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ASoC: Fixes for v7.1
A bigger batch of fixes than usual due to -next not happeing last week, this is mostly stuff for laptops - a lot of quirks and small fixes, mainly for x86 and SoundWire. Nothing too big or exciting individually, just two week's worth. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEzBAABCgAdFiEEreZoqmdXGLWf4p/qJNaLcl1Uh9AFAmoPk5oACgkQJNaLcl1U h9AW2Af+IFfNdP+xpv6d+aOjyvifBggBhCEUjbVJU/R5RVNd4Za3cHdSw1tueHqC /Bk9s+S9uoWMOvpsnYiqMG7ez1p3LAQbvV+ASSCgcsmZ7LohUxQY8nQAURGWq1mc 7zdDYeb/Lh+QikSaMQxxL0f5DLFctdGiHtlmJs34kDh8OTle0EDqG2r4rjNCFOqN fvRNjlArTRo1IHU8qryeyfm68C/80od36cuWsoGicVOuJoBvDTq6hVeVv+gL6jL1 QTKhDG6aOl0+zVYfy6fOy1LdA164O/NR5ptFnos7DtRf7qzqOuEWpuzm6Vzmqrwz bNuqL+6SuuaRdcD13LRnQaL8fdxcpQ== =ZHJg -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'asoc-fix-v7.1-rc4' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound into for-linus ASoC: Fixes for v7.1 A bigger batch of fixes than usual due to -next not happeing last week, this is mostly stuff for laptops - a lot of quirks and small fixes, mainly for x86 and SoundWire. Nothing too big or exciting individually, just two week's worth.
This commit is contained in:
Takashi Iwai
commit
2519003dd5
2
.mailmap
2
.mailmap
|
|
@ -682,6 +682,7 @@ Peter A Jonsson <pj@ludd.ltu.se>
|
|||
Peter Hilber <peter.hilber@oss.qualcomm.com> <quic_philber@quicinc.com>
|
||||
Peter Oruba <peter.oruba@amd.com>
|
||||
Peter Oruba <peter@oruba.de>
|
||||
Peter Rosin <peda@lysator.liu.se> <peda@axentia.se>
|
||||
Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.dev> <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
|
||||
Pratyush Anand <pratyush.anand@gmail.com> <pratyush.anand@st.com>
|
||||
Pratyush Yadav <pratyush@kernel.org> <ptyadav@amazon.de>
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|
|
@ -856,6 +857,7 @@ Tobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch> <klto@zhaw.ch>
|
|||
Tobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch> <tklauser@nuerscht.ch>
|
||||
Tobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch> <tklauser@xenon.tklauser.home>
|
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Todor Tomov <todor.too@gmail.com> <todor.tomov@linaro.org>
|
||||
Tomasz Jeznach <tomasz.jeznach@linux.dev> <tjeznach@rivosinc.com>
|
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Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
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Trilok Soni <quic_tsoni@quicinc.com> <tsoni@codeaurora.org>
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TripleX Chung <xxx.phy@gmail.com> <triplex@zh-kernel.org>
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|
|
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|
|
@ -47,21 +47,19 @@ Please note that implementation details can be changed.
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Called when swp_entry's refcnt goes down to 0. A charge against swap
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disappears.
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|
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3. charge-commit-cancel
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3. charge-commit
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||||
=======================
|
||||
|
||||
Memcg pages are charged in two steps:
|
||||
|
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- mem_cgroup_try_charge()
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- mem_cgroup_commit_charge() or mem_cgroup_cancel_charge()
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- commit_charge()
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At try_charge(), there are no flags to say "this page is charged".
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at this point, usage += PAGE_SIZE.
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At commit(), the page is associated with the memcg.
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At cancel(), simply usage -= PAGE_SIZE.
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Under below explanation, we assume CONFIG_SWAP=y.
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4. Anonymous
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|
|
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|
|
@ -21,13 +21,13 @@ call at each patchable function entry, and patches it dynamically at runtime to
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enable or disable the redirection. In the case of RISC-V, 2 instructions,
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AUIPC + JALR, are required to compose a function call. However, it is impossible
|
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to patch 2 instructions and expect that a concurrent read-side executes them
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without a race condition. This series makes atmoic code patching possible in
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without a race condition. This series makes atomic code patching possible in
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RISC-V ftrace. Kernel preemption makes things even worse as it allows the old
|
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state to persist across the patching process with stop_machine().
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In order to get rid of stop_machine() and run dynamic ftrace with full kernel
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preemption, we partially initialize each patchable function entry at boot-time,
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setting the first instruction to AUIPC, and the second to NOP. Now, atmoic
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setting the first instruction to AUIPC, and the second to NOP. Now, atomic
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patching is possible because the kernel only has to update one instruction.
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According to Ziccif, as long as an instruction is naturally aligned, the ISA
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guarantee an atomic update.
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|
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@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ By fixing down the first instruction, AUIPC, the range of the ftrace trampoline
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is limited to +-2K from the predetermined target, ftrace_caller, due to the lack
|
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of immediate encoding space in RISC-V. To address the issue, we introduce
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||||
CALL_OPS, where an 8B naturally align metadata is added in front of each
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pacthable function. The metadata is resolved at the first trampoline, then the
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execution can be derect to another custom trampoline.
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||||
patchable function. The metadata is resolved at the first trampoline, then the
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execution can be directed to another custom trampoline.
|
||||
|
||||
CMODX in the User Space
|
||||
-----------------------
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|
|
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|
|
@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ the program.
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|||
|
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Per-task indirect branch tracking state can be monitored and
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controlled via the :c:macro:`PR_GET_CFI` and :c:macro:`PR_SET_CFI`
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``prctl()` arguments (respectively), by supplying
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``prctl()`` arguments (respectively), by supplying
|
||||
:c:macro:`PR_CFI_BRANCH_LANDING_PADS` as the second argument. These
|
||||
are architecture-agnostic, and will return -EINVAL if the underlying
|
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functionality is not supported.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -16,10 +16,15 @@ allOf:
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|||
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
compatible:
|
||||
enum:
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||||
- amlogic,meson6-i2c # Meson6, Meson8 and compatible SoCs
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||||
- amlogic,meson-gxbb-i2c # GXBB and compatible SoCs
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- amlogic,meson-axg-i2c # AXG and compatible SoCs
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oneOf:
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- items:
|
||||
- enum:
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||||
- amlogic,t7-i2c
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- const: amlogic,meson-axg-i2c
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- enum:
|
||||
- amlogic,meson6-i2c # Meson6, Meson8 and compatible SoCs
|
||||
- amlogic,meson-gxbb-i2c # GXBB and compatible SoCs
|
||||
- amlogic,meson-axg-i2c # AXG and compatible SoCs
|
||||
|
||||
reg:
|
||||
maxItems: 1
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -22,7 +22,9 @@ properties:
|
|||
compatible:
|
||||
oneOf:
|
||||
- items:
|
||||
- const: apple,t6020-i2c
|
||||
- enum:
|
||||
- apple,t6020-i2c
|
||||
- apple,t8122-i2c
|
||||
- const: apple,t8103-i2c
|
||||
- items:
|
||||
- enum:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -18,7 +18,9 @@ properties:
|
|||
description: Phandles of rt5650 and rt5514 codecs
|
||||
items:
|
||||
- description: phandle of rt5650 codec
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||||
maxItems: 1
|
||||
- description: phandle of rt5514 codec
|
||||
maxItems: 1
|
||||
|
||||
mediatek,platform:
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$ref: /schemas/types.yaml#/definitions/phandle
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|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -22,5 +22,5 @@ The following sensors are supported
|
|||
sysfs-Interface
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||||
---------------
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||||
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||||
temp0_input
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temp1_input
|
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- Temperature of external NTC (milli-degree C)
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||||
|
|
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|||
|
|
@ -135,4 +135,4 @@ References
|
|||
|
||||
4. **Lenovo IdeaPad Laptop Driver:** Reference for DMI-based hardware
|
||||
feature gating in Lenovo laptops.
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||||
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/drivers/platform/x86/ideapad-laptop.c
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||||
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/drivers/platform/x86/lenovo/ideapad-laptop.c
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -69,6 +69,15 @@ properties:
|
|||
header:
|
||||
description: For C-compatible languages, header which already defines this value.
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
scope:
|
||||
description: |
|
||||
Visibility of this definition. "uapi" (default) renders into
|
||||
the uAPI header, "kernel" renders into the kernel-side
|
||||
generated header, "user" renders into the user-side
|
||||
generated header. When combined with `header:`, the
|
||||
definition is not rendered, and the named header is
|
||||
included only by code matching the scope.
|
||||
enum: [ uapi, kernel, user ]
|
||||
type:
|
||||
enum: [ const, enum, flags ]
|
||||
doc:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -83,6 +83,15 @@ properties:
|
|||
header:
|
||||
description: For C-compatible languages, header which already defines this value.
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
scope:
|
||||
description: |
|
||||
Visibility of this definition. "uapi" (default) renders into
|
||||
the uAPI header, "kernel" renders into the kernel-side
|
||||
generated header, "user" renders into the user-side
|
||||
generated header. When combined with `header:`, the
|
||||
definition is not rendered, and the named header is
|
||||
included only by code matching the scope.
|
||||
enum: [ uapi, kernel, user ]
|
||||
type:
|
||||
enum: [ const, enum, flags, struct ] # Trim
|
||||
doc:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -55,6 +55,15 @@ properties:
|
|||
header:
|
||||
description: For C-compatible languages, header which already defines this value.
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
scope:
|
||||
description: |
|
||||
Visibility of this definition. "uapi" (default) renders into
|
||||
the uAPI header, "kernel" renders into the kernel-side
|
||||
generated header, "user" renders into the user-side
|
||||
generated header. When combined with `header:`, the
|
||||
definition is not rendered, and the named header is
|
||||
included only by code matching the scope.
|
||||
enum: [ uapi, kernel, user ]
|
||||
type:
|
||||
enum: [ const, enum, flags ]
|
||||
doc:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -87,6 +87,15 @@ properties:
|
|||
header:
|
||||
description: For C-compatible languages, header which already defines this value.
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
scope:
|
||||
description: |
|
||||
Visibility of this definition. "uapi" (default) renders into
|
||||
the uAPI header, "kernel" renders into the kernel-side
|
||||
generated header, "user" renders into the user-side
|
||||
generated header. When combined with `header:`, the
|
||||
definition is not rendered, and the named header is
|
||||
included only by code matching the scope.
|
||||
enum: [ uapi, kernel, user ]
|
||||
type:
|
||||
enum: [ const, enum, flags, struct ] # Trim
|
||||
doc:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -33,6 +33,11 @@ doc: |
|
|||
@cap-get operation.
|
||||
|
||||
definitions:
|
||||
-
|
||||
type: const
|
||||
name: max-handle-id
|
||||
value: 0x3fffffe
|
||||
scope: kernel
|
||||
-
|
||||
type: enum
|
||||
name: scope
|
||||
|
|
@ -140,6 +145,8 @@ attribute-sets:
|
|||
-
|
||||
name: id
|
||||
type: u32
|
||||
checks:
|
||||
max: max-handle-id
|
||||
doc: |
|
||||
Numeric identifier of a shaper. The id semantic depends on
|
||||
the scope. For @queue scope it's the queue id and for @node
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ regressions and security problems.
|
|||
debugging/index
|
||||
handling-regressions
|
||||
security-bugs
|
||||
threat-model
|
||||
cve
|
||||
embargoed-hardware-issues
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -66,6 +66,42 @@ In addition, the following information are highly desirable:
|
|||
the issue appear. It is useful to share them, as they can be helpful to
|
||||
keep end users protected during the time it takes them to apply the fix.
|
||||
|
||||
What qualifies as a security bug
|
||||
--------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
It is important that most bugs are handled publicly so as to involve the widest
|
||||
possible audience and find the best solution. By nature, bugs that are handled
|
||||
in closed discussions between a small set of participants are less likely to
|
||||
produce the best possible fix (e.g., risk of missing valid use cases, limited
|
||||
testing abilities).
|
||||
|
||||
It turns out that the majority of the bugs reported via the security team are
|
||||
just regular bugs that have been improperly qualified as security bugs due to
|
||||
a lack of awareness of the Linux kernel's threat model, as described in
|
||||
Documentation/process/threat-model.rst, and ought to have been sent through
|
||||
the normal channels described in Documentation/admin-guide/reporting-issues.rst
|
||||
instead.
|
||||
|
||||
The security list exists for urgent bugs that grant an attacker a capability
|
||||
they are not supposed to have on a correctly configured production system, and
|
||||
can be easily exploited, representing an imminent threat to many users. Before
|
||||
reporting, consider whether the issue actually crosses a trust boundary on such
|
||||
a system.
|
||||
|
||||
**If you resorted to AI assistance to identify a bug, you must treat it as
|
||||
public**. While you may have valid reasons to believe it is not, the security
|
||||
team's experience shows that bugs discovered this way systematically surface
|
||||
simultaneously across multiple researchers, often on the same day. In this
|
||||
case, do not publicly share a reproducer, as this could cause unintended harm;
|
||||
just mention that one is available and maintainers might ask for it privately
|
||||
if they need it.
|
||||
|
||||
If you are unsure whether an issue qualifies, err on the side of reporting
|
||||
privately: the security team would rather triage a borderline report than miss
|
||||
a real vulnerability. Reporting ordinary bugs to the security list, however,
|
||||
does not make them move faster and consumes triage capacity that other reports
|
||||
need.
|
||||
|
||||
Identifying contacts
|
||||
--------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -74,7 +110,7 @@ affected subsystem's maintainers and Cc: the Linux kernel security team. Do
|
|||
not send it to a public list at this stage, unless you have good reasons to
|
||||
consider the issue as being public or trivial to discover (e.g. result of a
|
||||
widely available automated vulnerability scanning tool that can be repeated by
|
||||
anyone).
