_regs->cs */
xorq %r8,%r8
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->ip = 0 (placeholder) */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->ip = 0 (placeholder) */
pushq %rax /* pt_regs->orig_ax */
pushq %rdi /* pt_regs->di */
pushq %rsi /* pt_regs->si */
pushq %rdx /* pt_regs->dx */
pushq %rcx /* pt_regs->cx */
pushq $-ENOSYS /* pt_regs->ax */
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r8 = 0 */
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r9 = 0 */
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r10 = 0 */
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r11 = 0 */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r8 = 0 */
xorq %r8, %r8 /* nospec r8 */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r9 = 0 */
xorq %r9, %r9 /* nospec r9 */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r10 = 0 */
xorq %r10, %r10 /* nospec r10 */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r11 = 0 */
xorq %r11, %r11 /* nospec r11 */
pushq %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */
xorl %ebx, %ebx /* nospec rbx */
pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp (will be overwritten) */
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r12 = 0 */
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r13 = 0 */
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r14 = 0 */
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r15 = 0 */
xorl %ebp, %ebp /* nospec rbp */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r12 = 0 */
xorq %r12, %r12 /* nospec r12 */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r13 = 0 */
xorq %r13, %r13 /* nospec r13 */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r14 = 0 */
xorq %r14, %r14 /* nospec r14 */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r15 = 0 */
xorq %r15, %r15 /* nospec r15 */
cld
/*
@ -185,17 +194,26 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSCALL_compat)
pushq %rdx /* pt_regs->dx */
pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->cx (stashed in bp) */
pushq $-ENOSYS /* pt_regs->ax */
xorq %r8,%r8
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r8 = 0 */
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r9 = 0 */
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r10 = 0 */
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r11 = 0 */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r8 = 0 */
xorq %r8, %r8 /* nospec r8 */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r9 = 0 */
xorq %r9, %r9 /* nospec r9 */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r10 = 0 */
xorq %r10, %r10 /* nospec r10 */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r11 = 0 */
xorq %r11, %r11 /* nospec r11 */
pushq %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */
xorl %ebx, %ebx /* nospec rbx */
pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp (will be overwritten) */
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r12 = 0 */
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r13 = 0 */
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r14 = 0 */
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r15 = 0 */
xorl %ebp, %ebp /* nospec rbp */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r12 = 0 */
xorq %r12, %r12 /* nospec r12 */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r13 = 0 */
xorq %r13, %r13 /* nospec r13 */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r14 = 0 */
xorq %r14, %r14 /* nospec r14 */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r15 = 0 */
xorq %r15, %r15 /* nospec r15 */
/*
* User mode is traced as though IRQs are on, and SYSENTER
@ -292,17 +310,26 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat)
pushq %rdx /* pt_regs->dx */
pushq %rcx /* pt_regs->cx */
pushq $-ENOSYS /* pt_regs->ax */
xorq %r8,%r8
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r8 = 0 */
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r9 = 0 */
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r10 = 0 */
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r11 = 0 */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r8 = 0 */
xorq %r8, %r8 /* nospec r8 */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r9 = 0 */
xorq %r9, %r9 /* nospec r9 */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r10 = 0 */
xorq %r10, %r10 /* nospec r10 */
pushq $0 /* pt_regs->r11 = 0 */
xorq %r11, %r11 /* nospec r11 */
pushq %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */
xorl %ebx, %ebx /* nospec rbx */
pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */
xorl %ebp, %ebp /* nospec rbp */
pushq %r12 /* pt_regs->r12 */
xorq %r12, %r12 /* nospec r12 */
pushq %r13 /* pt_regs->r13 */
xorq %r13, %r13 /* nospec r13 */
pushq %r14 /* pt_regs->r14 */
xorq %r14, %r14 /* nospec r14 */
pushq %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */
xorq %r15, %r15 /* nospec r15 */
cld
/*

View File

@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
#ifndef _ASM_X86_MACH_DEFAULT_APM_H
#define _ASM_X86_MACH_DEFAULT_APM_H
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#ifdef APM_ZERO_SEGS
# define APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS \
"pushl %%ds\n\t" \
@ -31,6 +33,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in, u32 ecx_in,
* N.B. We do NOT need a cld after the BIOS call
* because we always save and restore the flags.
*/
firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start();
__asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS
"pushl %%edi\n\t"
"pushl %%ebp\n\t"
@ -43,6 +46,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in, u32 ecx_in,
"=S" (*esi)
: "a" (func), "b" (ebx_in), "c" (ecx_in)
: "memory", "cc");
firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end();
}
static inline u8 apm_bios_call_simple_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in,
@ -55,6 +59,7 @@ static inline u8 apm_bios_call_simple_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in,
* N.B. We do NOT need a cld after the BIOS call
* because we always save and restore the flags.
*/
firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start();
__asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS
"pushl %%edi\n\t"
"pushl %%ebp\n\t"
@ -67,6 +72,7 @@ static inline u8 apm_bios_call_simple_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in,
"=S" (si)
: "a" (func), "b" (ebx_in), "c" (ecx_in)
: "memory", "cc");
firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end();
return error;
}

View File

@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index,
asm volatile ("cmp %1,%2; sbb %0,%0;"
:"=r" (mask)
:"r"(size),"r" (index)
:"g"(size),"r" (index)
:"cc");
return mask;
}

View File

@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ enum cpuid_leafs
CPUID_8000_000A_EDX,
CPUID_7_ECX,
CPUID_8000_0007_EBX,
CPUID_7_EDX,
};
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES
@ -78,8 +79,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32];
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 15, feature_bit) || \
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \
REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK || \
BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18))
BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19))
#define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET(feature_bit) \
( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 0, feature_bit) || \
@ -100,8 +102,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32];
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 15, feature_bit) || \
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \
CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \
DISABLED_MASK_CHECK || \
BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18))
BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19))
#define cpu_has(c, bit) \
(__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 : \

View File

@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
/*
* Defines x86 CPU feature bits
*/
#define NCAPINTS 18 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
#define NCAPINTS 19 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
#define NBUGINTS 1 /* N 32-bit bug flags */
/*
@ -193,14 +193,29 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE ( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */
#define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT ( 7*32+15) /* Intel Processor Trace */
#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT ( 7*32+15) /* Intel Processor Trace */
#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */
#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */
#define X86_FEATURE_SSBD ( 7*32+17) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+29) /* Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+30) /* AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
/* Because the ALTERNATIVE scheme is for members of the X86_FEATURE club... */
#define X86_FEATURE_KAISER ( 7*32+31) /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION w/o nokaiser */
#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled*/
#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW ( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
#define X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD ( 7*32+24) /* "" AMD SSBD implementation */
#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS ( 7*32+25) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+26) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP ( 7*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN ( 7*32+28) /* "" CPU is AMD family 0x17 (Zen) */
#define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV ( 7*32+29) /* "" L1TF workaround PTE inversion */
/* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
#define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
#define X86_FEATURE_VNMI ( 8*32+ 1) /* Intel Virtual NMI */
@ -251,6 +266,10 @@
/* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (ebx), word 13 */
#define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO (13*32+0) /* CLZERO instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB (13*32+12) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS (13*32+14) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP (13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
#define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD (13*32+25) /* Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
/* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (eax), word 14 */
#define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM (14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */
@ -285,6 +304,16 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_SUCCOR (17*32+1) /* Uncorrectable error containment and recovery */
#define X86_FEATURE_SMCA (17*32+3) /* Scalable MCA */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
#define X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D (18*32+28) /* Flush L1D cache */
#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */
#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (18*32+31) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
/*
* BUG word(s)
*/
@ -302,5 +331,7 @@
#define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1 X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */
#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
#define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
#define X86_BUG_L1TF X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */

View File

@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
#define DISABLED_MASK15 0
#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE)
#define DISABLED_MASK17 0
#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18)
#define DISABLED_MASK18 0
#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
#endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */

