inet: frags: prevent acceptance of partially authenticated reassembly

A reassembled skb retains the secpath from its first fragment, which
makes it possible for the final policy check to accept bytes that were
not covered by the transform recorded on the skb. This can affect IPsec
tunnel traffic, including AH and ESP, and allow a packet to be accepted
even though only part of its payload was authenticated.

Reject a fragment when its secpath differs from the fragments already
in the queue, and keep overlap statistics limited to actual overlaps.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Miller <davem@davem-thinkpadp1gen8.ibmlond.csb>
This commit is contained in:
Jérémy Jean 2026-10-23 18:51:19 +00:00 committed by Dave Miller
parent 22dd6bb2ba
commit 6fb4e32f2c
5 changed files with 27 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ extern const u8 ip_frag_ecn_table[16];
#define IPFRAG_OK 0
#define IPFRAG_DUP 1
#define IPFRAG_OVERLAP 2
#define IPFRAG_MIXED_SECPATH 3
int inet_frag_queue_insert(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb,
int offset, int end);
void *inet_frag_reasm_prepare(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb,

View File

@ -1201,6 +1201,23 @@ secpath_reset(struct sk_buff *skb)
#endif
}
static inline bool
secpath_equal(const struct sk_buff *skb1, const struct sk_buff *skb2)
{
const struct sec_path *sp1 = skb_sec_path(skb1);
const struct sec_path *sp2 = skb_sec_path(skb2);
int i;
if (!sp1 || !sp2)
return sp1 == sp2;
if (sp1->len != sp2->len)
return false;
for (i = 0; i < sp1->len; i++)
if (sp1->xvec[i] != sp2->xvec[i])
return false;
return true;
}
static inline int
xfrm_addr_any(const xfrm_address_t *addr, unsigned short family)
{

View File

@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <net/inet_ecn.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>
/* Use skb->cb to track consecutive/adjacent fragments coming at
* the end of the queue. Nodes in the rb-tree queue will
@ -441,6 +442,10 @@ int inet_frag_queue_insert(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb,
{
struct sk_buff *last = q->fragments_tail;
/* The reassembled skb keeps the first fragment's secpath. */
if (last && !secpath_equal(last, skb))
return IPFRAG_MIXED_SECPATH;
/* An IP fragment is never a GSO packet, but an untrusted source
* (virtio_net_hdr) may have attached GSO metadata to it. Do not let
* that reach the reassembled skb, whose head keeps the first

View File

@ -378,8 +378,9 @@ static int ip_frag_queue(struct ipq *qp, struct sk_buff *skb, int *refs)
err = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
if (err == IPFRAG_OVERLAP)
__IP_INC_STATS(net, IPSTATS_MIB_REASM_OVERLAPS);
err = -EINVAL;
__IP_INC_STATS(net, IPSTATS_MIB_REASM_OVERLAPS);
discard_qp:
inet_frag_kill(&qp->q, refs);
__IP_INC_STATS(net, IPSTATS_MIB_REASMFAILS);

View File

@ -241,8 +241,9 @@ static int ip6_frag_queue(struct net *net,
err = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
if (err == IPFRAG_OVERLAP)
__IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_REASM_OVERLAPS);
err = -EINVAL;
__IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_REASM_OVERLAPS);
discard_fq:
inet_frag_kill(&fq->q, refs);
__IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_REASMFAILS);