Merge branch 'bpf-improve-linked-register-tracking'

Puranjay Mohan says:

====================
bpf: Improve linked register tracking

V3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260203222643.994713-1-puranjay@kernel.org/
Changes in v3->v4:
- Add a call to reg_bounds_sync() in sync_linked_regs() to sync bounds after alu op.
- Add a __sink(path[0]); in the C selftest so compiler doesn't say  "error: variable 'path' set but
  not used"

V2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260113152529.3217648-1-puranjay@kernel.org/
Changes in v2->v3:
- Added another selftest showing a real usage pattern
- Rebased on bpf-next/master

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260107203941.1063754-1-puranjay@kernel.org/
Changes in v1->v2:
- Add support for alu32 operations in linked register tracking (Alexei)
- Squash the selftest fix with the first patch (Eduard)
- Add more selftests to detect edge cases

This series extends the BPF verifier's linked register tracking to handle
negative offsets, BPF_SUB operations, and alu32 operations, enabling better bounds propagation for
common arithmetic patterns.

The verifier previously only tracked positive constant deltas between linked
registers using BPF_ADD. This meant patterns using negative offsets or
subtraction couldn't benefit from bounds propagation:

  void alu32_negative_offset(void)
  {
          volatile char path[5];
          volatile int offset = bpf_get_prandom_u32();
          int off = offset;

          if (off >= 5 && off < 10)
                  path[off - 5] = '.';
  }

this gets compiled to:

0000000000000478 <alu32_negative_offset>:
     143:       call 0x7
     144:       *(u32 *)(r10 - 0xc) = w0
     145:       w1 = *(u32 *)(r10 - 0xc)
     146:       w2 = w1				// w2 and w1 share the same id
     147:       w2 += -0x5			// verifier knows w1 = w2 + 5
     148:       if w2 > 0x4 goto +0x5 <L0>	// in fall-through: verifier knows w2 ∈ [0,4] => w1 ∈ [5, 9]
     149:       r2 = r10
     150:       r2 += -0x5			// r2 = fp - 5
     151:       r2 += r1			// r2 = fp - 5 + r1 (∈ [5, 9]) => r2 ∈ [fp, fp + 4]
     152:       w1 = 0x2e
     153:       *(u8 *)(r2 - 0x5) = w1		// r2 ∈ [fp, fp + 4] => r2 - 5 ∈ [fp - 5, fp - 1]
<L0>:
     154:       exit

After the changes, the verifier could link 32-bit scalars and also supported -ve offsets for linking:

	146:       w2 = w1
	147:       w2 += -0x5

It allowed the verifier to correctly propagate bounds, without the
changes in this patchset, verifier would reject this program with:

invalid unbounded variable-offset write to stack R2

This program has been added as a selftest in the second patch.

Veristat comparison on programs from sched_ext, selftests, and some meta internal programs:

Scx Progs
File               Program           Verdict (A)  Verdict (B)  Verdict (DIFF)  Insns (A)  Insns (B)  Insns  (DIFF)
-----------------  ----------------  -----------  -----------  --------------  ---------  ---------  -------------
scx_layered.bpf.o  layered_runnable  success      success      MATCH                5674       6077  +403 (+7.10%)

