From cff8eb65d1eafe7793e54b4d0cf6bf831644630b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Bommarito Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 05:28:25 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 1/9] thunderbolt: Reject zero-length property entries in validator tb_property_entry_valid() accepts entries with length == 0 for DIRECTORY, DATA, and TEXT types. A zero-length TEXT entry passes validation but causes an underflow in the null-termination logic: property->value.text[property->length * 4 - 1] = '\0'; When property->length is 0 this writes to offset -1 relative to the allocation. Reject zero-length entries early in the validator since they have no valid representation in the XDomain property protocol. Fixes: cdae7c07e3e3 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain properties") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg --- drivers/thunderbolt/property.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/thunderbolt/property.c b/drivers/thunderbolt/property.c index da2c59a17db5..5cbc1c4f159c 100644 --- a/drivers/thunderbolt/property.c +++ b/drivers/thunderbolt/property.c @@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ static bool tb_property_entry_valid(const struct tb_property_entry *entry, case TB_PROPERTY_TYPE_DIRECTORY: case TB_PROPERTY_TYPE_DATA: case TB_PROPERTY_TYPE_TEXT: + if (!entry->length) + return false; if (entry->length > block_len) return false; if (check_add_overflow(entry->value, entry->length, &end) || From 65423079c7420e3dbf9a7aa345c243a3f5752e5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Bommarito Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 05:28:26 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 2/9] thunderbolt: Bound root directory content to block size __tb_property_parse_dir() does not check that content_offset + content_len fits within block_len for the root directory case. When rootdir->length equals or exceeds block_len - 2, the entry loop reads past the allocated property block. Add a bounds check after computing content_offset and content_len to reject directories whose content extends past the block. Fixes: cdae7c07e3e3 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain properties") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg --- drivers/thunderbolt/property.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/thunderbolt/property.c b/drivers/thunderbolt/property.c index 5cbc1c4f159c..59beab43f90a 100644 --- a/drivers/thunderbolt/property.c +++ b/drivers/thunderbolt/property.c @@ -187,6 +187,10 @@ static struct tb_property_dir *__tb_property_parse_dir(const u32 *block, if (is_root) { content_offset = dir_offset + 2; content_len = dir_len; + if (content_offset + content_len > block_len) { + tb_property_free_dir(dir); + return NULL; + } } else { if (dir_len < 4) { tb_property_free_dir(dir); From 322e93448d908434ae5545660fcbe8f5a7a8e141 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Bommarito Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 05:28:27 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 3/9] thunderbolt: Clamp XDomain response data copy to allocation size tb_xdp_properties_request() derives the per-packet copy length from the response header without checking that it fits in the previously allocated data buffer. A malicious peer can set its length field larger than the declared data_length, causing memcpy to write past the kcalloc allocation. Clamp the per-packet copy length so that the cumulative offset never exceeds data_len. Fixes: cdae7c07e3e3 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain properties") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg --- drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c b/drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c index 754808c43f00..4099419c7479 100644 --- a/drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c +++ b/drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c @@ -393,6 +393,8 @@ static int tb_xdp_properties_request(struct tb_ctl *ctl, u64 route, } } + if (req.offset + len > data_len) + len = data_len - req.offset; memcpy(data + req.offset, res->data, len * 4); req.offset += len; } while (!data_len || req.offset < data_len); From a504b9f2797b739e0304d537e8aa4ce883ecce39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Bommarito Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 05:28:28 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 4/9] thunderbolt: Validate XDomain request packet size before type cast tb_xdp_handle_request() casts the received packet buffer to protocol-specific structs without verifying that the allocation is large enough for the target type. A peer can send a minimal XDomain packet that passes the generic header length check but is shorter than the struct accessed after the cast, causing out-of- bounds reads from the kmemdup allocation. Plumb the packet length through xdomain_request_work and validate it against the expected struct size before each cast. Fixes: 8e1de7042596 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain lane bonding") Fixes: cdae7c07e3e3 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain properties") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg --- drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c b/drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c index 4099419c7479..9d54e3ccc827 100644 --- a/drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c +++ b/drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ static const char * const state_names[] = { struct xdomain_request_work { struct work_struct work; struct tb_xdp_header *pkg; + size_t pkg_len; struct tb *tb; }; @@ -733,6 +734,7 @@ static void tb_xdp_handle_request(struct work_struct *work) struct xdomain_request_work *xw = container_of(work, typeof(*xw), work); const struct tb_xdp_header *pkg = xw->pkg; const struct tb_xdomain_header *xhdr = &pkg->xd_hdr; + size_t