bpf: Guard __get_user acesss with access_ok for uprobe_multi data

As reported by sashiko [1] we need to use access_ok to check the user
space data bounds before we use __get-user to get it.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260610145235.CB1441F00893@smtp.kernel.org/
Fixes: 0b779b61f6 ("bpf: Add cookies support for uprobe_multi link")
Fixes: 89ae89f53d ("bpf: Add multi uprobe link")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260611114230.950379-2-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Jiri Olsa 2026-06-11 13:42:24 +02:00 committed by Alexei Starovoitov
parent 16deef8de0
commit 4d87a251d4

View File

@ -3224,6 +3224,7 @@ int bpf_uprobe_multi_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *pr
unsigned long __user *uoffsets;
u64 __user *ucookies;
void __user *upath;
unsigned long size;
u32 flags, cnt, i;
struct path path;
char *name;
@ -3261,6 +3262,16 @@ int bpf_uprobe_multi_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *pr
uref_ctr_offsets = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->link_create.uprobe_multi.ref_ctr_offsets);
ucookies = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->link_create.uprobe_multi.cookies);
/*
* All uoffsets/uref_ctr_offsets/ucookies arrays have the same value
* size, we need to check their address range is safe for __get_user
* calls.
*/
size = sizeof(*uoffsets) * cnt;
if (!access_ok(uoffsets, size) || !access_ok(uref_ctr_offsets, size) ||
!access_ok(ucookies, size))
return -EFAULT;
name = strndup_user(upath, PATH_MAX);
if (IS_ERR(name)) {
err = PTR_ERR(name);