|
||||
anyone, or use of AI-based tools).
|
||||
|
||||
If you're sending a report for issues affecting multiple parts in the kernel,
|
||||
even if they're fairly similar issues, please send individual messages (think
|
||||
|
|
@ -131,6 +167,64 @@ the Linux kernel security team only. Your message will be triaged, and you
|
|||
will receive instructions about whom to contact, if needed. Your message may
|
||||
equally be forwarded as-is to the relevant maintainers.
|
||||
|
||||
Responsible use of AI to find bugs
|
||||
----------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
A significant fraction of bug reports submitted to the security team are
|
||||
actually the result of code reviews assisted by AI tools. While this can be an
|
||||
efficient means to find bugs in rarely explored areas, it causes an overload on
|
||||
maintainers, who are sometimes forced to ignore such reports due to their poor
|
||||
quality or accuracy. As such, reporters must be particularly cautious about a
|
||||
number of points which tend to make these reports needlessly difficult to
|
||||
handle:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Length**: AI-generated reports tend to be excessively long, containing
|
||||
multiple sections and excessive detail. This makes it difficult to spot
|
||||
important information such as affected files, versions, and impact. Please
|
||||
ensure that a clear summary of the problem and all critical details are
|
||||
presented first. Do not require triage engineers to scan multiple pages of
|
||||
text. Configure your tools to produce concise, human-style reports.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Formatting**: Most AI-generated reports are littered with Markdown tags.
|
||||
These decorations complicate the search for important information and do
|
||||
not survive the quoting processes involved in forwarding or replying.
|
||||
Please **always convert your report to plain text** without any formatting
|
||||
decorations before sending it.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Impact Evaluation**: Many AI-generated reports lack an understanding
|
||||
of the kernel's threat model (see Documentation/process/threat-model.rst)
|
||||
and go to great lengths inventing theoretical consequences. This adds
|
||||
noise and complicates triage. Please stick to verifiable facts (e.g.,
|
||||
"this bug permits any user to gain CAP_NET_ADMIN") without enumerating
|
||||
speculative implications. Have your tool read this documentation as
|
||||
part of the evaluation process.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Reproducer**: AI-based tools are often capable of generating reproducers.
|
||||
Please always ensure your tool provides one and **test it thoroughly**. If
|
||||
the reproducer does not work, or if the tool cannot produce one, the
|
||||
validity of the report should be seriously questioned. Note that since the
|
||||
report will be posted to a public list, the reproducer should only be
|
||||
shared upon maintainers' request.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Propose a Fix**: Many AI tools are actually better at writing code than
|
||||
evaluating it. Please ask your tool to propose a fix and **test it** before
|
||||
reporting the problem. If the fix cannot be tested because it relies on
|
||||
rare hardware or almost extinct network protocols, the issue is likely not
|
||||
a security bug. In any case, if a fix is proposed, it must adhere to
|
||||
Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst and include a 'Fixes:' tag
|
||||
designating the commit that introduced the bug.
|
||||
|
||||
Failure to consider these points exposes your report to the risk of being
|
||||
ignored.
|
||||
|
||||
Use common sense when evaluating the report. If the affected file has not been
|
||||
touched for more than one year and is maintained by a single individual, it is
|
||||
likely that usage has declined and exposed users are virtually non-existent
|
||||
(e.g., drivers for very old hardware, obsolete filesystems). In such cases,
|
||||
there is no need to consume a maintainer's time with an unimportant report. If
|
||||
the issue is clearly trivial and publicly discoverable, you should report it
|
||||
directly to the public mailing lists.
|
||||
|
||||
Sending the report
|
||||
------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -148,7 +242,15 @@ run additional tests. Reports where the reporter does not respond promptly
|
|||
or cannot effectively discuss their findings may be abandoned if the
|
||||
communication does not quickly improve.
|
||||
|
||||
The report must be sent to maintainers, with the security team in ``Cc:``.
|
||||
The report must be sent to maintainers. If there are two or fewer
|
||||
recipients in your message, you must also always Cc: the Linux kernel
|
||||
security team who will ensure the message is delivered to the proper
|
||||
people, and will be able to assist small maintainer teams with processes
|
||||
they may not be familiar with. For larger teams, Cc: the Linux kernel
|
||||
security team for your first few reports or when seeking specific help,
|
||||
such as when resending a message which got no response within a week.
|
||||
Once you have become comfortable with the process for a few reports, it is
|
||||
no longer necessary to Cc: the security list when sending to large teams.
|
||||
The Linux kernel security team can be contacted by email at
|
||||
<security@kernel.org>. This is a private list of security officers
|
||||
who will help verify the bug report and assist developers working on a fix.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
235
Documentation/process/threat-model.rst
Normal file
235
Documentation/process/threat-model.rst
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
|
|||
The Linux Kernel threat model
|
||||
=============================
|
||||
|
||||
There are a lot of assumptions regarding what the kernel does and does not
|
||||
protect against. These assumptions tend to cause confusion for bug reports
|
||||
(:doc:`security-related ones <security-bugs>` vs :doc:`non-security ones
|
||||
<../admin-guide/reporting-issues>`), and can complicate security enforcement
|
||||
when the responsibilities for some boundaries is not clear between the kernel,
|
||||
distros, administrators and users.
|
||||
|
||||
This document tries to clarify the responsibilities of the kernel in this
|
||||
domain.
|
||||
|
||||
The kernel's responsibilities
|
||||
-----------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
The kernel abstracts access to local hardware resources and to remote systems
|
||||
in a way that allows multiple local users to get a fair share of the available
|
||||
resources granted to them, and, when the underlying hardware permits, to assign
|
||||
a level of confidentiality to their communications and to the data they are
|
||||
processing or storing.
|
||||
|
||||
The kernel assumes that the underlying hardware behaves according to its
|
||||
specifications. This includes the integrity of the CPU's instruction set, the
|
||||
transparency of the branch prediction unit and the cache units, the consistency
|
||||
of the Memory Management Unit (MMU), the isolation of DMA-capable peripherals
|
||||
(e.g., via IOMMU), state transitions in controllers, ranges of values read from
|
||||
registers, the respect of documented hardware limitations, etc.
|
||||
|
||||
When hardware fails to maintain its specified isolation (e.g., CPU bugs,
|
||||
side-channels, hardware response to unexpected inputs), the kernel will usually
|
||||
attempt to implement reasonable mitigations. These are best-effort measures
|
||||
intended to reduce the attack surface or elevate the cost of an attack within
|
||||
the limits of the hardware's facilities; they do not constitute a
|
||||
kernel-provided safety guarantee.
|
||||
|
||||
Users always perform their activities under the authority of an administrator
|
||||
who is able to grant or deny various types of permissions that may affect how
|
||||
users benefit from available resources, or the level of confidentiality of
|
||||
their activities. Administrators may also delegate all or part of their own
|
||||
permissions to some users, particularly via capabilities but not only. All this
|
||||
is performed via configuration (sysctl, file-system permissions etc).
|
||||
|
||||
The Linux Kernel applies a certain collection of default settings that match
|
||||
its threat model. Distros have their own threat model and will come with their
|
||||
own configuration presets, that the administrator may have to adjust to better
|
||||
suit their expectations (relax or restrict).
|
||||
|
||||
By default, the Linux Kernel guarantees the following protections when running
|
||||
on common processors featuring privilege levels and memory management units:
|
||||
|
||||
* **User-based isolation**: an unprivileged user may restrict access to their
|
||||
own data from other unprivileged users running on the same system. This
|
||||
includes:
|
||||
|
||||
* stored data, via file system permissions
|
||||
* in-memory data (pages are not accessible by default to other users)
|
||||
* process activity (ptrace is not permitted to other users)
|
||||
* inter-process communication (other users may not observe data exchanged via
|
||||
UNIX domain sockets or other IPC mechanisms).
|
||||
* network communications within the same or with other systems
|
||||
|
||||
* **Capability-based protection**:
|
||||
|
||||
* users not having elevated capabilities (including but not limited to
|
||||
CAP_SYS_ADMIN) may not alter the
|
||||
kernel's configuration, memory nor state, change other users' view of the
|
||||
file system layout, grant any user capabilities they do not have, nor
|
||||
affect the system's availability (shutdown, reboot, panic, hang, or making
|
||||
the system unresponsive via unbounded resource exhaustion).
|
||||
* users not having the ``CAP_NET_ADMIN`` capability may not alter the network
|
||||
configuration, intercept nor spoof network communications from other users
|
||||
nor systems.
|
||||
* users not having ``CAP_SYS_PTRACE`` may not observe other users' processes
|
||||
activities.
|
||||
|
||||
When ``CONFIG_USER_NS`` is set, the kernel also permits unprivileged users to
|
||||
create their own user namespace in which they have all capabilities, but with a
|
||||
number of restrictions (they may not perform actions that have impacts on the
|
||||
initial user namespace, such as changing time, loading modules or mounting
|
||||
block devices). Please refer to ``user_namespaces(7)`` for more details, the
|
||||
possibilities of user namespaces are not covered in this document.
|
||||
|
||||
The kernel also offers a lot of troubleshooting and debugging facilities, which
|
||||
can constitute attack vectors when placed in wrong hands. While some of them
|
||||
are designed to be accessible to regular local users with a low risk (e.g.
|
||||
kernel logs via ``/proc/kmsg``), some would expose enough information to
|
||||
represent a risk in most places and the decision to expose them is under the
|
||||
administrator's responsibility (perf events, traces), and others are not
|
||||
designed to be accessed by non-privileged users (e.g. debugfs). Access to these
|
||||
facilities by a user who has been explicitly granted permission by an
|
||||
administrator does not constitute a security breach.
|
||||
|
||||
Bugs that permit to violate the principles above constitute security breaches.
|
||||
However, bugs that permit one violation only once another one was already
|
||||
achieved are only weaknesses. The kernel applies a number of self-protection
|
||||
measures whose purpose is to avoid crossing a security boundary when certain
|
||||
classes of bugs are found, but a failure of these extra protections do not
|
||||
constitute a vulnerability alone.
|
||||
|
||||
What does not constitute a security bug
|
||||
---------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
In the Linux kernel's threat model, the following classes of problems are
|
||||
**NOT** considered as Linux Kernel security bugs. However, when it is believed
|
||||
that the kernel could do better, they should be reported, so that they can be
|
||||
reviewed and fixed where reasonably possible, but they will be handled as any
|
||||
regular bug:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Configuration**:
|
||||
|
||||
* outdated kernels and particularly end-of-life branches are out of the scope
|
||||
of the kernel's threat model: administrators are responsible for keeping
|
||||
their system up to date. For a bug to qualify as a security bug, it must be
|
||||
demonstrated that it affects actively maintained versions.
|
||||
|
||||
* build-level: changes to the kernel configuration that are explicitly
|
||||
documented as lowering the security level (e.g. ``CONFIG_NOMMU``), or
|
||||
targeted at developers only.
|
||||
|
||||
* OS-level: changes to command line parameters, sysctls, filesystem
|
||||
permissions, user capabilities, exposure of privileged interfaces, that
|
||||
explicitly increase exposure by either offering non-default access to
|
||||
unprivileged users, or reduce the kernel's ability to enforce some
|
||||
protections or mitigations. Example: write access to procfs or debugfs.
|
||||
|
||||
* issues triggered only when using features intended for development or
|
||||
debugging (e.g., LOCKDEP, KASAN, FAULT_INJECTION): these features are known
|
||||
to introduce overhead and potential instability and are not intended for
|
||||
production use.
|
||||
|
||||
* issues affecting drivers exposed under CONFIG_STAGING, as well as features
|
||||
marked EXPERIMENTAL in the configuration.
|
||||
|
||||
* loading of explicitly insecure/broken/staging modules, and generally any
|
||||
using any subsystem marked as experimental or not intended for production
|
||||
use.
|
||||
|
||||
* running out-of-tree modules or unofficial kernel forks; these should be
|
||||
reported to the relevant vendor.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Excess of initial privileges**:
|
||||
|
||||
* actions performed by a user already possessing the privileges required to
|
||||
perform that action or modify that state (e.g. ``CAP_SYS_ADMIN``,
|
||||
``CAP_NET_ADMIN``, ``CAP_SYS_RAWIO``, ``CAP_SYS_MODULE`` with no further
|
||||
boundary being crossed).
|
||||
|
||||
* actions performed in user namespace that do not bypass the restrictions
|
||||
imposed to the initial user (e.g. ptrace usage, signal delivery, resource
|
||||
usage, access to FS/device/sysctl/memory, network binding, system/network
|
||||
configuration etc).
|
||||
|
||||
* anything performed by the root user in the initial namespace (e.g. kernel
|
||||
oops when writing to a privileged device).
|
||||
|
||||
* **Out of production use**:
|
||||
|
||||
This covers theoretical/probabilistic attacks that rely on laboratory
|
||||
conditions with zero system noise, or those requiring an unrealistic number
|
||||
of attempts (e.g., billions of trials) that would be detected by standard
|
||||
system monitoring long before success, such as:
|
||||
|
||||
* prediction of random numbers that only works in a totally silent
|
||||
environment (such as IP ID, TCP ports or sequence numbers that can only be
|
||||
guessed in a lab).
|
||||
|
||||
* activity observation and information leaks based on probabilistic
|
||||
approaches that are prone to measurement noise and not realistically
|
||||
reproducible on a production system.
|
||||
|
||||
* issues that can only be triggered by heavy attacks (e.g. brute force) whose
|
||||
impact on the system makes it unlikely or impossible to remain undetected
|
||||
before they succeed (e.g. consuming all memory before succeeding).