View File

@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
/*
* We map the EFI regions needed for runtime services non-contiguously,
@ -41,8 +42,10 @@ extern unsigned long asmlinkage efi_call_phys(void *, ...);
({ \
efi_status_t __s; \
kernel_fpu_begin(); \
firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(); \
__s = ((efi_##f##_t __attribute__((regparm(0)))*) \
efi.systab->runtime->f)(args); \
firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(); \
kernel_fpu_end(); \
__s; \
})
@ -51,8 +54,10 @@ extern unsigned long asmlinkage efi_call_phys(void *, ...);
#define __efi_call_virt(f, args...) \
({ \
kernel_fpu_begin(); \
firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(); \
((efi_##f##_t __attribute__((regparm(0)))*) \
efi.systab->runtime->f)(args); \
firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(); \
kernel_fpu_end(); \
})
@ -73,7 +78,9 @@ extern u64 asmlinkage efi_call(void *fp, ...);
efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(); \
preempt_disable(); \
__kernel_fpu_begin(); \
firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(); \
__s = efi_call((void *)efi.systab->runtime->f, __VA_ARGS__); \
firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(); \
__kernel_fpu_end(); \
preempt_enable(); \
__s; \

View File

@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
*/
#define INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH 0x0E
#define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM 0x0F
#define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM_L 0x16
#define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_PENRYN 0x17
@ -20,6 +21,7 @@
#define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM 0x1E
#define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EP 0x1A
#define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EX 0x2E
#define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE 0x25
#define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE2 0x1F
#define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EP 0x2C
@ -36,9 +38,9 @@
#define INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E 0x46
#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE 0x3D
#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D 0x56
#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E 0x47
#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X 0x4F
#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D 0x56
#define INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE 0x4E
#define INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP 0x5E
@ -56,13 +58,15 @@
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT1 0x37 /* BayTrail/BYT / Valleyview */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2 0x4D /* Avaton/Rangely */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT 0x4C /* CherryTrail / Braswell */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD1 0x4A /* Tangier */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD2 0x5A /* Annidale */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD 0x4A /* Tangier */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD 0x5A /* Annidale */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT 0x5C
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON 0x5F /* Goldmont Microserver */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE 0x7A
/* Xeon Phi */
#define INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL 0x57 /* Knights Landing */
#define INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM 0x85 /* Knights Mill */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_INTEL_FAMILY_H */

View File

@ -8,7 +8,9 @@
* Interrupt control:
*/
static inline unsigned long native_save_fl(void)
/* Declaration required for gcc < 4.9 to prevent -Werror=missing-prototypes */
extern inline unsigned long native_save_fl(void);
extern inline unsigned long native_save_fl(void)
{
unsigned long flags;
@ -26,7 +28,8 @@ static inline unsigned long native_save_fl(void)
return flags;
}
static inline void native_restore_fl(unsigned long flags)
extern inline void native_restore_fl(unsigned long flags);
extern inline void native_restore_fl(unsigned long flags)
{
asm volatile("push %0 ; popf"
: /* no output */

View File

@ -3,12 +3,18 @@
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
/*
* The x86 doesn't have a mmu context, but
* we put the segment information here.
* x86 has arch-specific MMU state beyond what lives in mm_struct.
*/
typedef struct {
/*
* ctx_id uniquely identifies this mm_struct. A ctx_id will never
* be reused, and zero is not a valid ctx_id.
*/
u64 ctx_id;
#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
struct ldt_struct *ldt;
#endif
@ -24,6 +30,11 @@ typedef struct {
atomic_t perf_rdpmc_allowed; /* nonzero if rdpmc is allowed */
} mm_context_t;
#define INIT_MM_CONTEXT(mm) \
.context = { \
.ctx_id = 1, \
}
void leave_mm(int cpu);
#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMU_H */

View File

@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
#include <asm/mpx.h>
extern atomic64_t last_mm_ctx_id;
#ifndef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
static inline void paravirt_activate_mm(struct mm_struct *prev,
struct mm_struct *next)
@ -52,15 +55,15 @@ struct ldt_struct {
/*
* Used for LDT copy/destruction.
*/
int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm);
void destroy_context(struct mm_struct *mm);
int init_new_context_ldt(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm);
void destroy_context_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm);
#else /* CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL */
static inline int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct mm_struct *mm)
static inline int init_new_context_ldt(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct mm_struct *mm)
{
return 0;
}
static inline void destroy_context(struct mm_struct *mm) {}
static inline void destroy_context_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm) {}
#endif
static inline void load_mm_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm)
@ -102,6 +105,17 @@ static inline void enter_lazy_tlb(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *tsk)
this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.state, TLBSTATE_LAZY);
}
static inline int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct mm_struct *mm)
{
mm->context.ctx_id = atomic64_inc_return(&last_mm_ctx_id);
return init_new_context_ldt(tsk, mm);
}
static inline void destroy_context(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
destroy_context_ldt(mm);
}
extern void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
struct task_struct *tsk);

View File

@ -32,6 +32,15 @@
#define EFER_FFXSR (1<<_EFER_FFXSR)
/* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */
#define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL 0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */
#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP (1 << 1) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT 2 /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (1 << SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
#define PRED_CMD_IBPB (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
#define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0 0x000000c1
#define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR1 0x000000c2
#define MSR_FSB_FREQ 0x000000cd
@ -45,6 +54,16 @@
#define SNB_C3_AUTO_UNDEMOTE (1UL << 28)
#define MSR_MTRRcap 0x000000fe
#define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a
#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO (1 << 0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL (1 << 1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */
#define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO (1 << 4) /*
* Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
* attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
* control required.
*/
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL 0x00000119
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3 0x0000011e
@ -132,6 +151,7 @@
/* DEBUGCTLMSR bits (others vary by model): */
#define DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR (1UL << 0) /* last branch recording */
#define DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF_SHIFT 1
#define DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF (1UL << 1) /* single-step on branches */
#define DEBUGCTLMSR_TR (1UL << 6)
#define DEBUGCTLMSR_BTS (1UL << 7)
@ -308,6 +328,8 @@
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSOPDATA4 0xc001103d
#define MSR_AMD64_IBS_REG_COUNT_MAX 8 /* includes MSR_AMD64_IBSBRTARGET */
#define MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL 0xc001011f
/* Fam 16h MSRs */
#define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTL 0xc0010230
#define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTR 0xc0010231

View File

@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
#include <asm/msr-index.h>
/*
* Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
@ -171,6 +172,14 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
};
/* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
enum ssb_mitigation {
SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE,
SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE,
SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL,
SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP,
};
extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
@ -194,6 +203,51 @@ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
#endif
}
static __always_inline
void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature)
{
asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "wrmsr", %c[feature])
: : "c" (msr),
"a" ((u32)val),
"d" ((u32)(val >> 32)),
[feature] "i" (feature)
: "memory");
}
static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
{
u64 val = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, val, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
}
/* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
/*
* With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
* before calling into firmware.
*
* (Implemented as CPP macros due to header hell.)
*/
#define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start() \
do { \
u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; \
\
preempt_disable(); \
alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \
X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \
} while (0)
#define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end() \
do { \
u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base; \
\
alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \
X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \
preempt_enable(); \
} while (0)
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
/*

View File

@ -27,8 +27,13 @@
#define N_EXCEPTION_STACKS 1
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
/* 44=32+12, the limit we can fit into an unsigned long pfn */
#define __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT 44
/*
* This is beyond the 44 bit limit imposed by the 32bit long pfns,
* but we need the full mask to make sure inverted PROT_NONE
* entries have all the host bits set in a guest.
* The real limit is still 44 bits.
*/
#define __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT 52
#define __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT 32
#else /* !CONFIG_X86_PAE */

View File

@ -77,4 +77,21 @@ static inline unsigned long pte_bitop(unsigned long value, unsigned int rightshi
#define __pte_to_swp_entry(pte) ((swp_entry_t) { (pte).pte_low })
#define __swp_entry_to_pte(x) ((pte_t) { .pte = (x).val })
/* No inverted PFNs on 2 level page tables */
static inline u64 protnone_mask(u64 val)
{
return 0;
}
static inline u64 flip_protnone_guard(u64 oldval, u64 val, u64 mask)
{
return val;
}
static inline bool __pte_needs_invert(u64 val)
{
return false;
}
#endif /* _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_2LEVEL_H */

