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inet: frags: limit the truesize of a reassembly queue
The truesize of fragments in a reassembly queue is only bounded by
the per netns ipfrag_high_thresh sysctl, which has no upper limit.
inet_frag_reasm_finish() sums the truesize of all fragments in an int.
If this sum reaches 2^32, it wraps, and the final sk_wmem_alloc
adjustment of the socket owning the reassembled skb can cancel its own
reference, leading to a use-after-free of this socket.
This can be triggered from an unprivileged user/network namespace,
raising ipfrag_high_thresh and using padded TUN packets, which keep
a large truesize after being trimmed by ip_rcv_core().
Track the sum of the truesize of fragments in each queue, and refuse
a fragment that would make it bigger than INT_MAX / 2. Callers kill
the queue on this error. This bound is far above the needs of
legitimate traffic.
Fixes: 18685451fc ("inet: inet_defrag: prevent sk release while still in use")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Tested-by: Wang Zhan <wang.zhan@smartx.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261030081225.2575462-1-edumazet@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
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@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ struct frag_v6_compare_key {
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* @tstamp_type: stamp has a mono delivery time (EDT)
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* @flags: fragment queue flags
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* @max_size: maximum received fragment size
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* @truesize: sum of the truesize of queued fragments
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* @fqdir: pointer to struct fqdir
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* @rcu: rcu head for freeing deferall
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*/
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@ -100,6 +101,7 @@ struct inet_frag_queue {
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u8 tstamp_type;
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__u8 flags;
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u16 max_size;
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unsigned int truesize;
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struct fqdir *fqdir;
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struct rcu_head rcu;
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};
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@ -172,6 +174,13 @@ extern const u8 ip_frag_ecn_table[16];
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#define IPFRAG_DUP 1
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#define IPFRAG_OVERLAP 2
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#define IPFRAG_MIXED_SECPATH 3
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#define IPFRAG_TOOBIG 4
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/* Max sum of the truesize of fragments in a queue. This keeps the sums
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* done in inet_frag_reasm_prepare() and inet_frag_reasm_finish() well
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* below INT_MAX. Legitimate traffic stays far below this limit.
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*/
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#define INET_FRAG_MAX_TRUESIZE (INT_MAX / 2)
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int inet_frag_queue_insert(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb,
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int offset, int end);
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void *inet_frag_reasm_prepare(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb,
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@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ void inet_frag_queue_flush(struct inet_frag_queue *q,
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q->rb_fragments = RB_ROOT;
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q->fragments_tail = NULL;
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q->last_run_head = NULL;
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q->truesize = 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_frag_queue_flush);
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@ -446,6 +447,9 @@ int inet_frag_queue_insert(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb,
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if (last && !secpath_equal(last, skb))
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return IPFRAG_MIXED_SECPATH;
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if (skb->truesize > INET_FRAG_MAX_TRUESIZE - q->truesize)
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return IPFRAG_TOOBIG;
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/* An IP fragment is never a GSO packet, but an untrusted source
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* (virtio_net_hdr) may have attached GSO metadata to it. Do not let
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* that reach the reassembled skb, whose head keeps the first
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@ -510,6 +514,7 @@ int inet_frag_queue_insert(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb,
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if (offset)
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nf_reset_ct(skb);
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q->truesize += skb->truesize;
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return IPFRAG_OK;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_frag_queue_insert);
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