x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for TAA

Use attack vector controls to determine if TAA mitigation is required.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-7-david.kaplan@amd.com
This commit is contained in:
David Kaplan 2025-07-07 13:33:01 -05:00 committed by Borislav Petkov (AMD)
parent e3a88d4c06
commit 736565d4ed

View File

@ -538,12 +538,13 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
return;
}
if (cpu_mitigations_off())
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
/* Microcode will be checked in taa_update_mitigation(). */
if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_AUTO)
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_AUTO) {
if (should_mitigate_vuln(X86_BUG_TAA))
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
else
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
}
if (taa_mitigation != TAA_MITIGATION_OFF)
verw_clear_cpu_buf_mitigation_selected = true;
@ -551,7 +552,7 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
static void __init taa_update_mitigation(void)
{
if (!taa_vulnerable() || cpu_mitigations_off())
if (!taa_vulnerable())
return;
if (verw_clear_cpu_buf_mitigation_selected)
@ -592,7 +593,7 @@ static void __init taa_apply_mitigation(void)
*/
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
if (taa_nosmt || smt_mitigations == SMT_MITIGATIONS_ON)
cpu_smt_disable(false);
}
}