View File

@ -177,11 +177,44 @@ static inline pmd_t native_pmdp_get_and_clear(pmd_t *pmdp)
#endif
/* Encode and de-code a swap entry */
#define SWP_TYPE_BITS 5
#define SWP_OFFSET_FIRST_BIT (_PAGE_BIT_PROTNONE + 1)
/* We always extract/encode the offset by shifting it all the way up, and then down again */
#define SWP_OFFSET_SHIFT (SWP_OFFSET_FIRST_BIT + SWP_TYPE_BITS)
#define MAX_SWAPFILES_CHECK() BUILD_BUG_ON(MAX_SWAPFILES_SHIFT > 5)
#define __swp_type(x) (((x).val) & 0x1f)
#define __swp_offset(x) ((x).val >> 5)
#define __swp_entry(type, offset) ((swp_entry_t){(type) | (offset) << 5})
#define __pte_to_swp_entry(pte) ((swp_entry_t){ (pte).pte_high })
#define __swp_entry_to_pte(x) ((pte_t){ { .pte_high = (x).val } })
/*
* Normally, __swp_entry() converts from arch-independent swp_entry_t to
* arch-dependent swp_entry_t, and __swp_entry_to_pte() just stores the result
* to pte. But here we have 32bit swp_entry_t and 64bit pte, and need to use the
* whole 64 bits. Thus, we shift the "real" arch-dependent conversion to
* __swp_entry_to_pte() through the following helper macro based on 64bit
* __swp_entry().
*/
#define __swp_pteval_entry(type, offset) ((pteval_t) { \
(~(pteval_t)(offset) << SWP_OFFSET_SHIFT >> SWP_TYPE_BITS) \
| ((pteval_t)(type) << (64 - SWP_TYPE_BITS)) })
#define __swp_entry_to_pte(x) ((pte_t){ .pte = \
__swp_pteval_entry(__swp_type(x), __swp_offset(x)) })
/*
* Analogically, __pte_to_swp_entry() doesn't just extract the arch-dependent
* swp_entry_t, but also has to convert it from 64bit to the 32bit
* intermediate representation, using the following macros based on 64bit
* __swp_type() and __swp_offset().
*/
#define __pteval_swp_type(x) ((unsigned long)((x).pte >> (64 - SWP_TYPE_BITS)))
#define __pteval_swp_offset(x) ((unsigned long)(~((x).pte) << SWP_TYPE_BITS >> SWP_OFFSET_SHIFT))
#define __pte_to_swp_entry(pte) (__swp_entry(__pteval_swp_type(pte), \
__pteval_swp_offset(pte)))
#include <asm/pgtable-invert.h>
#endif /* _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_3LEVEL_H */

View File

@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef _ASM_PGTABLE_INVERT_H
#define _ASM_PGTABLE_INVERT_H 1
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
/*
* A clear pte value is special, and doesn't get inverted.
*
* Note that even users that only pass a pgprot_t (rather
* than a full pte) won't trigger the special zero case,
* because even PAGE_NONE has _PAGE_PROTNONE | _PAGE_ACCESSED
* set. So the all zero case really is limited to just the
* cleared page table entry case.
*/
static inline bool __pte_needs_invert(u64 val)
{
return val && !(val & _PAGE_PRESENT);
}
/* Get a mask to xor with the page table entry to get the correct pfn. */
static inline u64 protnone_mask(u64 val)
{
return __pte_needs_invert(val) ? ~0ull : 0;
}
static inline u64 flip_protnone_guard(u64 oldval, u64 val, u64 mask)
{
/*
* When a PTE transitions from NONE to !NONE or vice-versa
* invert the PFN part to stop speculation.
* pte_pfn undoes this when needed.
*/
if (__pte_needs_invert(oldval) != __pte_needs_invert(val))
val = (val & ~mask) | (~val & mask);
return val;
}
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif

View File

@ -148,19 +148,34 @@ static inline int pte_special(pte_t pte)
return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_SPECIAL;
}
/* Entries that were set to PROT_NONE are inverted */
static inline u64 protnone_mask(u64 val);
static inline unsigned long pte_pfn(pte_t pte)
{
return (pte_val(pte) & PTE_PFN_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
phys_addr_t pfn = pte_val(pte);
pfn ^= protnone_mask(pfn);
return (pfn & PTE_PFN_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
}
static inline unsigned long pmd_pfn(pmd_t pmd)
{
return (pmd_val(pmd) & pmd_pfn_mask(pmd)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
phys_addr_t pfn = pmd_val(pmd);
pfn ^= protnone_mask(pfn);
return (pfn & pmd_pfn_mask(pmd)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
}
static inline unsigned long pud_pfn(pud_t pud)
{
return (pud_val(pud) & pud_pfn_mask(pud)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
phys_addr_t pfn = pud_val(pud);
pfn ^= protnone_mask(pfn);
return (pfn & pud_pfn_mask(pud)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
}
static inline unsigned long pgd_pfn(pgd_t pgd)
{
return (pgd_val(pgd) & PTE_PFN_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
}
#define pte_page(pte) pfn_to_page(pte_pfn(pte))
@ -305,11 +320,6 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd)
return pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_RW);
}
static inline pmd_t pmd_mknotpresent(pmd_t pmd)
{
return pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_PROTNONE);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY
static inline int pte_soft_dirty(pte_t pte)
{
@ -359,19 +369,58 @@ static inline pgprotval_t massage_pgprot(pgprot_t pgprot)
static inline pte_t pfn_pte(unsigned long page_nr, pgprot_t pgprot)
{
return __pte(((phys_addr_t)page_nr << PAGE_SHIFT) |
massage_pgprot(pgprot));
phys_addr_t pfn = (phys_addr_t)page_nr << PAGE_SHIFT;
pfn ^= protnone_mask(pgprot_val(pgprot));
pfn &= PTE_PFN_MASK;
return __pte(pfn | massage_pgprot(pgprot));
}
static inline pmd_t pfn_pmd(unsigned long page_nr, pgprot_t pgprot)
{
return __pmd(((phys_addr_t)page_nr << PAGE_SHIFT) |
massage_pgprot(pgprot));
phys_addr_t pfn = (phys_addr_t)page_nr << PAGE_SHIFT;
pfn ^= protnone_mask(pgprot_val(pgprot));
pfn &= PHYSICAL_PMD_PAGE_MASK;
return __pmd(pfn | massage_pgprot(pgprot));
}
static inline pud_t pfn_pud(unsigned long page_nr, pgprot_t pgprot)
{
phys_addr_t pfn = page_nr << PAGE_SHIFT;
pfn ^= protnone_mask(pgprot_val(pgprot));
pfn &= PHYSICAL_PUD_PAGE_MASK;
return __pud(pfn | massage_pgprot(pgprot));
}
static inline pmd_t pmd_mknotpresent(pmd_t pmd)
{
return pfn_pmd(pmd_pfn(pmd),
__pgprot(pmd_flags(pmd) & ~(_PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_PROTNONE)));
}
static inline pud_t pud_set_flags(pud_t pud, pudval_t set)
{
pudval_t v = native_pud_val(pud);
return __pud(v | set);
}
static inline pud_t pud_clear_flags(pud_t pud, pudval_t clear)
{
pudval_t v = native_pud_val(pud);
return __pud(v & ~clear);
}
static inline pud_t pud_mkhuge(pud_t pud)
{
return pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_PSE);
}
static inline u64 flip_protnone_guard(u64 oldval, u64 val, u64 mask);
static inline pte_t pte_modify(pte_t pte, pgprot_t newprot)
{
pteval_t val = pte_val(pte);
pteval_t val = pte_val(pte), oldval = val;
/*
* Chop off the NX bit (if present), and add the NX portion of
@ -379,17 +428,17 @@ static inline pte_t pte_modify(pte_t pte, pgprot_t newprot)
*/
val &= _PAGE_CHG_MASK;
val |= massage_pgprot(newprot) & ~_PAGE_CHG_MASK;
val = flip_protnone_guard(oldval, val, PTE_PFN_MASK);
return __pte(val);
}
static inline pmd_t pmd_modify(pmd_t pmd, pgprot_t newprot)
{
pmdval_t val = pmd_val(pmd);
pmdval_t val = pmd_val(pmd), oldval = val;
val &= _HPAGE_CHG_MASK;
val |= massage_pgprot(newprot) & ~_HPAGE_CHG_MASK;
val = flip_protnone_guard(oldval, val, PHYSICAL_PMD_PAGE_MASK);
return __pmd(val);
}
@ -534,8 +583,7 @@ static inline unsigned long pmd_page_vaddr(pmd_t pmd)
* Currently stuck as a macro due to indirect forward reference to
* linux/mmzone.h's __section_mem_map_addr() definition:
*/
#define pmd_page(pmd) \
pfn_to_page((pmd_val(pmd) & pmd_pfn_mask(pmd)) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
#define pmd_page(pmd) pfn_to_page(pmd_pfn(pmd))
/*
* the pmd page can be thought of an array like this: pmd_t[PTRS_PER_PMD]
@ -603,8 +651,7 @@ static inline unsigned long pud_page_vaddr(pud_t pud)
* Currently stuck as a macro due to indirect forward reference to
* linux/mmzone.h's __section_mem_map_addr() definition:
*/
#define pud_page(pud) \
pfn_to_page((pud_val(pud) & pud_pfn_mask(pud)) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
#define pud_page(pud) pfn_to_page(pud_pfn(pud))
/* Find an entry in the second-level page table.. */
static inline pmd_t *pmd_offset(pud_t *pud, unsigned long address)
@ -644,7 +691,7 @@ static inline unsigned long pgd_page_vaddr(pgd_t pgd)
* Currently stuck as a macro due to indirect forward reference to
* linux/mmzone.h's __section_mem_map_addr() definition:
*/
#define pgd_page(pgd) pfn_to_page(pgd_val(pgd) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
#define pgd_page(pgd) pfn_to_page(pgd_pfn(pgd))
/* to find an entry in a page-table-directory. */
static inline unsigned long pud_index(unsigned long address)
@ -926,6 +973,14 @@ static inline pte_t pte_swp_clear_soft_dirty(pte_t pte)
}
#endif
#define __HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED 1
extern bool pfn_modify_allowed(unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t prot);
static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)
{
return boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
}
#include <asm-generic/pgtable.h>
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */

View File

@ -163,18 +163,52 @@ static inline int pgd_large(pgd_t pgd) { return 0; }
#define pte_offset_map(dir, address) pte_offset_kernel((dir), (address))
#define pte_unmap(pte) ((void)(pte))/* NOP */
/* Encode and de-code a swap entry */
#define SWP_TYPE_BITS 5
#define SWP_OFFSET_SHIFT (_PAGE_BIT_PROTNONE + 1)
/*
* Encode and de-code a swap entry
*
* | ... | 11| 10| 9|8|7|6|5| 4| 3|2| 1|0| <- bit number
* | ... |SW3|SW2|SW1|G|L|D|A|CD|WT|U| W|P| <- bit names
* | TYPE (59-63) | ~OFFSET (9-58) |0|0|X|X| X| X|X|SD|0| <- swp entry
*
* G (8) is aliased and used as a PROT_NONE indicator for
* !present ptes. We need to start storing swap entries above
* there. We also need to avoid using A and D because of an
* erratum where they can be incorrectly set by hardware on
* non-present PTEs.
*
* SD (1) in swp entry is used to store soft dirty bit, which helps us
* remember soft dirty over page migration
*
* Bit 7 in swp entry should be 0 because pmd_present checks not only P,
* but also L and G.
*
* The offset is inverted by a binary not operation to make the high
* physical bits set.
*/
#define SWP_TYPE_BITS 5
#define SWP_OFFSET_FIRST_BIT (_PAGE_BIT_PROTNONE + 1)
/* We always extract/encode the offset by shifting it all the way up, and then down again */
#define SWP_OFFSET_SHIFT (SWP_OFFSET_FIRST_BIT+SWP_TYPE_BITS)
#define MAX_SWAPFILES_CHECK() BUILD_BUG_ON(MAX_SWAPFILES_SHIFT > SWP_TYPE_BITS)
#define __swp_type(x) (((x).val >> (_PAGE_BIT_PRESENT + 1)) \
& ((1U << SWP_TYPE_BITS) - 1))
#define __swp_offset(x) ((x).val >> SWP_OFFSET_SHIFT)
#define __swp_entry(type, offset) ((swp_entry_t) { \
((type) << (_PAGE_BIT_PRESENT + 1)) \
| ((offset) << SWP_OFFSET_SHIFT) })
/* Extract the high bits for type */
#define __swp_type(x) ((x).val >> (64 - SWP_TYPE_BITS))
/* Shift up (to get rid of type), then down to get value */
#define __swp_offset(x) (~(x).val << SWP_TYPE_BITS >> SWP_OFFSET_SHIFT)
/*
* Shift the offset up "too far" by TYPE bits, then down again
* The offset is inverted by a binary not operation to make the high
* physical bits set.
*/
#define __swp_entry(type, offset) ((swp_entry_t) { \
(~(unsigned long)(offset) << SWP_OFFSET_SHIFT >> SWP_TYPE_BITS) \
| ((unsigned long)(type) << (64-SWP_TYPE_BITS)) })
#define __pte_to_swp_entry(pte) ((swp_entry_t) { pte_val((pte)) })
#define __swp_entry_to_pte(x) ((pte_t) { .pte = (x).val })
@ -201,6 +235,8 @@ extern void cleanup_highmap(void);
extern void init_extra_mapping_uc(unsigned long phys, unsigned long size);
extern void init_extra_mapping_wb(unsigned long phys, unsigned long size);
#include <asm/pgtable-invert.h>
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_64_H */

View File

@ -70,15 +70,15 @@
/*
* Tracking soft dirty bit when a page goes to a swap is tricky.
* We need a bit which can be stored in pte _and_ not conflict
* with swap entry format. On x86 bits 6 and 7 are *not* involved
* into swap entry computation, but bit 6 is used for nonlinear
* file mapping, so we borrow bit 7 for soft dirty tracking.
* with swap entry format. On x86 bits 1-4 are *not* involved
* into swap entry computation, but bit 7 is used for thp migration,
* so we borrow bit 1 for soft dirty tracking.
*
* Please note that this bit must be treated as swap dirty page
* mark if and only if the PTE has present bit clear!
* mark if and only if the PTE/PMD has present bit clear!
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_MEM_SOFT_DIRTY
#define _PAGE_SWP_SOFT_DIRTY _PAGE_PSE
#define _PAGE_SWP_SOFT_DIRTY _PAGE_RW
#else
#define _PAGE_SWP_SOFT_DIRTY (_AT(pteval_t, 0))
#endif

View File

@ -172,6 +172,11 @@ extern const struct seq_operations cpuinfo_op;
extern void cpu_detect(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
static inline unsigned long long l1tf_pfn_limit(void)
{
return BIT_ULL(boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits - 1 - PAGE_SHIFT);
}
extern void early_cpu_init(void);
extern void identify_boot_cpu(void);
extern void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *);

View File

@ -100,6 +100,7 @@
#define REQUIRED_MASK15 0
#define REQUIRED_MASK16 0
#define REQUIRED_MASK17 0
#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18)
#define REQUIRED_MASK18 0
#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
#endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */

View File

@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef _ASM_X86_SPECCTRL_H_
#define _ASM_X86_SPECCTRL_H_
#include <linux/thread_info.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
/*
* On VMENTER we must preserve whatever view of the SPEC_CTRL MSR
* the guest has, while on VMEXIT we restore the host view. This
* would be easier if SPEC_CTRL were architecturally maskable or
* shadowable for guests but this is not (currently) the case.
* Takes the guest view of SPEC_CTRL MSR as a parameter and also
* the guest's version of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, if emulated.
*/
extern void x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool guest);
/**
* x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest - Set speculation control registers for the guest
* @guest_spec_ctrl: The guest content of MSR_SPEC_CTRL
* @guest_virt_spec_ctrl: The guest controlled bits of MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL
* (may get translated to MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG bits)
*
* Avoids writing to the MSR if the content/bits are the same
*/
static inline
void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl)
{
x86_virt_spec_ctrl(guest_spec_ctrl, guest_virt_spec_ctrl, true);
}
/**
* x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host - Restore host speculation control registers
* @guest_spec_ctrl: The guest content of MSR_SPEC_CTRL
* @guest_virt_spec_ctrl: The guest controlled bits of MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL
* (may get translated to MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG bits)
*
* Avoids writing to the MSR if the content/bits are the same
*/
static inline
void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl)
{
x86_virt_spec_ctrl(guest_spec_ctrl, guest_virt_spec_ctrl, false);
}
/* AMD specific Speculative Store Bypass MSR data */
extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(u64 tifn)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SSBD < SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) >> (TIF_SSBD - SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
}
static inline unsigned long ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(u64 spec_ctrl)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SSBD < SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
return (spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) << (TIF_SSBD - SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
}
static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(u64 tifn)
{
return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) ? x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask : 0ULL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
extern void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void);
#else
static inline void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void) { }
#endif
extern void speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tif);
static inline void speculative_store_bypass_update_current(void)
{
speculative_store_bypass_update(current_thread_info()->flags);
}
#endif

View File

@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ struct thread_info {
#define TIF_SIGPENDING 2 /* signal pending */
#define TIF_NEED_RESCHED 3 /* rescheduling necessary */
#define TIF_SINGLESTEP 4 /* reenable singlestep on user return*/
#define TIF_SSBD 5 /* Reduced data speculation */
#define TIF_SYSCALL_EMU 6 /* syscall emulation active */
#define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 7 /* syscall auditing active */
#define TIF_SECCOMP 8 /* secure computing */
@ -114,8 +115,9 @@ struct thread_info {
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
#define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME (1 << TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
#define _TIF_SIGPENDING (1 << TIF_SIGPENDING)
#define _TIF_SINGLESTEP (1 << TIF_SINGLESTEP)
#define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
#define _TIF_SINGLESTEP (1 << TIF_SINGLESTEP)
#define _TIF_SSBD (1 << TIF_SSBD)
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
#define _TIF_SECCOMP (1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
@ -147,7 +149,7 @@ struct thread_info {
/* flags to check in __switch_to() */
#define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW \
(_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP)
(_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP|_TIF_SSBD)
#define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_PREV (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW|_TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)
#define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_NEXT (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW)

View File

@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ static inline void invpcid_flush_all_nonglobals(void)
struct tlb_state {
struct mm_struct *active_mm;
int state;
/* last user mm's ctx id */
u64 last_ctx_id;
/*
* Access to this CR4 shadow and to H/W CR4 is protected by
@ -109,6 +111,16 @@ static inline void cr4_clear_bits(unsigned long mask)
}
}
static inline void cr4_toggle_bits(unsigned long mask)
{
unsigned long cr4;
cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
cr4 ^= mask;
this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.cr4, cr4);
__write_cr4(cr4);
}
/* Read the CR4 shadow. */
static inline unsigned long cr4_read_shadow(void)
{

View File

@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ obj-y += alternative.o i8253.o pci-nommu.o hw_breakpoint.o
obj-y += tsc.o tsc_msr.o io_delay.o rtc.o
obj-y += pci-iommu_table.o
obj-y += resource.o
obj-y += irqflags.o
obj-y += process.o
obj-y += fpu/

View File

@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
#include <asm/smp.h>
#include <asm/pci-direct.h>
#include <asm/delay.h>
@ -519,6 +520,26 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_MWAITX))
use_mwaitx_delay();
if (c->x86 >= 0x15 && c->x86 <= 0x17) {
unsigned int bit;
switch (c->x86) {
case 0x15: bit = 54; break;
case 0x16: bit = 33; break;
case 0x17: bit = 10; break;
default: return;
}
/*
* Try to cache the base value so further operations can
* avoid RMW. If that faults, do not enable SSBD.
*/
if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, &x86_amd_ls_cfg_base)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD);
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask = 1ULL << bit;
}
}
}
static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
@ -692,6 +713,17 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
}
static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN);
/*
* Fix erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. It affects
* all up to and including B1.
*/
if (c->x86_model <= 1 && c->x86_mask <= 1)
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB);
}
static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u32 dummy;
@ -722,6 +754,7 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
case 0x10: init_amd_gh(c); break;
case 0x12: init_amd_ln(c); break;
case 0x15: init_amd_bd(c); break;
case 0x17: init_amd_zn(c); break;
}
/* Enable workaround for FXSAVE leak */
@ -791,8 +824,9 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_3DNOW) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_LM))
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH);
/* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET */
set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
/* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32