|
||||
|
||||
* problems seen only under development simulators, emulators, or combinations
|
||||
that do not exist on real systems at the time of reporting (issues
|
||||
involving tens of millions of threads, tens of thousands of CPUs,
|
||||
unrealistic CPU frequencies, RAM sizes or disk capacities, network speeds.
|
||||
|
||||
* issues whose reproduction requires hardware modification or emulation,
|
||||
including fake USB devices that pretend to be another one.
|
||||
|
||||
* as well as issues that can be triggered at a cost that is orders of
|
||||
magnitude higher than the expected benefits (e.g. fully functional keyboard
|
||||
emulator only to retrieve 7 uninitialized bytes in a structure, or
|
||||
brute-force method involving millions of connection attempts to guess a
|
||||
port number).
|
||||
|
||||
* **Hardening failures**:
|
||||
|
||||
* ability to bypass some of the kernel's hardening measures with no
|
||||
demonstrable exploit path (e.g. ASLR bypass, events timing or probing with
|
||||
no demonstrable consequence). These are just weaknesses, not
|
||||
vulnerabilities.
|
||||
|
||||
* missing argument checks and failure to report certain errors with no
|
||||
immediate consequence.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Random information leaks**:
|
||||
|
||||
This concerns information leaks of small data parts that happen to be there
|
||||
and that cannot be chosen by the attacker, or face access restrictions:
|
||||
|
||||
* structure padding reported by syscalls or other interfaces.
|
||||
|
||||
* identifiers, partial data, non-terminated strings reported in error
|
||||
messages.
|
||||
|
||||
* Leaks of kernel memory addresses/pointers do not constitute an immediately
|
||||
exploitable vector and are not security bugs, though they must be reported
|
||||
and fixed.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Crafted file system images**:
|
||||
|
||||
* bugs triggered by mounting a corrupted or maliciously crafted file system
|
||||
image are generally not security bugs, as the kernel assumes the underlying
|
||||
storage media is under the administrator's control, unless the filesystem
|
||||
driver is specifically documented as being hardened against untrusted media.
|
||||
|
||||
* issues that are resolved, mitigated, or detected by running a filesystem
|
||||
consistency check (fsck) on the image prior to mounting.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Physical access**:
|
||||
|
||||
Issues that require physical access to the machine, hardware modification, or
|
||||
the use of specialized hardware (e.g., logic analyzers, DMA-attack tools over
|
||||
PCI-E/Thunderbolt) are out of scope unless the system is explicitly
|
||||
configured with technologies meant to defend against such attacks
|
||||
(e.g. IOMMU).
|
||||
|
||||
* **Functional and performance regressions**:
|
||||
|
||||
Any issue that can be mitigated by setting proper permissions and limits
|
||||
doesn't qualify as a security bug.
|
||||
|
|
@ -24,6 +24,97 @@ Quick access to CPU number, node ID
|
|||
Allows to implement per CPU data efficiently. Documentation is in code and
|
||||
selftests. :(
|
||||
|
||||
Optimized RSEQ V2
|
||||
-----------------
|
||||
|
||||
On architectures which utilize the generic entry code and generic TIF bits
|
||||
the kernel supports runtime optimizations for RSEQ, which also enable
|
||||
enhanced features like scheduler time slice extensions.
|
||||
|
||||
To enable them a task has to register the RSEQ region with at least the
|
||||
length advertised by getauxval(AT_RSEQ_FEATURE_SIZE).
|
||||
|
||||
If existing binaries register with RSEQ_ORIG_SIZE (32 bytes), the kernel
|
||||
keeps the legacy low performance mode enabled to fulfil the expectations
|
||||
of existing users regarding the original RSEQ implementation behaviour.
|
||||
|
||||
The following table documents the ABI and behavioral guarantees of the
|
||||
legacy and the optimized V2 mode.
|
||||
|
||||
.. list-table:: RSEQ modes
|
||||
:header-rows: 1
|
||||
|
||||
* - Nr
|
||||
- What
|
||||
|
||||
- Legacy
|
||||
- Optimized V2
|
||||
|
||||
* - 1
|
||||
- The cpu_id_start, cpu_id, node_id and mm_cid fields (User mode read
|
||||
only)
|
||||
.. Legacy
|
||||
- Updated by the kernel unconditionally after each context switch and
|
||||
before signal delivery
|
||||
.. Optimized V2
|
||||
- Updated by the kernel if and only if they change, i.e. if the task
|
||||
is migrated or mm_cid changes
|
||||
|
||||
* - 2
|
||||
- The rseq_cs critical section field
|
||||
.. Legacy
|
||||
- Evaluated and handled unconditionally after each context switch and
|
||||
before signal delivery
|
||||
.. Optimized V2
|
||||
- Evaluated and handled conditionally only when user space was
|
||||
interrupted and was scheduled out or before delivering a signal in
|
||||
the interrupted context.
|
||||
|
||||
* - 3
|
||||
- Read only fields
|
||||
.. Legacy
|
||||
- No strict enforcement except in debug mode
|
||||
.. Optimized V2
|
||||
- Strict enforcement
|
||||
|
||||
* - 4
|
||||
- membarrier(...RSEQ)
|
||||
.. Legacy
|
||||
- All running threads of the process are interrupted and the ID fields
|
||||
are rewritten and eventually active critical sections are aborted
|
||||
before they return to user space. All threads which are scheduled
|
||||
out whether voluntary or not are covered by #1/#2 above.
|
||||
.. Optimized V2
|
||||
- All running threads of the process are interrupted and eventually
|
||||
active critical sections are aborted before these threads return to
|
||||
user space. The ID fields are only updated if changed as a
|
||||
consequence of the interrupt. All threads which are scheduled out
|
||||
whether voluntary or not are covered by #1/#2 above.
|
||||
|
||||
* - 5
|
||||
- Time slice extensions
|
||||
.. Legacy
|
||||
- Not supported
|
||||
.. Optimized V2
|
||||
- Supported
|
||||
|
||||
The legacy mode is obviously less performant as it does unconditional
|
||||
updates and critical section checks even if not strictly required by the
|
||||
ABI contract. That can't be changed anymore as some users depend on that
|
||||
observed behavior, which in turn enables them to violate the ABI and
|
||||
overwrite the cpu_id_start field for their own purposes. This is obviously
|
||||
discouraged as it renders RSEQ incompatible with the intended usage and
|
||||
breaks the expectation of other libraries in the same application.
|
||||
|
||||
The ABI compliant optimized v2 mode, which respects the read only fields,
|
||||
does not require unconditional updates and therefore is way more
|
||||
performant. The kernel validates the read only fields for compliance. If
|
||||
user space modifies them, the process is killed. Compliant usage allows
|
||||
multiple libraries in the same application to benefit from the RSEQ
|
||||
functionality without disturbing each other. The ABI compliant optimized v2
|
||||
mode also enables extended RSEQ features like time slice extensions.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Scheduler time slice extensions
|
||||
-------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -37,7 +128,8 @@ The prerequisites for this functionality are:
|
|||
|
||||
* Enabled at boot time (default is enabled)
|
||||
|
||||
* A rseq userspace pointer has been registered for the thread
|
||||
* A rseq userspace pointer has been registered for the thread in
|
||||
optimized V2 mode
|
||||
|
||||
The thread has to enable the functionality via prctl(2)::
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -656,8 +656,8 @@ References
|
|||
See [white-paper]_, [api-spec]_, [amd-apm]_, [kvm-forum]_, and [snp-fw-abi]_
|
||||
for more info.
|
||||
|
||||
.. [white-paper] https://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf
|
||||
.. [api-spec] https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM_API_Specification.pdf
|
||||
.. [amd-apm] https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.34)
|
||||
.. [white-paper] https://docs.amd.com/v/u/en-US/memory-encryption-white-paper
|
||||
.. [api-spec] https://docs.amd.com/v/u/en-US/55766_PUB_3.24_SEV_API
|
||||
.. [amd-apm] https://docs.amd.com/v/u/en-US/24593_3.44_APM_Vol2 (section 15.34)
|
||||
.. [kvm-forum] https://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf
|
||||
.. [snp-fw-abi] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdf
|
||||
.. [snp-fw-abi] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/developer/56860.pdf
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
73
MAINTAINERS
73
MAINTAINERS
|
|
@ -68,6 +68,12 @@ Maintainers List
|
|||
first. When adding to this list, please keep the entries in
|
||||
alphabetical order.
|
||||
|
||||
3C509 NETWORK DRIVER
|
||||
M: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@orcam.me.uk>
|
||||
L: netdev@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
F: drivers/net/ethernet/3com/3c509.c
|
||||
|
||||
3C59X NETWORK DRIVER
|
||||
M: Steffen Klassert <klassert@kernel.org>
|
||||
L: netdev@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
|
|
@ -2015,7 +2021,7 @@ F: Documentation/hwmon/aquacomputer_d5next.rst
|
|||
F: drivers/hwmon/aquacomputer_d5next.c
|
||||
|
||||
AQUANTIA ETHERNET DRIVER (atlantic)
|
||||
M: Igor Russkikh <irusskikh@marvell.com>
|
||||
M: Sukhdeep Singh <sukhdeeps@marvell.com>
|
||||
L: netdev@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
W: https://www.marvell.com/
|
||||
|
|
@ -2024,7 +2030,7 @@ F: Documentation/networking/device_drivers/ethernet/aquantia/atlantic.rst
|
|||
F: drivers/net/ethernet/aquantia/atlantic/
|
||||
|
||||
AQUANTIA ETHERNET DRIVER PTP SUBSYSTEM
|
||||
M: Egor Pomozov <epomozov@marvell.com>
|
||||
M: Sukhdeep Singh <sukhdeeps@marvell.com>
|
||||
L: netdev@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
W: http://www.aquantia.com
|
||||
|
|
@ -4181,8 +4187,8 @@ F: include/uapi/linux/sonet.h
|
|||
F: net/atm/
|
||||
|
||||
ATMEL MACB ETHERNET DRIVER
|
||||
M: Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@microchip.com>
|
||||
M: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea@tuxon.dev>
|
||||
M: Théo Lebrun <theo.lebrun@bootlin.com>
|
||||
R: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
F: drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -4299,18 +4305,16 @@ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/leds/backlight/awinic,aw99706.yaml
|
|||
F: drivers/video/backlight/aw99706.c
|
||||
|
||||
AXENTIA ARM DEVICES
|
||||
M: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>
|
||||
L: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers)
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
S: Orphan
|
||||
F: arch/arm/boot/dts/microchip/at91-linea.dtsi
|
||||
F: arch/arm/boot/dts/microchip/at91-natte.dtsi
|
||||
F: arch/arm/boot/dts/microchip/at91-nattis-2-natte-2.dts
|
||||
F: arch/arm/boot/dts/microchip/at91-tse850-3.dts
|
||||
|
||||
AXENTIA ASOC DRIVERS
|
||||
M: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>
|
||||
L: linux-sound@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
S: Orphan
|
||||
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/axentia,*
|
||||
F: sound/soc/atmel/tse850-pcm5142.c
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -6358,6 +6362,7 @@ F: include/uapi/linux/comedi.h
|
|||
COMMON CLK FRAMEWORK
|
||||
M: Michael Turquette <mturquette@baylibre.com>
|
||||
M: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
|
||||
R: Brian Masney <bmasney@redhat.com>
|
||||
L: linux-clk@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
Q: http://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-clk/list/
|
||||
|
|
@ -7077,6 +7082,12 @@ T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git core/debugobjec
|
|||
F: include/linux/debugobjects.h
|
||||
F: lib/debugobjects.c
|
||||
|
||||
DEC LANCE NETWORK DRIVER
|
||||
M: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@orcam.me.uk>
|
||||
L: netdev@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
F: drivers/net/ethernet/amd/declance.c
|
||||
|
||||
DECSTATION PLATFORM SUPPORT
|
||||
M: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@orcam.me.uk>
|
||||
L: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
|
|
@ -8193,10 +8204,9 @@ F: include/uapi/drm/nouveau_drm.h
|
|||
CORE DRIVER FOR NVIDIA GPUS [RUST]
|
||||
M: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>
|
||||
M: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@nvidia.com>
|
||||
L: nouveau@lists.freedesktop.org
|
||||
L: nova-gpu@lists.linux.dev
|
||||
S: Supported
|
||||
W: https://rust-for-linux.com/nova-gpu-driver
|
||||
Q: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/project/nouveau/
|
||||
B: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/nova/-/issues
|
||||
C: irc://irc.oftc.net/nouveau
|
||||
T: git https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/rust/kernel.git drm-rust-next
|
||||
|
|
@ -8205,10 +8215,9 @@ F: drivers/gpu/nova-core/
|
|||
|
||||
DRM DRIVER FOR NVIDIA GPUS [RUST]
|
||||
M: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>
|
||||
L: nouveau@lists.freedesktop.org
|
||||
L: nova-gpu@lists.linux.dev
|
||||
S: Supported
|
||||
W: https://rust-for-linux.com/nova-gpu-driver
|
||||
Q: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/project/nouveau/
|
||||
B: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/nova/-/issues
|
||||
C: irc://irc.oftc.net/nouveau
|
||||
T: git https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/rust/kernel.git drm-rust-next
|
||||
|
|
@ -12046,7 +12055,7 @@ F: Documentation/i2c/busses/i2c-nvidia-gpu.rst
|
|||
F: drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-nvidia-gpu.c
|
||||
|
||||
I2C MUXES
|
||||
M: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>
|
||||
M: Peter Rosin <peda@lysator.liu.se>
|
||||
L: linux-i2c@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/i2c/i2c-arb*
|
||||
|
|
@ -12447,7 +12456,7 @@ F: drivers/iio/industrialio-backend.c
|
|||
F: include/linux/iio/backend.h
|
||||
|
||||
IIO DIGITAL POTENTIOMETER DAC
|
||||
M: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>
|
||||
M: Peter Rosin <peda@lysator.liu.se>
|
||||
L: linux-iio@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
F: Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio-dac-dpot-dac