FB Progs
File          Program           Verdict (A)  Verdict (B)  Verdict (DIFF)  Insns (A)  Insns (B)  Insns      (DIFF)
------------  ----------------  -----------  -----------  --------------  ---------  ---------  -----------------
bpf232.bpf.o  layered_dump      success      success      MATCH                1151       1218       +67 (+5.82%)
bpf257.bpf.o  layered_runnable  success      success      MATCH                5743       6143      +400 (+6.97%)
bpf252.bpf.o  layered_runnable  success      success      MATCH                5677       6075      +398 (+7.01%)
bpf227.bpf.o  layered_dump      success      success      MATCH                 915        982       +67 (+7.32%)
bpf239.bpf.o  layered_runnable  success      success      MATCH                5459       5861      +402 (+7.36%)
bpf246.bpf.o  layered_runnable  success      success      MATCH                5562       6008      +446 (+8.02%)
bpf229.bpf.o  layered_runnable  success      success      MATCH                2559       3011     +452 (+17.66%)
bpf231.bpf.o  layered_runnable  success      success      MATCH                2559       3011     +452 (+17.66%)
bpf234.bpf.o  layered_runnable  success      success      MATCH                2549       3001     +452 (+17.73%)
bpf019.bpf.o  do_sendmsg        success      success      MATCH              124823     153523   +28700 (+22.99%)
bpf019.bpf.o  do_parse          success      success      MATCH              124809     153509   +28700 (+23.00%)
bpf227.bpf.o  layered_runnable  success      success      MATCH                1915       2356     +441 (+23.03%)
bpf228.bpf.o  layered_runnable  success      success      MATCH                1700       2152     +452 (+26.59%)
bpf232.bpf.o  layered_runnable  success      success      MATCH                1499       1951     +452 (+30.15%)

bpf312.bpf.o  mount_exit        success      success      MATCH               19253      62883  +43630 (+226.61%)
bpf312.bpf.o  umount_exit       success      success      MATCH               19253      62883  +43630 (+226.61%)
bpf311.bpf.o  mount_exit        success      success      MATCH               19226      62863  +43637 (+226.97%)
bpf311.bpf.o  umount_exit       success      success      MATCH               19226      62863  +43637 (+226.97%)

The above four programs have specific patters that make the verifier explore a lot more states:

    for (; depth < MAX_DIR_DEPTH; depth++) {
        const unsigned char* name = BPF_CORE_READ(dentry, d_name.name);
        if (offset >= MAX_PATH_LEN - MAX_DIR_LEN) {
            return depth;
        }
        int len = bpf_probe_read_kernel_str(&path[offset], MAX_DIR_LEN, name);
        offset += len;
        if (len == MAX_DIR_LEN) {
            if (offset - 2 < MAX_PATH_LEN) {   // <---- (a)
                path[offset - 2] = '.';
            }
            if (offset - 3 < MAX_PATH_LEN) {   // <---- (b)
                path[offset - 3] = '.';
            }
            if (offset - 4 < MAX_PATH_LEN) {   // <---- (c)
                path[offset - 4] = '.';
            }
        }
    }

When at some depth == N false branches of conditions (a), (b) and (c) are scheduled for
verification, constraints for offset at depth == N+1 are:
1. offset >= MAX_PATH_LEN + 2
2. offset >= MAX_PATH_LEN + 3
3. offset >= MAX_PATH_LEN + 4 (visited before others)

And after offset += len it becomes:
1. offset >= MAX_PATH_LEN - 4093
2. offset >= MAX_PATH_LEN - 4092
3. offset >= MAX_PATH_LEN - 4091 (visited before others)

Because of the DFS states exploration logic, the states above are visited in order 3, 2, 1; 3 is not
a subset of 2 and 1 is not a subset of 2, so pruning logic does not kick in.
Previously this was not a problem, because range for offset was not propagated through the
statements (a), (b), (c).

As the root cause of this regression is understood, this is not a blocker for this change.

Selftest Progs
File                                Program                   Verdict (A)  Verdict (B)  Verdict (DIFF)  Insns (A)  Insns (B)  Insns   (DIFF)
----------------------------------  ------------------------  -----------  -----------  --------------  ---------  ---------  --------------
linked_list_peek.bpf.o              list_peek                 success      success      MATCH                 152         88   -64 (-42.11%)
verifier_iterating_callbacks.bpf.o  cond_break2               success      success      MATCH                 110         88   -22 (-20.00%)

