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x86/speculation: Fix prctl() when spectre_v2_user={seccomp,prctl},ibpb
When spectre_v2_user={seccomp,prctl},ibpb is specified on the command
line, IBPB is force-enabled and STIPB is conditionally-enabled (or not
available).
However, since
21998a3515 ("x86/speculation: Avoid force-disabling IBPB based on STIBP and enhanced IBRS.")
the spectre_v2_user_ibpb variable is set to SPECTRE_V2_USER_{PRCTL,SECCOMP}
instead of SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT, which is the actual behaviour.
Because the issuing of IBPB relies on the switch_mm_*_ibpb static
branches, the mitigations behave as expected.
Since
1978b3a53a ("x86/speculation: Allow IBPB to be conditionally enabled on CPUs with always-on STIBP")
this discrepency caused the misreporting of IB speculation via prctl().
On CPUs with STIBP always-on and spectre_v2_user=seccomp,ibpb,
prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL) would return PR_SPEC_PRCTL |
PR_SPEC_ENABLE instead of PR_SPEC_DISABLE since both IBPB and STIPB are
always on. It also allowed prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) to set the IB
speculation mode, even though the flag is ignored.
Similarly, for CPUs without SMT, prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL) should
also return PR_SPEC_DISABLE since IBPB is always on and STIBP is not
available.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Fixes: 21998a3515 ("x86/speculation: Avoid force-disabling IBPB based on STIBP and enhanced IBRS.")
Fixes: 1978b3a53a ("x86/speculation: Allow IBPB to be conditionally enabled on CPUs with always-on STIBP")
Signed-off-by: Anand K Mistry <amistry@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201110123349.1.Id0cbf996d2151f4c143c90f9028651a5b49a5908@changeid
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@ -739,11 +739,13 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
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if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
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setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
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spectre_v2_user_ibpb = mode;
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switch (cmd) {
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case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE:
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case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB:
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case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB:
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static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_always_ibpb);
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spectre_v2_user_ibpb = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT;
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break;
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case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL:
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case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO:
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@ -757,8 +759,6 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
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pr_info("mitigation: Enabling %s Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n",
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static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb) ?
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"always-on" : "conditional");
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spectre_v2_user_ibpb = mode;
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}
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/*
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