|
||||
|
|
@ -12455,7 +12464,7 @@ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/dac/dpot-dac.yaml
|
|||
F: drivers/iio/dac/dpot-dac.c
|
||||
|
||||
IIO ENVELOPE DETECTOR
|
||||
M: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>
|
||||
M: Peter Rosin <peda@lysator.liu.se>
|
||||
L: linux-iio@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
F: Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio-adc-envelope-detector
|
||||
|
|
@ -12471,7 +12480,7 @@ F: include/linux/iio/iio-gts-helper.h
|
|||
F: drivers/iio/test/iio-test-gts.c
|
||||
|
||||
IIO MULTIPLEXER
|
||||
M: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>
|
||||
M: Peter Rosin <peda@lysator.liu.se>
|
||||
L: linux-iio@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/multiplexer/io-channel-mux.yaml
|
||||
|
|
@ -12502,7 +12511,7 @@ F: include/linux/iio/
|
|||
F: tools/iio/
|
||||
|
||||
IIO UNIT CONVERTER
|
||||
M: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>
|
||||
M: Peter Rosin <peda@lysator.liu.se>
|
||||
L: linux-iio@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/afe/current-sense-amplifier.yaml
|
||||
|
|
@ -12779,7 +12788,6 @@ M: Cezary Rojewski <cezary.rojewski@intel.com>
|
|||
M: Liam Girdwood <liam.r.girdwood@linux.intel.com>
|
||||
M: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com>
|
||||
M: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
|
||||
M: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com>
|
||||
M: Kai Vehmanen <kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com>
|
||||
R: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.dev>
|
||||
L: linux-sound@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
|
|
@ -14052,6 +14060,7 @@ KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE FOR ARM64 (KVM/arm64)
|
|||
M: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
|
||||
M: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
|
||||
R: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
|
||||
R: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||
R: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
|
||||
R: Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>
|
||||
L: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers)
|
||||
|
|
@ -15718,7 +15727,7 @@ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/media/i2c/maxim,max96717.yaml
|
|||
F: drivers/media/i2c/max96717.c
|
||||
|
||||
MAX9860 MONO AUDIO VOICE CODEC DRIVER
|
||||
M: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>
|
||||
M: Peter Rosin <peda@lysator.liu.se>
|
||||
L: linux-sound@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/max9860.txt
|
||||
|
|
@ -15933,7 +15942,7 @@ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/microchip,mcp251xfd.yaml
|
|||
F: drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251xfd/
|
||||
|
||||
MCP4018 AND MCP4531 MICROCHIP DIGITAL POTENTIOMETER DRIVERS
|
||||
M: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>
|
||||
M: Peter Rosin <peda@lysator.liu.se>
|
||||
L: linux-iio@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
F: Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio-potentiometer-mcp4531
|
||||
|
|
@ -18238,7 +18247,7 @@ F: include/linux/mmc/
|
|||
F: include/uapi/linux/mmc/
|
||||
|
||||
MULTIPLEXER SUBSYSTEM
|
||||
M: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>
|
||||
M: Peter Rosin <peda@lysator.liu.se>
|
||||
S: Odd Fixes
|
||||
F: Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-mux*
|
||||
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/mux/
|
||||
|
|
@ -19347,7 +19356,7 @@ F: include/dt-bindings/display/tda998x.h
|
|||
K: "nxp,tda998x"
|
||||
|
||||
NXP TFA9879 DRIVER
|
||||
M: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>
|
||||
M: Peter Rosin <peda@lysator.liu.se>
|
||||
L: linux-sound@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/trivial-codec.yaml
|
||||
|
|
@ -19445,7 +19454,6 @@ F: include/misc/ocxl*
|
|||
F: include/uapi/misc/ocxl.h
|
||||
|
||||
OMAP AUDIO SUPPORT
|
||||
M: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@gmail.com>
|
||||
M: Jarkko Nikula <jarkko.nikula@bitmer.com>
|
||||
L: linux-sound@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
L: linux-omap@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
|
|
@ -20348,13 +20356,14 @@ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pci/marvell,armada8k-pcie.yaml
|
|||
F: drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-armada8k.c
|
||||
|
||||
PCI DRIVER FOR CADENCE PCIE IP
|
||||
R: Aksh Garg <a-garg7@ti.com>
|
||||
L: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Orphan
|
||||
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pci/cdns,*
|
||||
F: drivers/pci/controller/cadence/*cadence*
|
||||
F: drivers/pci/controller/cadence/
|
||||
|
||||
PCI DRIVER FOR CIX Sky1
|
||||
M: Hans Zhang <hans.zhang@cixtech.com>
|
||||
M: Hans Zhang <18255117159@163.com>
|
||||
L: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pci/cix,sky1-pcie-*.yaml
|
||||
|
|
@ -20466,7 +20475,7 @@ F: drivers/pci/controller/plda/pcie-plda-host.c
|
|||
F: drivers/pci/controller/plda/pcie-plda.h
|
||||
|
||||
PCI DRIVER FOR RENESAS R-CAR
|
||||
M: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut+renesas@gmail.com>
|
||||
M: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut+renesas@mailbox.org>
|
||||
M: Yoshihiro Shimoda <yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com>
|
||||
L: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
L: linux-renesas-soc@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
|
|
@ -22940,7 +22949,7 @@ N: riscv
|
|||
K: riscv
|
||||
|
||||
RISC-V IOMMU
|
||||
M: Tomasz Jeznach <tjeznach@rivosinc.com>
|
||||
M: Tomasz Jeznach <tomasz.jeznach@linux.dev>
|
||||
L: iommu@lists.linux.dev
|
||||
L: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
|
|
@ -24650,6 +24659,7 @@ S: Maintained
|
|||
F: fs/smb/client/smbdirect.*
|
||||
F: fs/smb/smbdirect/
|
||||
F: fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.*
|
||||
F: include/linux/smbdirect.h
|
||||
|
||||
SMC91x ETHERNET DRIVER
|
||||
M: Nicolas Pitre <nico@fluxnic.net>
|
||||
|
|
@ -25053,7 +25063,6 @@ SOUND - SOUND OPEN FIRMWARE (SOF) DRIVERS
|
|||
M: Liam Girdwood <lgirdwood@gmail.com>
|
||||
M: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com>
|
||||
M: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
|
||||
M: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com>
|
||||
M: Daniel Baluta <daniel.baluta@nxp.com>
|
||||
R: Kai Vehmanen <kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com>
|
||||
R: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.dev>
|
||||
|
|
@ -26346,7 +26355,7 @@ F: arch/xtensa/
|
|||
F: drivers/irqchip/irq-xtensa-*
|
||||
|
||||
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS ASoC DRIVERS
|
||||
M: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@gmail.com>
|
||||
M: Sen Wang <sen@ti.com>
|
||||
L: linux-sound@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/davinci-mcasp-audio.yaml
|
||||
|
|
@ -26848,12 +26857,6 @@ S: Maintained
|
|||
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/adc/ti,tsc2046.yaml
|
||||
F: drivers/iio/adc/ti-tsc2046.c
|
||||
|
||||
TI TWL4030 SERIES SOC CODEC DRIVER
|
||||
M: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@gmail.com>
|
||||
L: linux-sound@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
F: sound/soc/codecs/twl4030*
|
||||
|
||||
TI VPE/CAL DRIVERS
|
||||
M: Yemike Abhilash Chandra <y-abhilashchandra@ti.com>
|
||||
L: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
4
Makefile
4
Makefile
|
|
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
|||
VERSION = 7
|
||||
PATCHLEVEL = 1
|
||||
SUBLEVEL = 0
|
||||
EXTRAVERSION = -rc2
|
||||
EXTRAVERSION = -rc4
|
||||
NAME = Baby Opossum Posse
|
||||
|
||||
# *DOCUMENTATION*
|
||||
|
|
@ -486,6 +486,8 @@ export rust_common_flags := --edition=2021 \
|
|||
-Wclippy::as_ptr_cast_mut \
|
||||
-Wclippy::as_underscore \
|
||||
-Wclippy::cast_lossless \
|
||||
-Aclippy::collapsible_if \
|
||||
-Aclippy::collapsible_match \
|
||||
-Wclippy::ignored_unit_patterns \
|
||||
-Aclippy::incompatible_msrv \
|
||||
-Wclippy::mut_mut \
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static inline u64 tcr_el2_ps_to_tcr_el1_ips(u64 tcr_el2)
|
|||
static inline u64 translate_tcr_el2_to_tcr_el1(u64 tcr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return TCR_EPD1_MASK | /* disable TTBR1_EL1 */
|
||||
((tcr & TCR_EL2_DS) ? TCR_DS : 0) |
|
||||
((tcr & TCR_EL2_TBI) ? TCR_TBI0 : 0) |
|
||||
tcr_el2_ps_to_tcr_el1_ips(tcr) |
|
||||
(tcr & TCR_EL2_TG0_MASK) |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -844,7 +844,7 @@
|
|||
#define INIT_SCTLR_EL2_MMU_ON \
|
||||
(SCTLR_ELx_M | SCTLR_ELx_C | SCTLR_ELx_SA | SCTLR_ELx_I | \
|
||||
SCTLR_ELx_IESB | SCTLR_ELx_WXN | ENDIAN_SET_EL2 | \
|
||||
SCTLR_ELx_ITFSB | SCTLR_EL2_RES1)
|
||||
SCTLR_ELx_ITFSB | SCTLR_ELx_EIS | SCTLR_ELx_EOS | SCTLR_EL2_RES1)
|
||||
|
||||
#define INIT_SCTLR_EL2_MMU_OFF \
|
||||
(SCTLR_EL2_RES1 | ENDIAN_SET_EL2)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -62,6 +62,13 @@ static void noinstr arm64_exit_to_kernel_mode(struct pt_regs *regs,
|
|||
irqentry_exit_to_kernel_mode_after_preempt(regs, state);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static __always_inline void arm64_syscall_enter_from_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
||||
{
|
||||
enter_from_user_mode(regs);
|
||||
mte_disable_tco_entry(current);
|
||||
sme_enter_from_user_mode();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Handle IRQ/context state management when entering from user mode.
|
||||
* Before this function is called it is not safe to call regular kernel code,
|
||||
|
|
@ -70,20 +77,30 @@ static void noinstr arm64_exit_to_kernel_mode(struct pt_regs *regs,
|
|||
static __always_inline void arm64_enter_from_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
||||
{
|
||||
enter_from_user_mode(regs);
|
||||
rseq_note_user_irq_entry();
|
||||
mte_disable_tco_entry(current);
|
||||
sme_enter_from_user_mode();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static __always_inline void arm64_syscall_exit_to_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
||||
{
|
||||
local_irq_disable();
|
||||
syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(regs);
|
||||
local_daif_mask();
|
||||
sme_exit_to_user_mode();
|
||||
mte_check_tfsr_exit();
|
||||
exit_to_user_mode();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Handle IRQ/context state management when exiting to user mode.
|
||||
* After this function returns it is not safe to call regular kernel code,
|
||||
* instrumentable code, or any code which may trigger an exception.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
static __always_inline void arm64_exit_to_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
||||
{
|
||||
local_irq_disable();
|
||||
exit_to_user_mode_prepare_legacy(regs);
|
||||
irqentry_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(regs);
|
||||
local_daif_mask();
|
||||
sme_exit_to_user_mode();
|
||||
mte_check_tfsr_exit();
|
||||
|
|
@ -92,7 +109,7 @@ static __always_inline void arm64_exit_to_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
|||
|
||||
asmlinkage void noinstr asm_exit_to_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
||||
{
|
||||
arm64_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
|
||||
arm64_syscall_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
|
|
@ -716,12 +733,12 @@ static void noinstr el0_brk64(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
|
|||
|
||||
static void noinstr el0_svc(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
||||
{
|
||||
arm64_enter_from_user_mode(regs);
|
||||
arm64_syscall_enter_from_user_mode(regs);
|
||||
cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_svc_handler();
|
||||
fpsimd_syscall_enter();
|
||||
local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
|
||||
do_el0_svc(regs);
|
||||
arm64_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
|
||||
arm64_syscall_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
|
||||
fpsimd_syscall_exit();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -868,11 +885,11 @@ static void noinstr el0_cp15(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
|
|||
|
||||
static void noinstr el0_svc_compat(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
||||
{
|
||||
arm64_enter_from_user_mode(regs);
|
||||
arm64_syscall_enter_from_user_mode(regs);
|
||||
cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_svc_handler();
|
||||
local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
|
||||
do_el0_svc_compat(regs);
|
||||
arm64_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
|
||||
arm64_syscall_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void noinstr el0_bkpt32(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -983,8 +983,8 @@ static int sve_set_common(struct task_struct *target,
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Always zero V regs, FPSR, and FPCR */
|
||||
memset(¤t->thread.uw.fpsimd_state, 0,
|
||||
sizeof(current->thread.uw.fpsimd_state));
|
||||
memset(&target->thread.uw.fpsimd_state, 0,
|
||||
sizeof(target->thread.uw.fpsimd_state));
|
||||
|
||||
/* Registers: FPSIMD-only case */
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
|
|||
* Author: Christoffer Dall <c.dall@virtualopensystems.com>
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/bug.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/cpu_pm.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/errno.h>
|
||||
|
|
@ -2638,6 +2639,22 @@ static int init_pkvm_host_sve_state(void)
|
|||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int pkvm_check_sme_dvmsync_fw_call(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct arm_smccc_res res;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_4193714))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_CPU_WORKAROUND_4193714, &res);
|
||||
if (res.a0) {
|
||||
kvm_err("pKVM requires firmware support for C1-Pro erratum 4193714\n");
|
||||
return -ENODEV;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Finalizes the initialization of hyp mode, once everything else is initialized
|
||||
* and the initialziation process cannot fail.