These are the added selftests that failed earlier but are passing now:

verifier_linked_scalars.bpf.o       alu32_negative_offset     failure      success      MISMATCH               11         13    +2 (+18.18%)
verifier_linked_scalars.bpf.o       scalars_alu32_big_offset  failure      success      MISMATCH                7         10    +3 (+42.86%)
verifier_linked_scalars.bpf.o       scalars_neg_alu32_add     failure      success      MISMATCH                7         10    +3 (+42.86%)
verifier_linked_scalars.bpf.o       scalars_neg_alu32_sub     failure      success      MISMATCH                7         10    +3 (+42.86%)
verifier_linked_scalars.bpf.o       scalars_neg               failure      success      MISMATCH                7         10    +3 (+42.86%)
verifier_linked_scalars.bpf.o       scalars_neg_sub           failure      success      MISMATCH                7         10    +3 (+42.86%)
verifier_linked_scalars.bpf.o       scalars_sub_neg_imm       failure      success      MISMATCH                7         10    +3 (+42.86%)

iters.bpf.o                         iter_obfuscate_counter    success      success      MATCH                  83        119   +36 (+43.37%)
bpf_cubic.bpf.o                     bpf_cubic_acked           success      success      MATCH                 243        430  +187 (+76.95%)
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260204151741.2678118-1-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Alexei Starovoitov 2026-02-04 13:35:29 -08:00
commit 6e951a9b1a
4 changed files with 346 additions and 15 deletions

View File

@ -147,8 +147,12 @@ struct bpf_reg_state {
* registers. Example:
* r1 = r2; both will have r1->id == r2->id == N
* r1 += 10; r1->id == N | BPF_ADD_CONST and r1->off == 10
* r3 = r2; both will have r3->id == r2->id == N
* w3 += 10; r3->id == N | BPF_ADD_CONST32 and r3->off == 10
*/
#define BPF_ADD_CONST (1U << 31)
#define BPF_ADD_CONST64 (1U << 31)
#define BPF_ADD_CONST32 (1U << 30)
#define BPF_ADD_CONST (BPF_ADD_CONST64 | BPF_ADD_CONST32)
u32 id;
/* PTR_TO_SOCKET and PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK could be a ptr returned
* from a pointer-cast helper, bpf_sk_fullsock() and

View File

@ -16209,6 +16209,13 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
/*
* For alu32 linked register tracking, we need to check dst_reg's
* umax_value before the ALU operation. After adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(),
* alu32 ops will have zero-extended the result, making umax_value <= U32_MAX.
*/
u64 dst_umax = dst_reg->umax_value;
err = adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg);
if (err)
return err;
@ -16218,26 +16225,44 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
* r1 += 0x1
* if r2 < 1000 goto ...
* use r1 in memory access
* So for 64-bit alu remember constant delta between r2 and r1 and
* update r1 after 'if' condition.
* So remember constant delta between r2 and r1 and update r1 after
* 'if' condition.
*/
if (env->bpf_capable &&
BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD && !alu32 &&
dst_reg->id && is_reg_const(src_reg, false)) {
u64 val = reg_const_value(src_reg, false);
(BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD || BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_SUB) &&
dst_reg->id && is_reg_const(src_reg, alu32)) {
u64 val = reg_const_value(src_reg, alu32);
s32 off;
if ((dst_reg->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) ||
/* prevent overflow in sync_linked_regs() later */
val > (u32)S32_MAX) {
if (!alu32 && ((s64)val < S32_MIN || (s64)val > S32_MAX))
goto clear_id;
if (alu32 && (dst_umax > U32_MAX))
goto clear_id;
off = (s32)val;
if (BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_SUB) {
/* Negating S32_MIN would overflow */
if (off == S32_MIN)
goto clear_id;
off = -off;
}
if (dst_reg->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) {
/*
* If the register already went through rX += val
* we cannot accumulate another val into rx->off.
*/
clear_id:
dst_reg->off = 0;
dst_reg->id = 0;
} else {
dst_reg->id |= BPF_ADD_CONST;
dst_reg->off = val;
if (alu32)
dst_reg->id |= BPF_ADD_CONST32;
else
dst_reg->id |= BPF_ADD_CONST64;
dst_reg->off = off;
}
} else {
/*
@ -17334,7 +17359,7 @@ static void sync_linked_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_s
u32 saved_id = reg->id;
fake_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE;
__mark_reg_known(&fake_reg, (s32)reg->off - (s32)known_reg->off);
__mark_reg_known(&fake_reg, (s64)reg->off - (s64)known_reg->off);
/* reg = known_reg; reg += delta */
copy_register_state(reg, known_reg);
@ -17349,6 +17374,9 @@ static void sync_linked_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_s
scalar32_min_max_add(reg, &fake_reg);
scalar_min_max_add(reg, &fake_reg);
reg->var_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, fake_reg.var_off);
if (known_reg->id & BPF_ADD_CONST32)
zext_32_to_64(reg);
reg_bounds_sync(reg);
}
if (e->is_reg)
mark_reg_scratched(env, e->regno);