View File

@ -11,8 +11,10 @@
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
@ -24,8 +26,31 @@
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
#include <asm/e820.h>
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
/*
* Our boot-time value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR. We read it once so that any
* writes to SPEC_CTRL contain whatever reserved bits have been set.
*/
u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
/*
* The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
* x86_spec_ctrl_base.
*/
static u64 x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
/*
* AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
* x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
*/
u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
void __init check_bugs(void)
{
@ -36,9 +61,29 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
}
/*
* Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may
* have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD
* init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.
*/
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
/* Allow STIBP in MSR_SPEC_CTRL if supported */
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
/* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
/*
* Select proper mitigation for any exposure to the Speculative Store
* Bypass vulnerability.
*/
ssb_select_mitigation();
l1tf_select_mitigation();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
@ -94,6 +139,73 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
void
x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
{
u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
/* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
/*
* Restrict guest_spec_ctrl to supported values. Clear the
* modifiable bits in the host base value and or the
* modifiable bits from the guest value.
*/
guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
/* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
if (hostval != guestval) {
msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval;
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);
}
}
/*
* If SSBD is not handled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL on AMD, update
* MSR_AMD64_L2_CFG or MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL if supported.
*/
if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD) &&
!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
return;
/*
* If the host has SSBD mitigation enabled, force it in the host's
* virtual MSR value. If its not permanently enabled, evaluate
* current's TIF_SSBD thread flag.
*/
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE))
hostval = SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
else
hostval = ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
/* Sanitize the guest value */
guestval = guest_virt_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
if (hostval != guestval) {
unsigned long tif;
tif = setguest ? ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(guestval) :
ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(hostval);
speculative_store_bypass_update(tif);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_virt_spec_ctrl);
static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
{
u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
}
#ifdef RETPOLINE
static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
@ -162,8 +274,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
else {
ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg,
sizeof(arg));
ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
if (ret < 0)
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
@ -184,8 +295,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD ||
cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) &&
!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
mitigation_options[i].option);
pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option);
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
@ -203,23 +313,6 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
return cmd;
}
/* Check for Skylake-like CPUs (for RSB handling) */
static bool __init is_skylake_era(void)
{
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) {
switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE:
case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP:
case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE:
case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
{
enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
@ -255,14 +348,14 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
goto retpoline_auto;
break;
}
pr_err("kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
pr_err("Spectre mitigation: kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
return;
retpoline_auto:
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
retpoline_amd:
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
pr_err("LFENCE not serializing. Switching to generic retpoline\n");
pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n");
goto retpoline_generic;
}
mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD :
@ -280,52 +373,359 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
/*
* If neither SMEP or KPTI are available, there is a risk of
* hitting userspace addresses in the RSB after a context switch
* from a shallow call stack to a deeper one. To prevent this fill
* the entire RSB, even when using IBRS.
* If spectre v2 protection has been enabled, unconditionally fill
* RSB during a context switch; this protects against two independent
* issues:
*
* Skylake era CPUs have a separate issue with *underflow* of the
* RSB, when they will predict 'ret' targets from the generic BTB.
* The proper mitigation for this is IBRS. If IBRS is not supported
* or deactivated in favour of retpolines the RSB fill on context
* switch is required.
* - RSB underflow (and switch to BTB) on Skylake+
* - SpectreRSB variant of spectre v2 on X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 CPUs
*/
if ((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER) &&
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era()) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n");
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
/* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
}
/*
* Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect
* branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS to protect that.
*/
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
}
}
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Speculative Store Bypass: " fmt
static enum ssb_mitigation ssb_mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
/* The kernel command line selection */
enum ssb_mitigation_cmd {
SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE,
SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO,
SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON,
SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL,
SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP,
};
static const char *ssb_strings[] = {
[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE] = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled",
[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL] = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl",
[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP] = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp",
};
static const struct {
const char *option;
enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
} ssb_mitigation_options[] = {
{ "auto", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO }, /* Platform decides */
{ "on", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass */
{ "off", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE }, /* Don't touch Speculative Store Bypass */
{ "prctl", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass via prctl */
{ "seccomp", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass via prctl and seccomp */
};
static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
{
enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
char arg[20];
int ret, i;
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable")) {
return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
} else {
ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
arg, sizeof(arg));
if (ret < 0)
return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options); i++) {
if (!match_option(arg, ret, ssb_mitigation_options[i].option))
continue;
cmd = ssb_mitigation_options[i].cmd;
break;
}
if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options)) {
pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
}
}
return cmd;
}
static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
{
enum ssb_mitigation mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
return mode;
cmd = ssb_parse_cmdline();
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS) &&
(cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE ||
cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO))
return mode;
switch (cmd) {
case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO:
case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP:
/*
* Choose prctl+seccomp as the default mode if seccomp is
* enabled.
*/
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP;
else
mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
break;
case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON:
mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE;
break;
case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL:
mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
break;
case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE:
break;
}
/*
* We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
* - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
* - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
* - X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE - engage the mitigation
*/
if (mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE);
/*
* Intel uses the SPEC CTRL MSR Bit(2) for this, while AMD uses
* a completely different MSR and bit dependent on family.
*/
switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) {
case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
break;
case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
x86_amd_ssb_disable();
break;
}
}
return mode;
}
static void ssb_select_mitigation(void)
{
ssb_mode = __ssb_select_mitigation();
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
pr_info("%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
}
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Speculation prctl: " fmt
static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
{
bool update;
if (ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL &&
ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP)
return -ENXIO;
switch (ctrl) {
case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
/* If speculation is force disabled, enable is not allowed */
if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
return -EPERM;
task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task);
update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
break;
case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
break;
case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task);
update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
break;
default:
return -ERANGE;
}
/*
* If being set on non-current task, delay setting the CPU
* mitigation until it is next scheduled.
*/
if (task == current && update)
speculative_store_bypass_update_current();
return 0;
}
int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
unsigned long ctrl)
{
switch (which) {
case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
return ssb_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
default:
return -ENODEV;
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task)
{
if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP)
ssb_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
}
#endif
static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
{
switch (ssb_mode) {
case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE:
return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP:
case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL:
if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
if (task_spec_ssb_disable(task))
return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
default:
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
}
}
int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
{
switch (which) {
case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
return ssb_prctl_get(task);
default:
return -ENODEV;
}
}
void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
{
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
x86_amd_ssb_disable();
}
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "L1TF: " fmt
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
{
u64 half_pa;
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
return;
#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS == 2
pr_warn("Kernel not compiled for PAE. No mitigation for L1TF\n");
return;
#endif
/*
* This is extremely unlikely to happen because almost all
* systems have far more MAX_PA/2 than RAM can be fit into
* DIMM slots.
*/
half_pa = (u64)l1tf_pfn_limit() << PAGE_SHIFT;
if (e820_any_mapped(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_RAM)) {
pr_warn("System has more than MAX_PA/2 memory. L1TF mitigation not effective.\n");
pr_info("You may make it effective by booting the kernel with mem=%llu parameter.\n",
half_pa);
pr_info("However, doing so will make a part of your RAM unusable.\n");
pr_info("Reading https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html might help you decide.\n");
return;
}
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV);
}
#undef pr_fmt
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf, unsigned int bug)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER))
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n");
switch (bug) {
case X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN:
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER))
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n");
break;
case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1:
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
spectre_v2_module_string());
case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
case X86_BUG_L1TF:
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV))
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Page Table Inversion\n");
break;
default:
break;
}
return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
}
return sprintf(buf, "%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
spectre_v2_module_string());
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
}
ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_L1TF);
}
#endif

View File

@ -43,6 +43,8 @@
#include <asm/pat.h>
#include <asm/microcode.h>
#include <asm/microcode_intel.h>
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
#include <asm/uv/uv.h>
@ -674,6 +676,40 @@ static void apply_forced_caps(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
}
static void init_speculation_control(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
/*
* The Intel SPEC_CTRL CPUID bit implies IBRS and IBPB support,
* and they also have a different bit for STIBP support. Also,
* a hypervisor might have set the individual AMD bits even on
* Intel CPUs, for finer-grained selection of what's available.
*/
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) {
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
}
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP))
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS)) {
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
}
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB))
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) {
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
}
}
void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
@ -695,6 +731,7 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
cpuid_count(0x00000007, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_0_EBX] = ebx;
c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_ECX] = ecx;
c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_EDX] = edx;
}
/* Extended state features: level 0x0000000d */
@ -765,6 +802,14 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = cpuid_edx(0x8000000a);
init_scattered_cpuid_features(c);
init_speculation_control(c);
/*
* Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, after probe.
* This needs to happen each time we re-probe, which may happen
* several times during CPU initialization.
*/
apply_forced_caps(c);
}
static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
@ -793,6 +838,95 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
#endif
}
static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_speculation[] = {
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
{ X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR, 5 },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 5 },
{ X86_VENDOR_NSC, 5 },
{ X86_VENDOR_ANY, 4 },
{}
};
static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_meltdown[] = {
{ X86_VENDOR_AMD },
{}
};
static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_spec_store_bypass[] = {
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT1 },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2 },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM },
{ X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR, 5, },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 5, },
{ X86_VENDOR_NSC, 5, },
{ X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0x12, },
{ X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0x11, },
{ X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0x10, },
{ X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0xf, },
{ X86_VENDOR_ANY, 4, },
{}
};
static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_l1tf[] = {
/* in addition to cpu_no_speculation */
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT1 },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2 },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL },
{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM },
{}
};
static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 ia32_cap = 0;
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass) &&
!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation))
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown))
return;
/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO)
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_l1tf))
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
}
/*
* Do minimum CPU detection early.
* Fields really needed: vendor, cpuid_level, family, model, mask,
@ -839,11 +973,7 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
cpu_set_bug_bits(c);
fpu__init_system(c);
@ -1132,6 +1262,7 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
enable_sep_cpu();
#endif
mtrr_ap_init();
x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap();
}
struct msr_range {

View File

@ -46,4 +46,7 @@ extern const struct cpu_dev *const __x86_cpu_dev_start[],
extern void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void);
#endif /* ARCH_X86_CPU_H */

View File

@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
#include <linux/topology.h>
@ -25,6 +26,65 @@
#include <asm/apic.h>
#endif
/*
* Early microcode releases for the Spectre v2 mitigation were broken.
* Information taken from;
* - https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/03/microcode-update-guidance.pdf
* - https://kb.vmware.com/s/article/52345
* - Microcode revisions observed in the wild
* - Release note from 20180108 microcode release
*/
struct sku_microcode {
u8 model;
u8 stepping;
u32 microcode;
};
static const struct sku_microcode spectre_bad_microcodes[] = {
{ INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0B, 0x80 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0A, 0x80 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x09, 0x80 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x0A, 0x80 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x09, 0x80 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x03, 0x0100013e },
{ INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x04, 0x0200003c },
{ INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE, 0x04, 0x28 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x1b },
{ INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x02, 0x14 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x03, 0x07000011 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X, 0x01, 0x0b000025 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT, 0x01, 0x21 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x18 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE, 0x03, 0x23 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x02, 0x3b },
{ INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x04, 0x10 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X, 0x04, 0x42a },
/* Observed in the wild */
{ INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x06, 0x61b },
{ INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x07, 0x712 },
};
static bool bad_spectre_microcode(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
int i;
/*
* We know that the hypervisor lie to us on the microcode version so
* we may as well hope that it is running the correct version.
*/
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
return false;
if (c->x86 != 6)
return false;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spectre_bad_microcodes); i++) {
if (c->x86_model == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].model &&
c->x86_mask == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].stepping)
return (c->microcode <= spectre_bad_microcodes[i].microcode);
}
return false;
}
static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 misc_enable;
@ -51,6 +111,22 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV, lower_word, c->microcode);
}
/* Now if any of them are set, check the blacklist and clear the lot */
if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP) ||
cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ||
cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) && bad_spectre_microcode(c)) {
pr_warn("Intel Spectre v2 broken microcode detected; disabling Speculation Control\n");
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
}
/*
* Atom erratum AAE44/AAF40/AAG38/AAH41:
*