|
||||
|
|
@ -2838,6 +2855,10 @@ static int __init init_hyp_mode(void)
|
|||
if (err)
|
||||
goto out_err;
|
||||
|
||||
err = pkvm_check_sme_dvmsync_fw_call();
|
||||
if (err)
|
||||
goto out_err;
|
||||
|
||||
err = kvm_hyp_init_protection(hyp_va_bits);
|
||||
if (err) {
|
||||
kvm_err("Failed to init hyp memory protection\n");
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static inline void __activate_traps_ich_hfgxtr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
|
|||
__activate_fgt(hctxt, vcpu, ICH_HFGITR_EL2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#define __deactivate_fgt(htcxt, vcpu, reg) \
|
||||
#define __deactivate_fgt(hctxt, vcpu, reg) \
|
||||
do { \
|
||||
write_sysreg_s(ctxt_sys_reg(hctxt, reg), \
|
||||
SYS_ ## reg); \
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ void trace_clock_update(u32 mult, u32 shift, u64 epoch_ns, u64 epoch_cyc)
|
|||
struct clock_data *clock = &trace_clock_data;
|
||||
u64 bank = clock->cur ^ 1;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!mult || shift >= 64)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
clock->data[bank].mult = mult;
|
||||
clock->data[bank].shift = shift;
|
||||
clock->data[bank].epoch_ns = epoch_ns;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
|
|||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <asm/kvm_emulate.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/kvm_hyp.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/kvm_mmu.h>
|
||||
|
|
@ -14,6 +15,7 @@
|
|||
|
||||
#include <hyp/fault.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <nvhe/arm-smccc.h>
|
||||
#include <nvhe/gfp.h>
|
||||
#include <nvhe/memory.h>
|
||||
#include <nvhe/mem_protect.h>
|
||||
|
|
@ -29,6 +31,19 @@ static struct hyp_pool host_s2_pool;
|
|||
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct pkvm_hyp_vm *, __current_vm);
|
||||
#define current_vm (*this_cpu_ptr(&__current_vm))
|
||||
|
||||
static void pkvm_sme_dvmsync_fw_call(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (alternative_has_cap_unlikely(ARM64_WORKAROUND_4193714)) {
|
||||
struct arm_smccc_res res;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Ignore the return value. Probing for the workaround
|
||||
* availability took place in init_hyp_mode().
|
||||
*/
|
||||
hyp_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_CPU_WORKAROUND_4193714, &res);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void guest_lock_component(struct pkvm_hyp_vm *vm)
|
||||
{
|
||||
hyp_spin_lock(&vm->lock);
|
||||
|
|
@ -574,8 +589,14 @@ static int host_stage2_set_owner_metadata_locked(phys_addr_t addr, u64 size,
|
|||
ret = host_stage2_try(kvm_pgtable_stage2_annotate, &host_mmu.pgt,
|
||||
addr, size, &host_s2_pool,
|
||||
KVM_HOST_INVALID_PTE_TYPE_DONATION, annotation);
|
||||
if (!ret)
|
||||
if (!ret) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* After stage2 maintenance has happened, but before the page
|
||||
* owner has changed.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
pkvm_sme_dvmsync_fw_call();
|
||||
__host_update_page_state(addr, size, PKVM_NOPAGE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -1369,6 +1390,22 @@ int __pkvm_host_reclaim_page_guest(u64 gfn, struct pkvm_hyp_vm *vm)
|
|||
return ret && ret != -EHWPOISON ? ret : 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* share/donate install at most one stage-2 leaf (PAGE_SIZE, or one
|
||||
* KVM_PGTABLE_LAST_LEVEL - 1 block for share). kvm_mmu_cache_min_pages()
|
||||
* bounds the worst-case allocation: exact for the PAGE_SIZE leaf,
|
||||
* conservative by one for the block.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int __guest_check_pgtable_memcache(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *vcpu)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct pkvm_hyp_vm *vm = pkvm_hyp_vcpu_to_hyp_vm(vcpu);
|
||||
|
||||
if (vcpu->vcpu.arch.pkvm_memcache.nr_pages < kvm_mmu_cache_min_pages(vm->pgt.mmu))
|
||||
return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int __pkvm_host_donate_guest(u64 pfn, u64 gfn, struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *vcpu)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct pkvm_hyp_vm *vm = pkvm_hyp_vcpu_to_hyp_vm(vcpu);
|
||||
|
|
@ -1388,6 +1425,10 @@ int __pkvm_host_donate_guest(u64 pfn, u64 gfn, struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *vcpu)
|
|||
if (ret)
|
||||
goto unlock;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = __guest_check_pgtable_memcache(vcpu);
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
goto unlock;
|
||||
|
||||
meta = host_stage2_encode_gfn_meta(vm, gfn);
|
||||
WARN_ON(host_stage2_set_owner_metadata_locked(phys, PAGE_SIZE,
|
||||
PKVM_ID_GUEST, meta));
|
||||
|
|
@ -1453,6 +1494,10 @@ int __pkvm_host_share_guest(u64 pfn, u64 gfn, u64 nr_pages, struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu
|
|||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ret = __guest_check_pgtable_memcache(vcpu);
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
goto unlock;
|
||||
|
||||
for_each_hyp_page(page, phys, size) {
|
||||
set_host_state(page, PKVM_PAGE_SHARED_OWNED);
|
||||
page->host_share_guest_count++;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -752,16 +752,30 @@ static struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu selftest_vcpu = {
|
|||
struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *init_selftest_vm(void *virt)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct hyp_page *p = hyp_virt_to_page(virt);
|
||||
unsigned long min_pages, seeded = 0;
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
|
||||
selftest_vm.kvm.arch.mmu.vtcr = host_mmu.arch.mmu.vtcr;
|
||||
WARN_ON(kvm_guest_prepare_stage2(&selftest_vm, virt));
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Mirror pkvm_refill_memcache() for the share/donate pre-checks;
|
||||
* the selftest invokes those functions directly and would
|
||||
* otherwise see an empty memcache.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
min_pages = kvm_mmu_cache_min_pages(&selftest_vm.kvm.arch.mmu);
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < pkvm_selftest_pages(); i++) {
|
||||
if (p[i].refcount)
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
p[i].refcount = 1;
|
||||
hyp_put_page(&selftest_vm.pool, hyp_page_to_virt(&p[i]));
|
||||
if (seeded < min_pages) {
|
||||
push_hyp_memcache(&selftest_vcpu.vcpu.arch.pkvm_memcache,
|
||||
hyp_page_to_virt(&p[i]), hyp_virt_to_phys);
|
||||
seeded++;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
hyp_put_page(&selftest_vm.pool, hyp_page_to_virt(&p[i]));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
selftest_vm.kvm.arch.pkvm.handle = __pkvm_reserve_vm();
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -663,7 +663,8 @@ static void __noreturn __hyp_call_panic(u64 spsr, u64 elr, u64 par)
|
|||
host_ctxt = host_data_ptr(host_ctxt);
|
||||
vcpu = host_ctxt->__hyp_running_vcpu;
|
||||
|
||||
__deactivate_traps(vcpu);
|
||||
if (vcpu)
|
||||
__deactivate_traps(vcpu);
|
||||
sysreg_restore_host_state_vhe(host_ctxt);
|
||||
|
||||
panic("HYP panic:\nPS:%08llx PC:%016llx ESR:%08llx\nFAR:%016llx HPFAR:%016llx PAR:%016llx\nVCPU:%p\n",
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1576,21 +1576,24 @@ struct kvm_s2_fault_desc {
|
|||
static int gmem_abort(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd)
|
||||
{
|
||||
bool write_fault, exec_fault;
|
||||
bool perm_fault = kvm_vcpu_trap_is_permission_fault(s2fd->vcpu);
|
||||
enum kvm_pgtable_walk_flags flags = KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_SHARED;
|
||||
enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot = KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R;
|
||||
struct kvm_pgtable *pgt = s2fd->vcpu->arch.hw_mmu->pgt;
|
||||
unsigned long mmu_seq;
|
||||
struct page *page;
|
||||
struct kvm *kvm = s2fd->vcpu->kvm;
|
||||
void *memcache;
|
||||
void *memcache = NULL;
|
||||
kvm_pfn_t pfn;
|
||||
gfn_t gfn;
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
memcache = get_mmu_memcache(s2fd->vcpu);
|
||||
ret = topup_mmu_memcache(s2fd->vcpu, memcache);
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
if (!perm_fault) {
|
||||
memcache = get_mmu_memcache(s2fd->vcpu);
|
||||
ret = topup_mmu_memcache(s2fd->vcpu, memcache);
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (s2fd->nested)
|
||||
gfn = kvm_s2_trans_output(s2fd->nested) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
|
||||
|
|
@ -1631,9 +1634,19 @@ static int gmem_abort(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd)
|
|||
goto out_unlock;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ret = KVM_PGT_FN(kvm_pgtable_stage2_map)(pgt, s2fd->fault_ipa, PAGE_SIZE,
|
||||
__pfn_to_phys(pfn), prot,
|
||||
memcache, flags);
|
||||
if (perm_fault) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Drop the SW bits in favour of those stored in the
|
||||
* PTE, which will be preserved.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
prot &= ~KVM_NV_GUEST_MAP_SZ;
|
||||
ret = KVM_PGT_FN(kvm_pgtable_stage2_relax_perms)(pgt, s2fd->fault_ipa,
|
||||
prot, flags);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ret = KVM_PGT_FN(kvm_pgtable_stage2_map)(pgt, s2fd->fault_ipa, PAGE_SIZE,
|
||||
__pfn_to_phys(pfn), prot,
|
||||
memcache, flags);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
out_unlock:
|
||||
kvm_release_faultin_page(kvm, page, !!ret, prot & KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_W);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ obj-y += mm/
|
|||
obj-y += net/
|
||||
obj-y += vdso/
|
||||
|
||||
obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += kvm/
|
||||
obj-$(subst m,y,$(CONFIG_KVM)) += kvm/
|
||||
|
||||
# for cleaning
|
||||
subdir- += boot
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ menu "Kernel type and options"
|
|||
|
||||
choice
|
||||
prompt "Kernel type"
|
||||
default 64BIT # Keep existing behavior
|
||||
|
||||
config 32BIT
|
||||
bool "32-bit kernel"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -55,9 +55,11 @@ endif
|
|||
ifdef CONFIG_32BIT
|
||||
tool-archpref = $(32bit-tool-archpref)
|
||||
UTS_MACHINE := loongarch32
|
||||
cflags-y += $(call cc-option,-m32)
|
||||
else
|
||||
tool-archpref = $(64bit-tool-archpref)
|
||||
UTS_MACHINE := loongarch64
|
||||
cflags-y += $(call cc-option,-m64)
|
||||
endif
|
||||
|
||||
ifneq ($(SUBARCH),$(ARCH))
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -20,3 +20,23 @@ asmlinkage void noinstr __no_stack_protector ret_from_kernel_thread(struct task_
|
|||
struct pt_regs *regs,
|
||||
int (*fn)(void *),
|
||||
void *fn_arg);
|
||||
|
||||
struct kvm_run;
|
||||
struct kvm_vcpu;
|
||||
struct loongarch_fpu;
|
||||
|
||||
void kvm_exc_entry(void);
|
||||
int kvm_enter_guest(struct kvm_run *run, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
|
||||
|
||||
void kvm_save_fpu(struct loongarch_fpu *fpu);
|
||||
void kvm_restore_fpu(struct loongarch_fpu *fpu);
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_HAS_LSX
|
||||
void kvm_save_lsx(struct loongarch_fpu *fpu);
|
||||
void kvm_restore_lsx(struct loongarch_fpu *fpu);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_HAS_LASX
|
||||
void kvm_save_lasx(struct loongarch_fpu *fpu);
|
||||
void kvm_restore_lasx(struct loongarch_fpu *fpu);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -87,7 +87,6 @@ struct kvm_context {
|
|||
struct kvm_world_switch {
|
||||
int (*exc_entry)(void);
|
||||
int (*enter_guest)(struct kvm_run *run, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
|
||||
unsigned long page_order;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
#define MAX_PGTABLE_LEVELS 4
|
||||
|
|
@ -359,8 +358,6 @@ void kvm_exc_entry(void);
|
|||
int kvm_enter_guest(struct kvm_run *run, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
|
||||
|
||||
extern unsigned long vpid_mask;
|
||||
extern const unsigned long kvm_exception_size;
|
||||
extern const unsigned long kvm_enter_guest_size;
|
||||
extern struct kvm_world_switch *kvm_loongarch_ops;
|
||||
|
||||
#define SW_GCSR (1 << 0)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
|
|||
9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, \
|
||||
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, \
|
||||
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31; \
|
||||
.cfi_offset \num, SC_REGS + \num * SZREG; \
|
||||
.cfi_offset \num, SC_REGS + \num * 8; \
|
||||
.endr; \
|
||||
\
|
||||
nop; \
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -85,12 +85,6 @@ static __always_inline u64 __arch_get_hw_counter(s32 clock_mode,
|
|||
return count;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline bool loongarch_vdso_hres_capable(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#define __arch_vdso_hres_capable loongarch_vdso_hres_capable
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* CONFIG_GENERIC_GETTIMEOFDAY */
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLER__ */
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -7,11 +7,12 @@ include $(srctree)/virt/kvm/Makefile.kvm
|
|||
|
||||
obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += kvm.o
|
||||
|
||||
obj-y += switch.o
|
||||
|
||||
kvm-y += exit.o
|
||||
kvm-y += interrupt.o
|
||||
kvm-y += main.o
|
||||
kvm-y += mmu.o
|
||||
kvm-y += switch.o
|
||||
kvm-y += timer.o
|
||||
kvm-y += tlb.o
|
||||
kvm-y += vcpu.o
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -390,6 +390,7 @@ int kvm_emu_mmio_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, larch_inst inst)
|
|||
run->mmio.len = 8;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
ret = EMULATE_FAIL;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -28,23 +28,29 @@ static unsigned int priority_to_irq[EXCCODE_INT_NUM] = {
|
|||
static int kvm_irq_deliver(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int priority)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned int irq = 0;
|
||||
unsigned long old, new;
|
||||
|
||||
clear_bit(priority, &vcpu->arch.irq_pending);
|
||||
if (priority < EXCCODE_INT_NUM)
|
||||
irq = priority_to_irq[priority];
|
||||
|
||||
if (kvm_guest_has_msgint(&vcpu->arch) && (priority == INT_AVEC)) {
|
||||
dmsintc_inject_irq(vcpu);
|
||||
set_gcsr_estat(irq);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
switch (priority) {
|
||||
case INT_AVEC:
|
||||
if (!kvm_guest_has_msgint(&vcpu->arch))
|
||||
break;
|
||||
dmsintc_inject_irq(vcpu);
|
||||
fallthrough;
|
||||
case INT_TI:
|
||||
case INT_IPI:
|
||||
case INT_SWI0:
|
||||
case INT_SWI1:
|
||||
old = kvm_read_hw_gcsr(LOONGARCH_CSR_TVAL);
|
||||
set_gcsr_estat(irq);
|
||||
new = kvm_read_hw_gcsr(LOONGARCH_CSR_TVAL);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Inject TI if TVAL inverted */
|
||||
if (new > old)
|
||||
set_gcsr_estat(CPU_TIMER);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case INT_HWI0 ... INT_HWI7:
|
||||
|
|
@ -61,22 +67,28 @@ static int kvm_irq_deliver(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int priority)
|
|||
static int kvm_irq_clear(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int priority)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned int irq = 0;
|
||||
unsigned long old, new;
|
||||
|
||||
clear_bit(priority, &vcpu->arch.irq_clear);
|
||||
if (priority < EXCCODE_INT_NUM)
|
||||
irq = priority_to_irq[priority];
|
||||
|
||||
if (kvm_guest_has_msgint(&vcpu->arch) && (priority == INT_AVEC)) {
|
||||
clear_gcsr_estat(irq);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
switch (priority) {
|
||||
case INT_AVEC:
|
||||
if (!kvm_guest_has_msgint(&vcpu->arch))
|
||||
break;
|
||||
fallthrough;
|
||||
case INT_TI:
|
||||
case INT_IPI:
|
||||
case INT_SWI0:
|
||||
case INT_SWI1:
|
||||
old = kvm_read_hw_gcsr(LOONGARCH_CSR_TVAL);
|
||||
clear_gcsr_estat(irq);
|
||||
new = kvm_read_hw_gcsr(LOONGARCH_CSR_TVAL);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Inject TI if TVAL inverted */
|
||||
if (new > old)
|
||||
set_gcsr_estat(CPU_TIMER);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case INT_HWI0 ... INT_HWI7:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -348,8 +348,7 @@ void kvm_arch_disable_virtualization_cpu(void)
|
|||
|
||||
static int kvm_loongarch_env_init(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int cpu, order, ret;
|
||||
void *addr;
|
||||
int cpu, ret;
|
||||
struct kvm_context *context;
|
||||
|
||||
vmcs = alloc_percpu(struct kvm_context);
|
||||
|
|
@ -365,30 +364,8 @@ static int kvm_loongarch_env_init(void)
|
|||
return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* PGD register is shared between root kernel and kvm hypervisor.