View File

@ -1477,7 +1477,7 @@ __naked void sub64_full_overflow(void)
SEC("socket")
__description("64-bit subtraction, partial overflow, result in unbounded reg")
__success __log_level(2)
__msg("3: (1f) r3 -= r2 {{.*}} R3=scalar()")
__msg("3: (1f) r3 -= r2 {{.*}} R3=scalar(id=1-1)")
__retval(0)
__naked void sub64_partial_overflow(void)
{

View File

@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
#include "bpf_misc.h"
@ -18,9 +19,9 @@ __naked void scalars(void)
r4 = r1; \
w2 += 0x7FFFFFFF; \
w4 += 0; \
if r2 == 0 goto l1; \
if r2 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
exit; \
l1: \
l0_%=: \
r4 >>= 63; \
r3 = 1; \
r3 -= r4; \
@ -64,4 +65,302 @@ l0_%=: \
: __clobber_all);
}
SEC("socket")
__success
__naked void scalars_neg(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
r0 &= 0xff; \
r1 = r0; \
r1 += -4; \
if r1 s< 0 goto l0_%=; \
if r0 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
r0 /= 0; \
l0_%=: \
r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
: __clobber_all);
}
/* Same test but using BPF_SUB instead of BPF_ADD with negative immediate */
SEC("socket")
__success
__naked void scalars_neg_sub(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
r0 &= 0xff; \
r1 = r0; \
r1 -= 4; \
if r1 s< 0 goto l0_%=; \
if r0 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
r0 /= 0; \
l0_%=: \
r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
: __clobber_all);
}
/* alu32 with negative offset */
SEC("socket")
__success
__naked void scalars_neg_alu32_add(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
w0 &= 0xff; \
w1 = w0; \
w1 += -4; \
if w1 s< 0 goto l0_%=; \
if w0 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
r0 /= 0; \
l0_%=: \
r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
: __clobber_all);
}
/* alu32 with negative offset using SUB */
SEC("socket")
__success
__naked void scalars_neg_alu32_sub(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
w0 &= 0xff; \
w1 = w0; \
w1 -= 4; \
if w1 s< 0 goto l0_%=; \
if w0 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
r0 /= 0; \
l0_%=: \
r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
: __clobber_all);
}
/* Positive offset: r1 = r0 + 4, then if r1 >= 6, r0 >= 2, so r0 != 0 */
SEC("socket")
__success
__naked void scalars_pos(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
r0 &= 0xff; \
r1 = r0; \
r1 += 4; \
if r1 < 6 goto l0_%=; \
if r0 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
r0 /= 0; \
l0_%=: \
r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
: __clobber_all);
}
/* SUB with negative immediate: r1 -= -4 is equivalent to r1 += 4 */
SEC("socket")
__success
__naked void scalars_sub_neg_imm(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
r0 &= 0xff; \
r1 = r0; \
r1 -= -4; \
if r1 < 6 goto l0_%=; \
if r0 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
r0 /= 0; \
l0_%=: \
r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
: __clobber_all);
}
/* Double ADD clears the ID (can't accumulate offsets) */
SEC("socket")
__failure
__msg("div by zero")
__naked void scalars_double_add(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
r0 &= 0xff; \
r1 = r0; \
r1 += 2; \
r1 += 2; \
