inet: frags: limit the truesize of a reassembly queue

The truesize of fragments in a reassembly queue is only bounded by
the per netns ipfrag_high_thresh sysctl, which has no upper limit.

inet_frag_reasm_finish() sums the truesize of all fragments in an int.
If this sum reaches 2^32, it wraps, and the final sk_wmem_alloc
adjustment of the socket owning the reassembled skb can cancel its own
reference, leading to a use-after-free of this socket.

This can be triggered from an unprivileged user/network namespace,
raising ipfrag_high_thresh and using padded TUN packets, which keep
a large truesize after being trimmed by ip_rcv_core().

Track the sum of the truesize of fragments in each queue, and refuse
a fragment that would make it bigger than INT_MAX / 2. Callers kill
the queue on this error. This bound is far above the needs of
legitimate traffic.

Fixes: 18685451fc ("inet: inet_defrag: prevent sk release while still in use")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Tested-by: Wang Zhan <wang.zhan@smartx.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261030081225.2575462-1-edumazet@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Eric Dumazet 2026-10-30 09:12:25 +01:00 committed by Paolo Abeni
parent 7308ef8b4a
commit 3ae20e4697
2 changed files with 14 additions and 0 deletions

View File

@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ struct frag_v6_compare_key {
* @tstamp_type: stamp has a mono delivery time (EDT)
* @flags: fragment queue flags
* @max_size: maximum received fragment size
* @truesize: sum of the truesize of queued fragments
* @fqdir: pointer to struct fqdir
* @rcu: rcu head for freeing deferall
*/
@ -100,6 +101,7 @@ struct inet_frag_queue {
u8 tstamp_type;
__u8 flags;
u16 max_size;
unsigned int truesize;
struct fqdir *fqdir;
struct rcu_head rcu;
};
@ -172,6 +174,13 @@ extern const u8 ip_frag_ecn_table[16];
#define IPFRAG_DUP 1
#define IPFRAG_OVERLAP 2
#define IPFRAG_MIXED_SECPATH 3
#define IPFRAG_TOOBIG 4
/* Max sum of the truesize of fragments in a queue. This keeps the sums
* done in inet_frag_reasm_prepare() and inet_frag_reasm_finish() well
* below INT_MAX. Legitimate traffic stays far below this limit.
*/
#define INET_FRAG_MAX_TRUESIZE (INT_MAX / 2)
int inet_frag_queue_insert(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb,
int offset, int end);
void *inet_frag_reasm_prepare(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb,

View File

@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ void inet_frag_queue_flush(struct inet_frag_queue *q,
q->rb_fragments = RB_ROOT;
q->fragments_tail = NULL;
q->last_run_head = NULL;
q->truesize = 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_frag_queue_flush);
@ -446,6 +447,9 @@ int inet_frag_queue_insert(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (last && !secpath_equal(last, skb))
return IPFRAG_MIXED_SECPATH;
if (skb->truesize > INET_FRAG_MAX_TRUESIZE - q->truesize)
return IPFRAG_TOOBIG;
/* An IP fragment is never a GSO packet, but an untrusted source
* (virtio_net_hdr) may have attached GSO metadata to it. Do not let
* that reach the reassembled skb, whose head keeps the first
@ -510,6 +514,7 @@ int inet_frag_queue_insert(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (offset)
nf_reset_ct(skb);
q->truesize += skb->truesize;
return IPFRAG_OK;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_frag_queue_insert);