|
||||
* So world switch entry should be in DMW area rather than TLB area
|
||||
* to avoid page fault reenter.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* In future if hardware pagetable walking is supported, we won't
|
||||
* need to copy world switch code to DMW area.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
order = get_order(kvm_exception_size + kvm_enter_guest_size);
|
||||
addr = (void *)__get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL, order);
|
||||
if (!addr) {
|
||||
free_percpu(vmcs);
|
||||
vmcs = NULL;
|
||||
kfree(kvm_loongarch_ops);
|
||||
kvm_loongarch_ops = NULL;
|
||||
return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(addr, kvm_exc_entry, kvm_exception_size);
|
||||
memcpy(addr + kvm_exception_size, kvm_enter_guest, kvm_enter_guest_size);
|
||||
flush_icache_range((unsigned long)addr, (unsigned long)addr + kvm_exception_size + kvm_enter_guest_size);
|
||||
kvm_loongarch_ops->exc_entry = addr;
|
||||
kvm_loongarch_ops->enter_guest = addr + kvm_exception_size;
|
||||
kvm_loongarch_ops->page_order = order;
|
||||
kvm_loongarch_ops->exc_entry = (void *)kvm_exc_entry;
|
||||
kvm_loongarch_ops->enter_guest = (void *)kvm_enter_guest;
|
||||
|
||||
vpid_mask = read_csr_gstat();
|
||||
vpid_mask = (vpid_mask & CSR_GSTAT_GIDBIT) >> CSR_GSTAT_GIDBIT_SHIFT;
|
||||
|
|
@ -428,16 +405,10 @@ static int kvm_loongarch_env_init(void)
|
|||
|
||||
static void kvm_loongarch_env_exit(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned long addr;
|
||||
|
||||
if (vmcs)
|
||||
free_percpu(vmcs);
|
||||
|
||||
if (kvm_loongarch_ops) {
|
||||
if (kvm_loongarch_ops->exc_entry) {
|
||||
addr = (unsigned long)kvm_loongarch_ops->exc_entry;
|
||||
free_pages(addr, kvm_loongarch_ops->page_order);
|
||||
}
|
||||
kfree(kvm_loongarch_ops);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int kvm_flush_pte(kvm_pte_t *pte, phys_addr_t addr, kvm_ptw_ctx *ctx)
|
|||
else
|
||||
kvm->stat.pages--;
|
||||
|
||||
*pte = ctx->invalid_entry;
|
||||
kvm_set_pte(pte, ctx->invalid_entry);
|
||||
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4,9 +4,11 @@
|
|||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <linux/linkage.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/kvm_types.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/asm.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/asmmacro.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/loongarch.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/page.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/regdef.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -100,11 +102,16 @@
|
|||
* - is still in guest mode, such as pgd table/vmid registers etc,
|
||||
* - will fix with hw page walk enabled in future
|
||||
* load kvm_vcpu from reserved CSR KVM_VCPU_KS, and save a2 to KVM_TEMP_KS
|
||||
*
|
||||
* PGD register is shared between root kernel and kvm hypervisor.
|
||||
* So world switch entry should be in DMW area rather than TLB area
|
||||
* to avoid page fault re-enter.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
.text
|
||||
.p2align PAGE_SHIFT
|
||||
.cfi_sections .debug_frame
|
||||
SYM_CODE_START(kvm_exc_entry)
|
||||
UNWIND_HINT_UNDEFINED
|
||||
UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
|
||||
csrwr a2, KVM_TEMP_KS
|
||||
csrrd a2, KVM_VCPU_KS
|
||||
addi.d a2, a2, KVM_VCPU_ARCH
|
||||
|
|
@ -190,8 +197,8 @@ ret_to_host:
|
|||
kvm_restore_host_gpr a2
|
||||
jr ra
|
||||
|
||||
SYM_INNER_LABEL(kvm_exc_entry_end, SYM_L_LOCAL)
|
||||
SYM_CODE_END(kvm_exc_entry)
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(kvm_exc_entry)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* int kvm_enter_guest(struct kvm_run *run, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
|
||||
|
|
@ -215,8 +222,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(kvm_enter_guest)
|
|||
/* Save kvm_vcpu to kscratch */
|
||||
csrwr a1, KVM_VCPU_KS
|
||||
kvm_switch_to_guest
|
||||
SYM_INNER_LABEL(kvm_enter_guest_end, SYM_L_LOCAL)
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_END(kvm_enter_guest)
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(kvm_enter_guest)
|
||||
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_START(kvm_save_fpu)
|
||||
fpu_save_csr a0 t1
|
||||
|
|
@ -224,6 +231,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(kvm_save_fpu)
|
|||
fpu_save_cc a0 t1 t2
|
||||
jr ra
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_END(kvm_save_fpu)
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(kvm_save_fpu)
|
||||
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_START(kvm_restore_fpu)
|
||||
fpu_restore_double a0 t1
|
||||
|
|
@ -231,6 +239,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(kvm_restore_fpu)
|
|||
fpu_restore_cc a0 t1 t2
|
||||
jr ra
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_END(kvm_restore_fpu)
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(kvm_restore_fpu)
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_HAS_LSX
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_START(kvm_save_lsx)
|
||||
|
|
@ -239,6 +248,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(kvm_save_lsx)
|
|||
lsx_save_data a0 t1
|
||||
jr ra
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_END(kvm_save_lsx)
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(kvm_save_lsx)
|
||||
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_START(kvm_restore_lsx)
|
||||
lsx_restore_data a0 t1
|
||||
|
|
@ -246,6 +256,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(kvm_restore_lsx)
|
|||
fpu_restore_csr a0 t1 t2
|
||||
jr ra
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_END(kvm_restore_lsx)
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(kvm_restore_lsx)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_HAS_LASX
|
||||
|
|
@ -255,6 +266,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(kvm_save_lasx)
|
|||
lasx_save_data a0 t1
|
||||
jr ra
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_END(kvm_save_lasx)
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(kvm_save_lasx)
|
||||
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_START(kvm_restore_lasx)
|
||||
lasx_restore_data a0 t1
|
||||
|
|
@ -262,10 +274,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(kvm_restore_lasx)
|
|||
fpu_restore_csr a0 t1 t2
|
||||
jr ra
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_END(kvm_restore_lasx)
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(kvm_restore_lasx)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
.section ".rodata"
|
||||
SYM_DATA(kvm_exception_size, .quad kvm_exc_entry_end - kvm_exc_entry)
|
||||
SYM_DATA(kvm_enter_guest_size, .quad kvm_enter_guest_end - kvm_enter_guest)
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_HAS_LBT
|
||||
STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD kvm_restore_fpu
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -96,15 +96,21 @@ void kvm_restore_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
|
|||
* and set CSR TVAL with -1
|
||||
*/
|
||||
write_gcsr_timertick(0);
|
||||
__delay(2); /* Wait cycles until timer interrupt injected */
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Writing CSR_TINTCLR_TI to LOONGARCH_CSR_TINTCLR will clear
|
||||
* timer interrupt, and CSR TVAL keeps unchanged with -1, it
|
||||
* avoids spurious timer interrupt
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!(estat & CPU_TIMER))
|
||||
if (!(estat & CPU_TIMER)) {
|
||||
__delay(2); /* Wait cycles until timer interrupt injected */
|
||||
|
||||
/* Write TVAL with max value if no TI shot */
|
||||
estat = kvm_read_hw_gcsr(LOONGARCH_CSR_ESTAT);
|
||||
if (!(estat & CPU_TIMER))
|
||||
write_gcsr_timertick(CSR_TCFG_VAL);
|
||||
gcsr_write(CSR_TINTCLR_TI, LOONGARCH_CSR_TINTCLR);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
|
|||
r = 1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case KVM_CAP_NR_VCPUS:
|
||||
r = num_online_cpus();
|
||||
r = min_t(unsigned int, num_online_cpus(), KVM_MAX_VCPUS);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS:
|
||||
r = KVM_MAX_VCPUS;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -61,11 +61,16 @@ static void acpi_release_root_info(struct acpi_pci_root_info *ci)
|
|||
static int acpi_prepare_root_resources(struct acpi_pci_root_info *ci)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int status;
|
||||
unsigned long long pci_h = 0;
|
||||
struct resource_entry *entry, *tmp;
|
||||
struct acpi_device *device = ci->bridge;
|
||||
|
||||
status = acpi_pci_probe_root_resources(ci);
|
||||
if (status > 0) {
|
||||
acpi_evaluate_integer(device->handle, "PCIH", NULL, &pci_h);
|
||||
if (pci_h)
|
||||
return status;
|
||||
|
||||
resource_list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ci->resources) {
|
||||
if (entry->res->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM) {
|
||||
entry->offset = ci->root->mcfg_addr & GENMASK_ULL(63, 40);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -132,6 +132,9 @@ static void loongson_gpu_fixup_dma_hang(struct pci_dev *pdev, bool on)
|
|||
crtc_reg = regbase;
|
||||
crtc_offset = 0x400;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
iounmap(regbase);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < CRTC_NUM_MAX; i++, crtc_reg += crtc_offset) {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ obj-vdso-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_GETTIMEOFDAY) += vgettimeofday.o
|
|||
ccflags-vdso := \
|
||||
$(filter -I%,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) \
|
||||
$(filter -E%,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) \
|
||||
$(filter -m32,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) \
|
||||
$(filter -m64,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) \
|
||||
$(filter -march=%,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) \
|
||||
$(filter -m%-float,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) \
|
||||
$(CLANG_FLAGS) \
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -174,15 +174,21 @@ ifeq ($(KBUILD_EXTMOD),)
