9p/trans_virtio: reject mount tags longer than NAME_MAX at probe

p9_virtio_probe() reads a 16-bit mount tag length (tag_len) from the
device config and kzalloc()s tag_len + 1 bytes for chan->tag with no
upper bound. A malicious or compromised host can present a tag of up to
65535 bytes; that tag is later copied into the single-page sysfs buffer
by p9_mount_tag_show() (memcpy(buf, chan->tag, tag_len + 1)), a
host-controlled out-of-bounds write of up to ~64 KiB past the PAGE_SIZE
attribute buffer.

Reject an overlong tag at probe time. A 9p mount tag is a name-like
identifier, so bound it by NAME_MAX (255): that limit is independent of
the sysfs/seq_file page size and is far above any legitimate mount tag,
which keeps p9_mount_tag_show() safe at the root without hard-coding a
seq_file implementation detail.

Fixes: 179a5bc4b8 ("net/9p: use memcpy() instead of snprintf() in p9_mount_tag_show()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Christian Schoenebeck <linux_oss@crudebyte.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Schoenebeck <linux_oss@crudebyte.com>
Message-ID: <20260627211012.4042372-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
This commit is contained in:
Michael Bommarito 2026-06-27 17:10:12 -04:00 committed by Dominique Martinet
parent b58943dd69
commit 5bfef2b6da

View File

@ -633,6 +633,11 @@ static int p9_virtio_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev)
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free_vq;
}
if (tag_len > NAME_MAX) {
dev_err(&vdev->dev, "mount tag too long (%u bytes)\n", tag_len);
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free_vq;
}
tag = kzalloc(tag_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tag) {
err = -ENOMEM;