sctp: auth: propagate HMAC calculation errors to callers

sctp_auth_calculate_hmac() can fail when building the association secret
under memory pressure, but its void return silently leaves the HMAC digest
zeroed.  On the receive path, sctp_sf_authenticate() compares this zeroed
digest against the peer-supplied one using crypto_memneq(), potentially
accepting an all-zero HMAC from the peer if the allocation failed.  On the
send path, sctp_packet_pack() transmits a packet with a zeroed HMAC that
the peer would reject.

Improve error handling by making sctp_auth_calculate_hmac() return int:
- sctp_sf_authenticate() returns SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM instead of accepting
  a zero HMAC.
- sctp_packet_pack() drops the packet on failure instead of transmitting
  a zeroed HMAC.

Update the declaration in auth.h accordingly.

Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Qing Luo <luoqing@kylinos.cn>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807064314.500742-1-l1138897701@163.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Qing Luo 2026-08-07 14:43:14 +08:00 committed by Paolo Abeni
parent d67e5dbda2
commit 5d3ae80ecd
4 changed files with 24 additions and 13 deletions

View File

@ -83,9 +83,9 @@ int sctp_auth_send_cid(enum sctp_cid chunk,
const struct sctp_association *asoc);
int sctp_auth_recv_cid(enum sctp_cid chunk,
const struct sctp_association *asoc);
void sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sk_buff *skb, struct sctp_auth_chunk *auth,
struct sctp_shared_key *ep_key, gfp_t gfp);
int sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sk_buff *skb, struct sctp_auth_chunk *auth,
struct sctp_shared_key *ep_key, gfp_t gfp);
void sctp_auth_shkey_release(struct sctp_shared_key *sh_key);
void sctp_auth_shkey_hold(struct sctp_shared_key *sh_key);

View File

@ -613,9 +613,9 @@ int sctp_auth_recv_cid(enum sctp_cid chunk, const struct sctp_association *asoc)
* zero (as shown in Figure 6) followed by all chunks that are placed
* after the AUTH chunk in the SCTP packet.
*/
void sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sk_buff *skb, struct sctp_auth_chunk *auth,
struct sctp_shared_key *ep_key, gfp_t gfp)
int sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sk_buff *skb, struct sctp_auth_chunk *auth,
struct sctp_shared_key *ep_key, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct sctp_auth_bytes *asoc_key;
__u16 key_id, hmac_id;
@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ void sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
/* ep_key can't be NULL here */
asoc_key = sctp_auth_asoc_create_secret(asoc, ep_key, gfp);
if (!asoc_key)
return;
return -ENOMEM;
free_key = 1;
}
@ -654,6 +654,8 @@ void sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
if (free_key)
sctp_auth_key_put(asoc_key);
return 0;
}
/* API Helpers */

View File

@ -517,8 +517,14 @@ static int sctp_packet_pack(struct sctp_packet *packet,
}
if (auth) {
sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(tp->asoc, nskb, auth,
packet->auth->shkey, gfp);
if (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(tp->asoc, nskb, auth,
packet->auth->shkey, gfp)) {
sctp_chunk_free(packet->auth);
packet->auth = NULL;
if (gso)
kfree_skb(nskb);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* free auth if no more chunks, or add it back */
if (list_empty(&packet->chunk_list))
sctp_chunk_free(packet->auth);
@ -619,7 +625,7 @@ int sctp_packet_transmit(struct sctp_packet *packet, gfp_t gfp)
/* pack up chunks */
pkt_count = sctp_packet_pack(packet, head, gso, gfp);
if (!pkt_count) {
if (pkt_count <= 0) {
kfree_skb(head);
goto out;
}

View File

@ -4455,9 +4455,12 @@ static enum sctp_ierror sctp_sf_authenticate(
memset(digest, 0, sig_len);
sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(asoc, chunk->skb,
(struct sctp_auth_chunk *)chunk->chunk_hdr,
sh_key, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(asoc, chunk->skb,
(struct sctp_auth_chunk *)chunk->chunk_hdr,
sh_key, GFP_ATOMIC)) {
kfree(save_digest);
return SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM;
}
/* Discard the packet if the digests do not match */
if (crypto_memneq(save_digest, digest, sig_len)) {