|
|||
# this hack.
|
||||
prepare: vdso_prepare
|
||||
vdso_prepare: prepare0
|
||||
$(if $(CONFIG_64BIT),$(Q)$(MAKE) \
|
||||
$(build)=arch/parisc/kernel/vdso64 include/generated/vdso64-offsets.h)
|
||||
$(if $(CONFIG_PA11)$(CONFIG_COMPAT),$(Q)$(MAKE) \
|
||||
ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
|
||||
$(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=arch/parisc/kernel/vdso64 include/generated/vdso64-offsets.h
|
||||
$(if $(CONFIG_COMPAT),$(Q)$(MAKE) \
|
||||
$(build)=arch/parisc/kernel/vdso32 include/generated/vdso32-offsets.h)
|
||||
else
|
||||
$(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=arch/parisc/kernel/vdso32 include/generated/vdso32-offsets.h
|
||||
endif
|
||||
endif
|
||||
|
||||
vdso-install-$(CONFIG_PA11) += arch/parisc/kernel/vdso32/vdso32.so
|
||||
ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
|
||||
vdso-install-y += arch/parisc/kernel/vdso64/vdso64.so
|
||||
vdso-install-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += arch/parisc/kernel/vdso32/vdso32.so
|
||||
vdso-install-$(CONFIG_64BIT) += arch/parisc/kernel/vdso64/vdso64.so
|
||||
else
|
||||
vdso-install-y += arch/parisc/kernel/vdso32/vdso32.so
|
||||
endif
|
||||
|
||||
install: KBUILD_IMAGE := vmlinux
|
||||
zinstall: KBUILD_IMAGE := vmlinuz
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,13 +6,14 @@
|
|||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
|
||||
#include <generated/vdso64-offsets.h>
|
||||
#define VDSO64_SYMBOL(tsk, name) ((tsk)->mm->context.vdso_base + (vdso64_offset_##name))
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#if !defined(CONFIG_64BIT) || defined(CONFIG_COMPAT)
|
||||
#include <generated/vdso32-offsets.h>
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#define VDSO64_SYMBOL(tsk, name) ((tsk)->mm->context.vdso_base + (vdso64_offset_##name))
|
||||
#define VDSO32_SYMBOL(tsk, name) ((tsk)->mm->context.vdso_base + (vdso32_offset_##name))
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#define VDSO32_SYMBOL(tsk, name) 0UL
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE) += kexec_file.o
|
|||
|
||||
# vdso
|
||||
obj-y += vdso.o
|
||||
obj-$(CONFIG_64BIT) += vdso64/
|
||||
obj-$(CONFIG_PA11) += vdso32/
|
||||
ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
|
||||
obj-y += vdso64/
|
||||
obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += vdso32/
|
||||
else
|
||||
obj-y += vdso32/
|
||||
endif
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -41,9 +41,7 @@
|
|||
const struct dma_map_ops *hppa_dma_ops __ro_after_init;
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hppa_dma_ops);
|
||||
|
||||
static struct device root = {
|
||||
.init_name = "parisc",
|
||||
};
|
||||
static struct device *root;
|
||||
|
||||
static inline int check_dev(struct device *dev)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
|
@ -89,7 +87,7 @@ static int for_each_padev(int (*fn)(struct device *, void *), void * data)
|
|||
.obj = data,
|
||||
.fn = fn,
|
||||
};
|
||||
return device_for_each_child(&root, &recurse_data, descend_children);
|
||||
return device_for_each_child(root, &recurse_data, descend_children);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
|
|
@ -290,7 +288,7 @@ const struct parisc_device *
|
|||
find_pa_parent_type(const struct parisc_device *padev, int type)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const struct device *dev = &padev->dev;
|
||||
while (dev != &root) {
|
||||
while (dev != root) {
|
||||
struct parisc_device *candidate = to_parisc_device(dev);
|
||||
if (candidate->id.hw_type == type)
|
||||
return candidate;
|
||||
|
|
@ -319,7 +317,7 @@ static void get_node_path(struct device *dev, struct hardware_path *path)
|
|||
dev = dev->parent;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
while (dev != &root) {
|
||||
while (dev != root) {
|
||||
if (dev_is_pci(dev)) {
|
||||
unsigned int devfn = to_pci_dev(dev)->devfn;
|
||||
path->bc[i--] = PCI_SLOT(devfn) | (PCI_FUNC(devfn)<< 5);
|
||||
|
|
@ -482,7 +480,7 @@ static struct parisc_device * __init alloc_tree_node(
|
|||
static struct parisc_device *create_parisc_device(struct hardware_path *modpath)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
struct device *parent = &root;
|
||||
struct device *parent = root;
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
|
||||
if (modpath->bc[i] == -1)
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
|
|
@ -755,7 +753,7 @@ parse_tree_node(struct device *parent, int index, struct hardware_path *modpath)
|
|||
struct device *hwpath_to_device(struct hardware_path *modpath)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
struct device *parent = &root;
|
||||
struct device *parent = root;
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
|
||||
if (modpath->bc[i] == -1)
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
|
|
@ -880,7 +878,7 @@ void __init walk_central_bus(void)
|
|||
{
|
||||
walk_native_bus(CENTRAL_BUS_ADDR,
|
||||
CENTRAL_BUS_ADDR + (MAX_NATIVE_DEVICES * NATIVE_DEVICE_OFFSET),
|
||||
&root);
|
||||
root);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static __init void print_parisc_device(struct parisc_device *dev)
|
||||
|
|
@ -907,9 +905,10 @@ void __init init_parisc_bus(void)
|
|||
{
|
||||
if (bus_register(&parisc_bus_type))
|
||||
panic("Could not register PA-RISC bus type\n");
|
||||
if (device_register(&root))
|
||||
|
||||
root = root_device_register("parisc");
|
||||
if (IS_ERR(root))
|
||||
panic("Could not register PA-RISC root device\n");
|
||||
get_device(&root);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static __init void qemu_header(void)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -83,11 +83,10 @@ config MSI_BITMAP_SELFTEST
|
|||
depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
|
||||
|
||||
config GUEST_STATE_BUFFER_TEST
|
||||
def_tristate n
|
||||
def_tristate KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
|
||||
prompt "Enable Guest State Buffer unit tests"
|
||||
depends on KUNIT
|
||||
depends on KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE
|
||||
default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
|
||||
help
|
||||
The Guest State Buffer is a data format specified in the PAPR.
|
||||
It is by hcalls to communicate the state of L2 guests between
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -76,7 +76,6 @@ CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE=y
|
|||
# CONFIG_HW_RANDOM is not set
|
||||
# CONFIG_HWMON is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_FB=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FIRMWARE_EDID=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB_TILEBLITTING=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB_RADEON=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB_3DFX=y
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -76,7 +76,6 @@ CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE=y
|
|||
CONFIG_NVRAM=y
|
||||
# CONFIG_HWMON is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_FB=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FIRMWARE_EDID=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB_OF=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB_MATROX=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB_MATROX_MILLENIUM=y
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ CONFIG_PMAC_SMU=y
|
|||
CONFIG_MAC_EMUMOUSEBTN=y
|
||||
CONFIG_WINDFARM=y
|
||||
CONFIG_WINDFARM_PM81=y
|
||||
CONFIG_WINDFARM_PM72=y
|
||||
CONFIG_WINDFARM_RM31=y
|
||||
CONFIG_WINDFARM_PM91=y
|
||||
CONFIG_WINDFARM_PM112=y
|
||||
CONFIG_WINDFARM_PM121=y
|
||||
|
|
@ -121,7 +123,6 @@ CONFIG_I2C_CHARDEV=y
|
|||
CONFIG_AGP=m
|
||||
CONFIG_AGP_UNINORTH=m
|
||||
CONFIG_FB=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FIRMWARE_EDID=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB_TILEBLITTING=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB_OF=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB_NVIDIA=y
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -98,7 +98,6 @@ CONFIG_SENSORS_LM85=y
|
|||
CONFIG_SENSORS_LM90=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DRM=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DRM_RADEON=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FIRMWARE_EDID=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB_TILEBLITTING=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB_VGA16=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB_NVIDIA=y
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -196,7 +196,6 @@ CONFIG_I2C_CHARDEV=y
|
|||
# CONFIG_PTP_1588_CLOCK is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_DRM=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DRM_AST=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FIRMWARE_EDID=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB_OF=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB_MATROX=m
|
||||
CONFIG_FB_MATROX_MILLENIUM=y
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -249,7 +249,6 @@ CONFIG_I2C_CHARDEV=y
|
|||
CONFIG_I2C_AMD8111=y
|
||||
CONFIG_I2C_PASEMI=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FIRMWARE_EDID=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB_OF=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB_MATROX=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB_MATROX_MILLENIUM=y
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -118,7 +118,6 @@ CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE=y
|
|||
CONFIG_I2C_CHARDEV=y
|
||||
CONFIG_I2C_AMD8111=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FIRMWARE_EDID=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB_OF=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB_MATROX=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FB_MATROX_MILLENIUM=y
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -214,7 +214,6 @@ CONFIG_SENSORS_IBMPOWERNV=m
|
|||
CONFIG_DRM=m
|
||||
CONFIG_DRM_AST=m
|
||||
CONFIG_FB=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FIRMWARE_EDID=y
|
||||
# CONFIG_VGA_CONSOLE is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_FRAMEBUFFER_CONSOLE=y
|
||||
CONFIG_LOGO=y
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -79,10 +79,6 @@ extern int pmac_i2c_match_adapter(struct device_node *dev,
|
|||
struct i2c_adapter *adapter);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/* (legacy) Locking functions exposed to i2c-keywest */
|
||||
extern int pmac_low_i2c_lock(struct device_node *np);
|
||||
extern int pmac_low_i2c_unlock(struct device_node *np);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Access functions for platform code */
|
||||
extern int pmac_i2c_open(struct pmac_i2c_bus *bus, int polled);
|
||||
extern void pmac_i2c_close(struct pmac_i2c_bus *bus);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -458,6 +458,10 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(u8, irq_work_pending);
|
|||
|
||||
#endif /* 32 vs 64 bit */
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Must be called with preemption disabled since it updates
|
||||
* per-CPU irq_work state and programs the local CPU decrementer.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void arch_irq_work_raise(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/*
|
||||
|
|
@ -471,10 +475,8 @@ void arch_irq_work_raise(void)
|
|||
* which could get tangled up if we're messing with the same state
|
||||
* here.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
preempt_disable();
|
||||
set_irq_work_pending_flag();
|
||||
set_dec(1);
|
||||
preempt_enable();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void set_dec_or_work(u64 val)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -62,6 +62,12 @@ CC32FLAGSREMOVE += -fno-stack-clash-protection
|
|||
# 32-bit one. clang validates the values passed to these arguments during
|
||||
# parsing, even when -fno-stack-protector is passed afterwards.
|
||||
CC32FLAGSREMOVE += -mstack-protector-guard%
|
||||
# ftrace is disabled for the vdso but arch/powerpc/Makefile adds this define to
|
||||
# KBUILD_CPPFLAGS, which enables use of the 'patchable_function_entry'
|
||||
# attribute in the 'inline' define via 'notrace'. This attribute is not
|
||||
# supported for the powerpcle target, resulting in many instances of
|
||||
# -Wunknown-attributes.
|
||||
CC32FLAGSREMOVE += -DCC_USING_PATCHABLE_FUNCTION_ENTRY
|
||||
endif
|
||||
LD32FLAGS := -Wl,-soname=linux-vdso32.so.1
|
||||
AS32FLAGS := -D__VDSO32__
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -16,4 +16,4 @@ GCOV_PROFILE_core_$(BITS).o := n
|
|||
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_core_$(BITS).o := n
|
||||
UBSAN_SANITIZE_core_$(BITS).o := n
|
||||
KASAN_SANITIZE_core.o := n
|
||||
KASAN_SANITIZE_core_$(BITS) := n
|
||||
KASAN_SANITIZE_core_$(BITS).o := n
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -52,7 +52,14 @@ int exit_vmx_usercopy(void)
|
|||
}
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL(exit_vmx_usercopy);
|
||||
|
||||
int enter_vmx_ops(void)
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Can be called from kexec copy_page() path with MMU off. The kexec
|
||||
* code sets preempt_count to HARDIRQ_OFFSET so we return early here.
|
||||
* Since in_interrupt() is always inline, __no_sanitize_address on this
|
||||
* function is sufficient to avoid KASAN shadow memory accesses in real
|
||||
* mode.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int __no_sanitize_address enter_vmx_ops(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (in_interrupt())
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -2242,6 +2242,7 @@ static void record_and_restart(struct perf_event *event, unsigned long val,
|
|||
const u64 last_period = event->hw.last_period;
|
||||
s64 prev, delta, left;
|
||||
int record = 0;
|
||||
int mark_event = regs->dsisr & MMCRA_SAMPLE_ENABLE;
|
||||
|
||||
if (event->hw.state & PERF_HES_STOPPED) {
|
||||
write_pmc(event->hw.idx, 0);
|
||||
|
|
@ -2304,9 +2305,9 @@ static void record_and_restart(struct perf_event *event, unsigned long val,
|
|||
* In ISA v3.0 and before values "0" and "7" are considered reserved.
|
||||
* In ISA v3.1, value "7" has been used to indicate "larx/stcx".
|
||||
* Drop the sample if "type" has reserved values for this field with a
|
||||
* ISA version check.