if r1 < 6 goto l0_%=; \
if r0 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
r0 /= 0; \
l0_%=: \
r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
: __clobber_all);
}
/*
* Test that sync_linked_regs() correctly handles large offset differences.
* r1.off = S32_MIN, r2.off = 1, delta = S32_MIN - 1 requires 64-bit math.
*/
SEC("socket")
__success
__naked void scalars_sync_delta_overflow(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
r0 &= 0xff; \
r1 = r0; \
r2 = r0; \
r1 += %[s32_min]; \
r2 += 1; \
if r2 s< 100 goto l0_%=; \
if r1 s< 0 goto l0_%=; \
r0 /= 0; \
l0_%=: \
r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32),
[s32_min]"i"(INT_MIN)
: __clobber_all);
}
/*
* Another large delta case: r1.off = S32_MAX, r2.off = -1.
* delta = S32_MAX - (-1) = S32_MAX + 1 requires 64-bit math.
*/
SEC("socket")
__success
__naked void scalars_sync_delta_overflow_large_range(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
r0 &= 0xff; \
r1 = r0; \
r2 = r0; \
r1 += %[s32_max]; \
r2 += -1; \
if r2 s< 0 goto l0_%=; \
if r1 s>= 0 goto l0_%=; \
r0 /= 0; \
l0_%=: \
r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32),
[s32_max]"i"(INT_MAX)
: __clobber_all);
}
/*
* Test linked scalar tracking with alu32 and large positive offset (0x7FFFFFFF).
* After w1 += 0x7FFFFFFF, w1 wraps to negative for any r0 >= 1.
* If w1 is signed-negative, then r0 >= 1, so r0 != 0.
*/
SEC("socket")
__success
__naked void scalars_alu32_big_offset(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
w0 &= 0xff; \
w1 = w0; \
w1 += 0x7FFFFFFF; \
if w1 s>= 0 goto l0_%=; \
if w0 != 0 goto l0_%=; \
r0 /= 0; \
l0_%=: \
r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
: __clobber_all);
}
SEC("socket")
__failure
__msg("div by zero")
__naked void scalars_alu32_basic(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
r1 = r0; \
w1 += 1; \
if r1 > 10 goto 1f; \
r0 >>= 32; \
if r0 == 0 goto 1f; \
r0 /= 0; \
1: \
r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
: __clobber_all);
}
/*
* Test alu32 linked register tracking with wrapping.
* R0 is bounded to [0xffffff00, 0xffffffff] (high 32-bit values)
* w1 += 0x100 causes R1 to wrap to [0, 0xff]
*
* After sync_linked_regs, if bounds are computed correctly:
* R0 should be [0x00000000_ffffff00, 0x00000000_ffffff80]
* R0 >> 32 == 0, so div by zero is unreachable
*
* If bounds are computed incorrectly (64-bit underflow):
* R0 becomes [0xffffffff_ffffff00, 0xffffffff_ffffff80]
* R0 >> 32 == 0xffffffff != 0, so div by zero is reachable
*/
SEC("socket")
__success
__naked void scalars_alu32_wrap(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \
w0 |= 0xffffff00; \
r1 = r0; \
w1 += 0x100; \
if r1 > 0x80 goto l0_%=; \
r2 = r0; \
r2 >>= 32; \
if r2 == 0 goto l0_%=; \
r0 /= 0; \
l0_%=: \
r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
: __clobber_all);
}
SEC("socket")
__success
void alu32_negative_offset(void)
{
volatile char path[5];
volatile int offset = bpf_get_prandom_u32();
int off = offset;
if (off >= 5 && off < 10)
path[off - 5] = '.';
/* So compiler doesn't say: error: variable 'path' set but not used */
__sink(path[0]);
}
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";