pkg_len = xw->pkg_len; struct tb *tb = xw->tb; struct tb_ctl *ctl = tb->ctl; struct tb_xdomain *xd; @@ -764,7 +766,7 @@ static void tb_xdp_handle_request(struct work_struct *work) switch (pkg->type) { case PROPERTIES_REQUEST: tb_dbg(tb, "%llx: received XDomain properties request\n", route); - if (xd) { + if (xd && pkg_len >= sizeof(struct tb_xdp_properties)) { ret = tb_xdp_properties_response(tb, ctl, xd, sequence, (const struct tb_xdp_properties *)pkg); } @@ -818,7 +820,8 @@ static void tb_xdp_handle_request(struct work_struct *work) tb_dbg(tb, "%llx: received XDomain link state change request\n", route); - if (xd && xd->state == XDOMAIN_STATE_BONDING_UUID_HIGH) { + if (xd && xd->state == XDOMAIN_STATE_BONDING_UUID_HIGH && + pkg_len >= sizeof(struct tb_xdp_link_state_change)) { const struct tb_xdp_link_state_change *lsc = (const struct tb_xdp_link_state_change *)pkg; @@ -870,6 +873,7 @@ tb_xdp_schedule_request(struct tb *tb, const struct tb_xdp_header *hdr, kfree(xw); return false; } + xw->pkg_len = size; xw->tb = tb_domain_get(tb); schedule_work(&xw->work); From 4db2bd2ed4785dbadaeeab9f4e346b21ac5fb8eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Bommarito Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 05:28:29 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 5/9] thunderbolt: Limit XDomain response copy to actual frame size tb_xdomain_copy() copies req->response_size bytes from the received packet buffer regardless of the actual frame size. When a short response arrives, this reads past the valid frame data in the DMA pool buffer into stale contents from previous transactions. Use the minimum of frame size and expected response size for the copy length. Fixes: cdae7c07e3e3 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain properties") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg --- drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c b/drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c index 9d54e3ccc827..1fd1cf4295a2 100644 --- a/drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c +++ b/drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c @@ -123,7 +123,9 @@ static bool tb_xdomain_match(const struct tb_cfg_request *req, static bool tb_xdomain_copy(struct tb_cfg_request *req, const struct ctl_pkg *pkg) { - memcpy(req->response, pkg->buffer, req->response_size); + size_t len = min_t(size_t, pkg->frame.size, req->response_size); + + memcpy(req->response, pkg->buffer, len); req->result.err = 0; return true; } From 183c1076eca43bbb3e7bdf597456f91d81c73e74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Adrian Korwel Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 09:58:31 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 6/9] USB: serial: io_ti: fix heap overflow in get_manuf_info() get_manuf_info() reads le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size) bytes from the device I2C EEPROM into a buffer allocated with kmalloc_obj(), which is sizeof(struct edge_ti_manuf_descriptor) = 10 bytes. The Size field comes from the device and is only validated (in check_i2c_image()) to make sure the descriptor fits within TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE (16384 bytes), not against the destination buffer size. A malicious USB device can therefore set Size to any value up to 16377, causing a heap overflow of up to 16367 bytes when plugged into a host running this driver. valid_csum() is called after read_rom() and also iterates buffer[0..Size-1], compounding the out-of-bounds access. Fix by rejecting descriptors with unexpected length before calling read_rom(). Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Adrian Korwel [ johan: amend commit message; also check for short descriptors ] Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold --- drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c b/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c index cb55370e036f..6e0d4c38911b 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c @@ -773,6 +773,12 @@ static int get_manuf_info(struct edgeport_serial *serial, u8 *buffer) } /* Read the descriptor data */ + if (le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size) != sizeof(struct edge_ti_manuf_descriptor)) { + dev_err(dev, "unexpected Edge descriptor length: %u\n", + le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size)); + status = -EINVAL; + goto exit; + } status = read_rom(serial, start_address+sizeof(struct ti_i2c_desc), le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size), buffer); if (status) From 0fd2b00b2d3d05e3eaa13342b3dfb0fa85c226ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Adrian Korwel Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 09:58:32 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 7/9] USB: serial: io_ti: fix heap overflow in build_i2c_fw_hdr() build_i2c_fw_hdr() allocates a fixed-size buffer of (16*1024 - 512) + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec) bytes, then copies le16_to_cpu(img_header->Length) bytes into it without validating that Length fits within the available space after the firmware record header. img_header->Length is a __le16 from the firmware file and can be up to 65535. check_fw_sanity() validates the total firmware size but not img_header->Length specifically. Fix by rejecting images where img_header->Length exceeds the available destination space. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Adrian Korwel Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold --- drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c b/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c index 6e0d4c38911b..d48819d785ef 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c @@ -844,6 +844,11 @@ static int build_i2c_fw_hdr(u8 *header, const struct firmware *fw) /* Pointer to fw_down memory image */ img_header = (struct ti_i2c_image_header *)&fw->data[4]; + if (le16_to_cpu(img_header->Length) > + buffer_size - sizeof(struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec)) { + kfree(buffer); + return -EINVAL; + } memcpy(buffer + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec), &fw->data[4 + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_image_header)], le16_to_cpu(img_header->Length)); From 1938fb9fe38c4f04a3f30bea44f8071c80a63be4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jack Wu Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2026 10:04:40 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 8/9] USB: serial: option: add usb-id for Dell Wireless DW5826e-m Add support for Dell DW5826e-m with USB-id 0x413c:0x81ea T: Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=04 Cnt=01 Dev#= 8 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.10 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=413c ProdID=81ea Rev= 5.04 S: Manufacturer=DELL S: Product=DW5826e-m Qualcomm Snapdragon X12 Global LTE-A S: SerialNumber=358988870177734 C:* #Ifs= 7 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA A: FirstIf#=12 IfCount= 2 Cls=02(comm.) Sub=0e Prot=00 I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=usbfs E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=82(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=60 Driver=option E: Ad=84(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms E: Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option E: Ad=86(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms E: Ad=85(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=(none) E: Ad=87(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=32ms I:* If#=12 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(comm.) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim E: Ad=88(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=32ms I: If#=13 Alt= 0 #EPs= 0 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim I:* If#=13 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim E: Ad=8e(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=0f(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms Signed-off-by: Jack Wu Reviewed-by: Lars Melin Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [ johan: reserve also interface 4 ] Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold --- drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c index 48ae0188f2e9..a34e79cfd5b6 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c @@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ static void option_instat_callback(struct urb *urb); #define DELL_PRODUCT_5821E_ESIM 0x81e0 #define DELL_PRODUCT_5829E_ESIM 0x81e4 #define DELL_PRODUCT_5829E 0x81e6 +#define DELL_PRODUCT_5826E_ESIM 0x81ea #define DELL_PRODUCT_FM101R_ESIM 0x8213 #define DELL_PRODUCT_FM101R 0x8215 @@ -1123,6 +1124,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = { .driver_info = RSVD(0) | RSVD(6) }, { USB_DEVICE(DELL_VENDOR_ID, DELL_PRODUCT_5829E_ESIM), .driver_info = RSVD(0) | RSVD(6) }, + { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(DELL_VENDOR_ID, DELL_PRODUCT_5826E_ESIM, 0xff), + .driver_info = RSVD(1) | RSVD(4) }, { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(DELL_VENDOR_ID, DELL_PRODUCT_FM101R, 0xff) }, { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(DELL_VENDOR_ID, DELL_PRODUCT_FM101R_ESIM, 0xff) }, { USB_DEVICE(ANYDATA_VENDOR_ID, ANYDATA_PRODUCT_ADU_E100A) }, /* ADU-E100, ADU-310 */ From 96d47e40bf9db4a9efd5c8fb53287a508d165f14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: HyeongJun An Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 18:09:26 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 9/9] USB: serial: kl5kusb105: fix bulk-out buffer overflow klsi_105_prepare_write_buffer() is called by the generic write path with the bulk-out buffer and its size (bulk_out_size, 64 bytes). It stores a two-byte length header at the start of the buffer and copies the payload from the write fifo starting at buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN, but passes the full buffer size as the number of bytes to copy: count = kfifo_out_locked(&port->write_fifo, buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN, size, &port->lock); When the fifo holds at least size bytes, size bytes are copied starting two bytes into the size-byte buffer, writing KLSI_HDR_LEN bytes past its end. Copy at most size - KLSI_HDR_LEN bytes instead, leaving room for the header as safe_serial already does. Writing bulk_out_size or more bytes to the tty triggers a slab out-of-bounds write, observed with KASAN by emulating the device with dummy_hcd and raw-gadget: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kfifo_copy_out+0x83/0xc0 Write of size 64 at addr ffff888112c62202 by task python3 kfifo_copy_out klsi_105_prepare_write_buffer [kl5kusb105] usb_serial_generic_write_start [usbserial] Allocated by task 139: usb_serial_probe [usbserial] The buggy address is located 2 bytes inside of allocated 64-byte region The out-of-bounds write no longer occurs with this change applied. Fixes: 60b3013cdaf3 ("USB: kl5usb105: reimplement using generic framework") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: HyeongJun An Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold --- drivers/usb/serial/kl5kusb105.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/kl5kusb105.c b/drivers/usb/serial/kl5kusb105.c index ed8531a64768..e72a0b45a707 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/kl5kusb105.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/kl5kusb105.c @@ -330,8 +330,8 @@ static int klsi_105_prepare_write_buffer(struct usb_serial_port *port, unsigned char *buf = dest; int count; - count = kfifo_out_locked(&port->write_fifo, buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN, size, - &port->lock); + count = kfifo_out_locked(&port->write_fifo, buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN, + size - KLSI_HDR_LEN, &port->lock); put_unaligned_le16(count, buf); return count + KLSI_HDR_LEN;