View File

@ -2294,9 +2294,6 @@ static ssize_t store_int_with_restart(struct device *s,
if (check_interval == old_check_interval)
return ret;
if (check_interval < 1)
check_interval = 1;
mutex_lock(&mce_sysfs_mutex);
mce_restart();
mutex_unlock(&mce_sysfs_mutex);

View File

@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ void uncore_perf_event_update(struct intel_uncore_box *box, struct perf_event *e
u64 prev_count, new_count, delta;
int shift;
if (event->hw.idx >= UNCORE_PMC_IDX_FIXED)
if (event->hw.idx == UNCORE_PMC_IDX_FIXED)
shift = 64 - uncore_fixed_ctr_bits(box);
else
shift = 64 - uncore_perf_ctr_bits(box);

View File

@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ static void nhmex_uncore_msr_enable_event(struct intel_uncore_box *box, struct p
{
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
if (hwc->idx >= UNCORE_PMC_IDX_FIXED)
if (hwc->idx == UNCORE_PMC_IDX_FIXED)
wrmsrl(hwc->config_base, NHMEX_PMON_CTL_EN_BIT0);
else if (box->pmu->type->event_mask & NHMEX_PMON_CTL_EN_BIT0)
wrmsrl(hwc->config_base, hwc->config | NHMEX_PMON_CTL_EN_BIT22);

View File

@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm-generic/export.h>
#include <linux/linkage.h>
/*
* unsigned long native_save_fl(void)
*/
ENTRY(native_save_fl)
pushf
pop %_ASM_AX
ret
ENDPROC(native_save_fl)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(native_save_fl)
/*
* void native_restore_fl(unsigned long flags)
* %eax/%rdi: flags
*/
ENTRY(native_restore_fl)
push %_ASM_ARG1
popf
ret
ENDPROC(native_restore_fl)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(native_restore_fl)

View File

@ -394,7 +394,6 @@ int __copy_instruction(u8 *dest, u8 *src)
newdisp = (u8 *) src + (s64) insn.displacement.value - (u8 *) dest;
if ((s64) (s32) newdisp != newdisp) {
pr_err("Kprobes error: new displacement does not fit into s32 (%llx)\n", newdisp);
pr_err("\tSrc: %p, Dest: %p, old disp: %x\n", src, dest, insn.displacement.value);
return 0;
}
disp = (u8 *) dest + insn_offset_displacement(&insn);
@ -610,8 +609,7 @@ static int reenter_kprobe(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs,
* Raise a BUG or we'll continue in an endless reentering loop
* and eventually a stack overflow.
*/
printk(KERN_WARNING "Unrecoverable kprobe detected at %p.\n",
p->addr);
pr_err("Unrecoverable kprobe detected.\n");
dump_kprobe(p);
BUG();
default:

View File

@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ static void free_ldt_struct(struct ldt_struct *ldt)
* we do not have to muck with descriptors here, that is
* done in switch_mm() as needed.
*/
int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm)
int init_new_context_ldt(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct ldt_struct *new_ldt;
struct mm_struct *old_mm;
@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm)
*
* 64bit: Don't touch the LDT register - we're already in the next thread.
*/
void destroy_context(struct mm_struct *mm)
void destroy_context_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
free_ldt_struct(mm->context.ldt);
mm->context.ldt = NULL;

View File

@ -97,10 +97,12 @@ unsigned paravirt_patch_call(void *insnbuf,
struct branch *b = insnbuf;
unsigned long delta = (unsigned long)target - (addr+5);
if (tgt_clobbers & ~site_clobbers)
return len; /* target would clobber too much for this site */
if (len < 5)
if (len < 5) {
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
WARN_ONCE("Failing to patch indirect CALL in %ps\n", (void *)addr);
#endif
return len; /* call too long for patch site */
}
b->opcode = 0xe8; /* call */
b->delta = delta;
@ -115,8 +117,12 @@ unsigned paravirt_patch_jmp(void *insnbuf, const void *target,
struct branch *b = insnbuf;
unsigned long delta = (unsigned long)target - (addr+5);
if (len < 5)
if (len < 5) {
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
WARN_ONCE("Failing to patch indirect JMP in %ps\n", (void *)addr);
#endif
return len; /* call too long for patch site */
}
b->opcode = 0xe9; /* jmp */
b->delta = delta;

