KVM: arm64: Validate the SVE vector length in pkvm_vcpu_init_sve()

pkvm_vcpu_init_sve() clamps only the upper bound of the host-provided
sve_max_vl, so an invalid vector length reaches sve_state_size_from_vl()
and the WARN_ON() there, which is fatal at EL2. The existing
!sve_state_size test rejects such a length, but only after the macro has
run.

Check sve_vl_valid() before deriving the state size. A valid length
cannot yield a zero size, so the !sve_state_size test goes with it.

Fixes: 5db1bef933 ("KVM: arm64: Track SVE state in the hypervisor vcpu structure")
Reported-by: Stefan Teodorescu <fane@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260825085948.1674721-2-fuad.tabba@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Fuad Tabba 2026-08-25 09:59:45 +01:00 committed by Oliver Upton
parent 4c74e233cd
commit 2a2eb10795

View File

@ -459,14 +459,15 @@ static int pkvm_vcpu_init_sve(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu, struct kvm_vcpu *h
/* Limit guest vector length to the maximum supported by the host. */
sve_max_vl = min(READ_ONCE(host_vcpu->arch.sve_max_vl), kvm_host_sve_max_vl);
sve_state_size = sve_state_size_from_vl(sve_max_vl);
sve_state = kern_hyp_va(READ_ONCE(host_vcpu->arch.sve_state));
if (!sve_state || !sve_state_size) {
if (!sve_vl_valid(sve_max_vl) || !sve_state) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
sve_state_size = sve_state_size_from_vl(sve_max_vl);
ret = hyp_pin_shared_mem(sve_state, sve_state + sve_state_size);
if (ret)
goto err;