View File

@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/mce.h>
#include <asm/vm86.h>
#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
/*
* per-CPU TSS segments. Threads are completely 'soft' on Linux,
@ -116,11 +117,6 @@ void flush_thread(void)
fpu__clear(&tsk->thread.fpu);
}
static void hard_disable_TSC(void)
{
cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_TSD);
}
void disable_TSC(void)
{
preempt_disable();
@ -129,15 +125,10 @@ void disable_TSC(void)
* Must flip the CPU state synchronously with
* TIF_NOTSC in the current running context.
*/
hard_disable_TSC();
cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_TSD);
preempt_enable();
}
static void hard_enable_TSC(void)
{
cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_TSD);
}
static void enable_TSC(void)
{
preempt_disable();
@ -146,7 +137,7 @@ static void enable_TSC(void)
* Must flip the CPU state synchronously with
* TIF_NOTSC in the current running context.
*/
hard_enable_TSC();
cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_TSD);
preempt_enable();
}
@ -174,48 +165,199 @@ int set_tsc_mode(unsigned int val)
return 0;
}
void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p,
struct tss_struct *tss)
static inline void switch_to_bitmap(struct tss_struct *tss,
struct thread_struct *prev,
struct thread_struct *next,
unsigned long tifp, unsigned long tifn)
{
struct thread_struct *prev, *next;
prev = &prev_p->thread;
next = &next_p->thread;
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(prev_p, TIF_BLOCKSTEP) ^
test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_BLOCKSTEP)) {
unsigned long debugctl = get_debugctlmsr();
debugctl &= ~DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_BLOCKSTEP))
debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
update_debugctlmsr(debugctl);
}
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(prev_p, TIF_NOTSC) ^
test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_NOTSC)) {
/* prev and next are different */
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_NOTSC))
hard_disable_TSC();
else
hard_enable_TSC();
}
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_IO_BITMAP)) {
if (tifn & _TIF_IO_BITMAP) {
/*
* Copy the relevant range of the IO bitmap.
* Normally this is 128 bytes or less:
*/
memcpy(tss->io_bitmap, next->io_bitmap_ptr,
max(prev->io_bitmap_max, next->io_bitmap_max));
} else if (test_tsk_thread_flag(prev_p, TIF_IO_BITMAP)) {
} else if (tifp & _TIF_IO_BITMAP) {
/*
* Clear any possible leftover bits:
*/
memset(tss->io_bitmap, 0xff, prev->io_bitmap_max);
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
struct ssb_state {
struct ssb_state *shared_state;
raw_spinlock_t lock;
unsigned int disable_state;
unsigned long local_state;
};
#define LSTATE_SSB 0
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct ssb_state, ssb_state);
void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void)
{
struct ssb_state *st = this_cpu_ptr(&ssb_state);
unsigned int this_cpu = smp_processor_id();
unsigned int cpu;
st->local_state = 0;
/*
* Shared state setup happens once on the first bringup
* of the CPU. It's not destroyed on CPU hotunplug.
*/
if (st->shared_state)
return;
raw_spin_lock_init(&st->lock);
/*
* Go over HT siblings and check whether one of them has set up the
* shared state pointer already.
*/
for_each_cpu(cpu, topology_sibling_cpumask(this_cpu)) {
if (cpu == this_cpu)
continue;
if (!per_cpu(ssb_state, cpu).shared_state)
continue;
/* Link it to the state of the sibling: */
st->shared_state = per_cpu(ssb_state, cpu).shared_state;
return;
}
/*
* First HT sibling to come up on the core. Link shared state of
* the first HT sibling to itself. The siblings on the same core
* which come up later will see the shared state pointer and link
* themself to the state of this CPU.
*/
st->shared_state = st;
}
/*
* Logic is: First HT sibling enables SSBD for both siblings in the core
* and last sibling to disable it, disables it for the whole core. This how
* MSR_SPEC_CTRL works in "hardware":
*
* CORE_SPEC_CTRL = THREAD0_SPEC_CTRL | THREAD1_SPEC_CTRL
*/
static __always_inline void amd_set_core_ssb_state(unsigned long tifn)
{
struct ssb_state *st = this_cpu_ptr(&ssb_state);
u64 msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ZEN)) {
msr |= ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
return;
}
if (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) {
/*
* Since this can race with prctl(), block reentry on the
* same CPU.
*/
if (__test_and_set_bit(LSTATE_SSB, &st->local_state))
return;
msr |= x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
raw_spin_lock(&st->shared_state->lock);
/* First sibling enables SSBD: */
if (!st->shared_state->disable_state)
wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
st->shared_state->disable_state++;
raw_spin_unlock(&st->shared_state->lock);
} else {
if (!__test_and_clear_bit(LSTATE_SSB, &st->local_state))
return;
raw_spin_lock(&st->shared_state->lock);
st->shared_state->disable_state--;
if (!st->shared_state->disable_state)
wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
raw_spin_unlock(&st->shared_state->lock);
}
}
#else
static __always_inline void amd_set_core_ssb_state(unsigned long tifn)
{
u64 msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
}
#endif
static __always_inline void amd_set_ssb_virt_state(unsigned long tifn)
{
/*
* SSBD has the same definition in SPEC_CTRL and VIRT_SPEC_CTRL,
* so ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl() just works.
*/
wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn));
}
static __always_inline void intel_set_ssb_state(unsigned long tifn)
{
u64 msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
}
static __always_inline void __speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tifn)
{
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
amd_set_ssb_virt_state(tifn);
else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
amd_set_core_ssb_state(tifn);
else
intel_set_ssb_state(tifn);
}
void speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tif)
{
preempt_disable();
__speculative_store_bypass_update(tif);
preempt_enable();
}
void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p,
struct tss_struct *tss)
{
struct thread_struct *prev, *next;
unsigned long tifp, tifn;
prev = &prev_p->thread;
next = &next_p->thread;
tifn = READ_ONCE(task_thread_info(next_p)->flags);
tifp = READ_ONCE(task_thread_info(prev_p)->flags);
switch_to_bitmap(tss, prev, next, tifp, tifn);
propagate_user_return_notify(prev_p, next_p);
if ((tifp & _TIF_BLOCKSTEP || tifn & _TIF_BLOCKSTEP) &&
arch_has_block_step()) {
unsigned long debugctl, msk;
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, debugctl);
debugctl &= ~DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
msk = tifn & _TIF_BLOCKSTEP;
debugctl |= (msk >> TIF_BLOCKSTEP) << DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF_SHIFT;
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, debugctl);
}
if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_NOTSC)
cr4_toggle_bits(X86_CR4_TSD);
if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_SSBD)
__speculative_store_bypass_update(tifn);
}
/*

View File

@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long new_ip, unsigned long new_sp)
start_thread_common(regs, new_ip, new_sp,
__USER_CS, __USER_DS, 0);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(start_thread);
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
void compat_start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 new_ip, u32 new_sp)

View File

@ -851,6 +851,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
memblock_reserve(__pa_symbol(_text),
(unsigned long)__bss_stop - (unsigned long)_text);
/*
* Make sure page 0 is always reserved because on systems with
* L1TF its contents can be leaked to user processes.
*/
memblock_reserve(0, PAGE_SIZE);
early_reserve_initrd();
/*

View File

@ -75,6 +75,7 @@
#include <asm/i8259.h>
#include <asm/realmode.h>
#include <asm/misc.h>
#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
/* Number of siblings per CPU package */
int smp_num_siblings = 1;
@ -217,6 +218,8 @@ static void notrace start_secondary(void *unused)
*/
check_tsc_sync_target();
speculative_store_bypass_ht_init();
/*
* Lock vector_lock and initialize the vectors on this cpu
* before setting the cpu online. We must set it online with
@ -1209,6 +1212,8 @@ void __init native_smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus)
set_mtrr_aps_delayed_init();
smp_quirk_init_udelay();
speculative_store_bypass_ht_init();
}
void arch_enable_nonboot_cpus_begin(void)

View File

@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
#include <asm/desc.h>
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
#include <asm/kvm_para.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
#include <asm/virtext.h>
#include "trace.h"

View File

@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
#include <asm/kexec.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
#include "trace.h"
#include "pmu.h"
@ -6843,6 +6843,8 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
HRTIMER_MODE_REL);
vmx->nested.preemption_timer.function = vmx_preemption_timer_fn;
vmx->nested.vpid02 = allocate_vpid();
vmx->nested.vmxon = true;
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
@ -8887,10 +8889,8 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
goto free_vmcs;
}
if (nested) {
if (nested)
nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(vmx);
vmx->nested.vpid02 = allocate_vpid();
}
vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = -1;
vmx->nested.current_vmptr = -1ull;
@ -8899,7 +8899,6 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
return &vmx->vcpu;
free_vmcs:
free_vpid(vmx->nested.vpid02);
free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
free_msrs:
kfree(vmx->guest_msrs);

View File

@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/bootmem.h> /* for max_low_pfn */
#include <linux/swapfile.h>
#include <linux/swapops.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/e820.h>
@ -767,3 +769,26 @@ void update_cache_mode_entry(unsigned entry, enum page_cache_mode cache)
__cachemode2pte_tbl[cache] = __cm_idx2pte(entry);
__pte2cachemode_tbl[entry] = cache;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
unsigned long max_swapfile_size(void)
{
unsigned long pages;
pages = generic_max_swapfile_size();
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF)) {
/* Limit the swap file size to MAX_PA/2 for L1TF workaround */
unsigned long long l1tf_limit = l1tf_pfn_limit();
/*
* We encode swap offsets also with 3 bits below those for pfn
* which makes the usable limit higher.
*/
#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 2
l1tf_limit <<= PAGE_SHIFT - SWP_OFFSET_FIRST_BIT;
#endif
pages = min_t(unsigned long long, l1tf_limit, pages);
}
return pages;
}
#endif

View File

@ -125,24 +125,29 @@ static struct kmmio_fault_page *get_kmmio_fault_page(unsigned long addr)
static void clear_pmd_presence(pmd_t *pmd, bool clear, pmdval_t *old)
{
pmd_t new_pmd;
pmdval_t v = pmd_val(*pmd);
if (clear) {
*old = v & _PAGE_PRESENT;
v &= ~_PAGE_PRESENT;
} else /* presume this has been called with clear==true previously */
v |= *old;
set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(v));
*old = v;
new_pmd = pmd_mknotpresent(*pmd);
} else {
/* Presume this has been called with clear==true previously */
new_pmd = __pmd(*old);
}
set_pmd(pmd, new_pmd);
}
static void clear_pte_presence(pte_t *pte, bool clear, pteval_t *old)
{
pteval_t v = pte_val(*pte);
if (clear) {
*old = v & _PAGE_PRESENT;
v &= ~_PAGE_PRESENT;
} else /* presume this has been called with clear==true previously */
v |= *old;
set_pte_atomic(pte, __pte(v));
*old = v;
/* Nothing should care about address */
pte_clear(&init_mm, 0, pte);
} else {
/* Presume this has been called with clear==true previously */
set_pte_atomic(pte, __pte(*old));
}
}
static int clear_page_presence(struct kmmio_fault_page *f, bool clear)

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