|
||||
* ISA version check for marked events.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_DATA_SRC &&
|
||||
if (mark_event && event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_DATA_SRC &&
|
||||
ppmu->get_mem_data_src) {
|
||||
val = (regs->dar & SIER_TYPE_MASK) >> SIER_TYPE_SHIFT;
|
||||
if (val == 0 || (val == 7 && !cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_31))) {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static ssize_t processor_bus_topology_show(struct device *dev, struct device_att
|
|||
0, 0, buf, &n, arg);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ret)
|
||||
return n;
|
||||
goto out_success;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
|
@ -244,12 +244,14 @@ static ssize_t processor_bus_topology_show(struct device *dev, struct device_att
|
|||
starting_index, 0, buf, &n, arg);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ret)
|
||||
return n;
|
||||
goto out_success;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
out_success:
|
||||
put_cpu_var(hv_gpci_reqb);
|
||||
return n;
|
||||
|
||||
out:
|
||||
|
|
@ -278,7 +280,7 @@ static ssize_t processor_config_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute
|
|||
0, 0, buf, &n, arg);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ret)
|
||||
return n;
|
||||
goto out_success;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
|
@ -312,12 +314,14 @@ static ssize_t processor_config_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute
|
|||
starting_index, 0, buf, &n, arg);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ret)
|
||||
return n;
|
||||
goto out_success;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
out_success:
|
||||
put_cpu_var(hv_gpci_reqb);
|
||||
return n;
|
||||
|
||||
out:
|
||||
|
|
@ -346,7 +350,7 @@ static ssize_t affinity_domain_via_virtual_processor_show(struct device *dev,
|
|||
0, 0, buf, &n, arg);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ret)
|
||||
return n;
|
||||
goto out_success;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
|
@ -382,12 +386,14 @@ static ssize_t affinity_domain_via_virtual_processor_show(struct device *dev,
|
|||
starting_index, secondary_index, buf, &n, arg);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ret)
|
||||
return n;
|
||||
goto out_success;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
out_success:
|
||||
put_cpu_var(hv_gpci_reqb);
|
||||
return n;
|
||||
|
||||
out:
|
||||
|
|
@ -416,7 +422,7 @@ static ssize_t affinity_domain_via_domain_show(struct device *dev, struct device
|
|||
0, 0, buf, &n, arg);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ret)
|
||||
return n;
|
||||
goto out_success;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
|
@ -448,12 +454,14 @@ static ssize_t affinity_domain_via_domain_show(struct device *dev, struct device
|
|||
starting_index, 0, buf, &n, arg);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ret)
|
||||
return n;
|
||||
goto out_success;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
out_success:
|
||||
put_cpu_var(hv_gpci_reqb);
|
||||
return n;
|
||||
|
||||
out:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -293,6 +293,8 @@ static int pika_dtm_thread(void __iomem *fpga)
|
|||
schedule_timeout(HZ);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
put_device(&client->dev);
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -27,8 +27,8 @@
|
|||
|
||||
static void __init km82xx_pic_init(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct device_node *np __free(device_node);
|
||||
np = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "fsl,pq2-pic");
|
||||
struct device_node *np __free(device_node) = of_find_compatible_node(NULL,
|
||||
NULL, "fsl,pq2-pic");
|
||||
|
||||
if (!np) {
|
||||
pr_err("PIC init: can not find cpm-pic node\n");
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ int cpm1_gpiochip_add16(struct device *dev)
|
|||
struct device_node *np = dev->of_node;
|
||||
struct cpm1_gpio16_chip *cpm1_gc;
|
||||
struct gpio_chip *gc;
|
||||
u16 mask;
|
||||
u32 mask;
|
||||
|
||||
cpm1_gc = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*cpm1_gc), GFP_KERNEL);
|
||||
if (!cpm1_gc)
|
||||
|
|
@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ int cpm1_gpiochip_add16(struct device *dev)
|
|||
|
||||
spin_lock_init(&cpm1_gc->lock);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!of_property_read_u16(np, "fsl,cpm1-gpio-irq-mask", &mask)) {
|
||||
if (!of_property_read_u32(np, "fsl,cpm1-gpio-irq-mask", &mask)) {
|
||||
int i, j;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < 16; i++)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -272,13 +272,12 @@ void __init pas_pci_init(void)
|
|||
{
|
||||
struct device_node *root = of_find_node_by_path("/");
|
||||
struct device_node *np;
|
||||
int res;
|
||||
|
||||
pci_set_flags(PCI_SCAN_ALL_PCIE_DEVS);
|
||||
|
||||
np = of_find_compatible_node(root, NULL, "pasemi,rootbus");
|
||||
if (np) {
|
||||
res = pas_add_bridge(np);
|
||||
pas_add_bridge(np);
|
||||
of_node_put(np);
|
||||
}
|
||||
of_node_put(root);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1058,40 +1058,6 @@ int pmac_i2c_match_adapter(struct device_node *dev, struct i2c_adapter *adapter)
|
|||
}
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pmac_i2c_match_adapter);
|
||||
|
||||
int pmac_low_i2c_lock(struct device_node *np)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct pmac_i2c_bus *bus, *found = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
list_for_each_entry(bus, &pmac_i2c_busses, link) {
|
||||
if (np == bus->controller) {
|
||||
found = bus;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!found)
|
||||
return -ENODEV;
|
||||
return pmac_i2c_open(bus, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pmac_low_i2c_lock);
|
||||
|
||||
int pmac_low_i2c_unlock(struct device_node *np)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct pmac_i2c_bus *bus, *found = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
list_for_each_entry(bus, &pmac_i2c_busses, link) {
|
||||
if (np == bus->controller) {
|
||||
found = bus;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!found)
|
||||
return -ENODEV;
|
||||
pmac_i2c_close(bus);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pmac_low_i2c_unlock);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
int pmac_i2c_open(struct pmac_i2c_bus *bus, int polled)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int rc;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -950,8 +950,6 @@ static int __init ps3_start_probe_thread(enum ps3_bus_type bus_type)
|
|||
|
||||
static int __init ps3_register_devices(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int result;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!firmware_has_feature(FW_FEATURE_PS3_LV1))
|
||||
return -ENODEV;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -959,7 +957,7 @@ static int __init ps3_register_devices(void)
|
|||
|
||||
/* ps3_repository_dump_bus_info(); */
|
||||
|
||||
result = ps3_start_probe_thread(PS3_BUS_TYPE_STORAGE);
|
||||
ps3_start_probe_thread(PS3_BUS_TYPE_STORAGE);
|
||||
|
||||
ps3_register_vuart_devices();
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ static void *htm_buf;
|
|||
static void *htm_status_buf;
|
||||
static void *htm_info_buf;
|
||||
static void *htm_caps_buf;
|
||||
static void *htm_mem_buf;
|
||||
static u32 nodeindex;
|
||||
static u32 nodalchipindex;
|
||||
static u32 coreindexonchip;
|
||||
|
|
@ -86,7 +87,7 @@ static ssize_t htm_return_check(long rc)
|
|||
static ssize_t htmdump_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
|
||||
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
|
||||
{
|
||||
void *htm_buf = filp->private_data;
|
||||
void *htm_buf_data = filp->private_data;
|
||||
unsigned long page, read_size, available;
|
||||
loff_t offset;
|
||||
long rc, ret;
|
||||
|
|
@ -100,7 +101,7 @@ static ssize_t htmdump_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
|
|||
* - last three values are address, size and offset
|
||||
*/
|
||||
rc = htm_hcall_wrapper(htmflags, nodeindex, nodalchipindex, coreindexonchip,
|
||||
htmtype, H_HTM_OP_DUMP_DATA, virt_to_phys(htm_buf),
|
||||
htmtype, H_HTM_OP_DUMP_DATA, virt_to_phys(htm_buf_data),
|
||||
PAGE_SIZE, page);
|
||||
|
||||
ret = htm_return_check(rc);
|
||||
|
|
@ -112,7 +113,61 @@ static ssize_t htmdump_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
|
|||
available = PAGE_SIZE;
|
||||
read_size = min(count, available);
|
||||
*ppos += read_size;
|
||||
return simple_read_from_buffer(ubuf, count, &offset, htm_buf, available);
|
||||
return simple_read_from_buffer(ubuf, count, &offset, htm_buf_data, available);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static ssize_t htmsystem_mem_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
|
||||
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
|
||||
{
|
||||
void *htm_mem_data = filp->private_data;
|
||||
long rc, ret;
|
||||
u64 *num_entries;
|
||||
u64 to_copy = 0;
|
||||
loff_t offset = 0;
|
||||
u64 mem_offset = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Invoke H_HTM call with:
|
||||
* - operation as htm status (H_HTM_OP_STATUS)
|
||||
* - last three values as addr, size and offset. "offset"
|
||||
* is value from output buffer header that points to next
|
||||
* entry to dump. 0 is the first entry to dump. next entry
|
||||
* is read from the output bufferbyte offset 0x8.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* When first time hcall is invoked, mem_offset should be
|
||||
* zero because zero is the first entry.
|
||||
* In the next hcall, offset of next entry to read from is
|
||||
* picked from output buffer header itself. So don't fill
|
||||
* mem_offset for first read.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If there is no further data to read in next iteration,
|
||||
* offset value from output buffer header will point to -1.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (*ppos) {
|
||||
mem_offset = *(u64 *)(htm_mem_data + 0x8);
|
||||
if (mem_offset == -1)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
rc = htm_hcall_wrapper(htmflags, nodeindex, nodalchipindex, coreindexonchip,
|
||||
htmtype, H_HTM_OP_DUMP_SYSMEM_CONF, virt_to_phys(htm_mem_data),
|
||||
PAGE_SIZE, be64_to_cpu(mem_offset));
|
||||
ret = htm_return_check(rc);
|
||||
if (ret <= 0) {
|
||||
pr_debug("H_HTM hcall returned for op: H_HTM_OP_DUMP_SYSMEM_CONF with hcall returning %ld\n", ret);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* HTM system mem buffer, start of buffer + 0x10 gives the
|
||||
* number of HTM entries in the buffer.
|
||||
* So total count to copy is:
|
||||
* 32 bytes (for first 5 fields) + (number of HTM entries * entry size)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
num_entries = htm_mem_data + 0x10;
|
||||
to_copy = 32 + (be64_to_cpu(*num_entries) * 32);
|
||||
|
||||
*ppos += to_copy;
|
||||
return simple_read_from_buffer(ubuf, count, &offset, htm_mem_data, to_copy);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static const struct file_operations htmdump_fops = {
|
||||
|
|
@ -121,6 +176,12 @@ static const struct file_operations htmdump_fops = {
|
|||
.open = simple_open,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static const struct file_operations htmsystem_mem_fops = {
|
||||
.llseek = NULL,
|
||||
.read = htmsystem_mem_read,
|
||||
.open = simple_open,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static int htmconfigure_set(void *data, u64 val)
|
||||
{
|
||||
long rc, ret;
|
||||
|
|
@ -226,20 +287,31 @@ static int htmstart_get(void *data, u64 *val)
|
|||
static ssize_t htmstatus_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
|
||||
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
|
||||
{
|
||||
void *htm_status_buf = filp->private_data;
|
||||
void *htm_status_data = filp->private_data;
|
||||
long rc, ret;
|
||||
u64 *num_entries;
|
||||
u64 to_copy;
|
||||
int htmstatus_flag;
|
||||
loff_t offset = 0;
|
||||
u64 status_offset = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Invoke H_HTM call with:
|
||||
* - operation as htm status (H_HTM_OP_STATUS)
|
||||
* - last three values as addr, size and offset
|
||||
* - last three values as addr, size and offset.
|
||||
* "offset" is value from output buffer header
|
||||
* that points to next entry to dump. 0 is the first
|
||||
* entry to dump. next entry is read from the output
|
||||
* bufferbyte offset 0x8.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (*ppos) {
|
||||
status_offset = *(u64 *)(htm_status_data + 0x8);
|
||||
if (status_offset == -1)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
rc = htm_hcall_wrapper(htmflags, nodeindex, nodalchipindex, coreindexonchip,
|
||||
htmtype, H_HTM_OP_STATUS, virt_to_phys(htm_status_buf),
|
||||
PAGE_SIZE, 0);
|
||||
htmtype, H_HTM_OP_STATUS, virt_to_phys(htm_status_data),
|
||||
PAGE_SIZE, be64_to_cpu(status_offset));
|
||||
|
||||
ret = htm_return_check(rc);
|
||||
if (ret <= 0) {
|
||||
|
|
@ -255,13 +327,15 @@ static ssize_t htmstatus_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
|
|||
* So total count to copy is:
|
||||
* 32 bytes (for first 7 fields) + (number of HTM entries * entry size)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
num_entries = htm_status_buf + 0x10;
|
||||
num_entries = htm_status_data + 0x10;
|
||||
if (htmtype == 0x2)
|
||||
htmstatus_flag = 0x8;
|
||||
else
|
||||
htmstatus_flag = 0x6;
|
||||
to_copy = 32 + (be64_to_cpu(*num_entries) * htmstatus_flag);
|
||||
return simple_read_from_buffer(ubuf, count, ppos, htm_status_buf, to_copy);
|
||||
*ppos += to_copy;
|
||||
|
||||
return simple_read_from_buffer(ubuf, count, &offset, htm_status_data, to_copy);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static const struct file_operations htmstatus_fops = {
|
||||
|
|
@ -273,19 +347,30 @@ static const struct file_operations htmstatus_fops = {
|
|||
static ssize_t htminfo_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
|
||||
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
|
||||
{
|
||||
void *htm_info_buf = filp->private_data;
|
||||
void *htm_info_data = filp->private_data;
|
||||
long rc, ret;
|
||||
u64 *num_entries;
|
||||
u64 to_copy;
|
||||
loff_t offset = 0;
|
||||
u64 info_offset = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Invoke H_HTM call with:
|
||||
* - operation as htm status (H_HTM_OP_STATUS)
|
||||
* - last three values as addr, size and offset
|
||||
* "offset" is value from output buffer header
|
||||
* that points to next entry to dump. 0 is the first
|
||||
* entry to dump. next entry is read from the output
|
||||
* bufferbyte offset 0x8.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (*ppos) {
|
||||
info_offset = *(u64 *)(htm_info_data + 0x8);
|
||||
if (info_offset == -1)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
rc = htm_hcall_wrapper(htmflags, nodeindex, nodalchipindex, coreindexonchip,
|
||||
htmtype, H_HTM_OP_DUMP_SYSPROC_CONF, virt_to_phys(htm_info_buf),
|
||||
PAGE_SIZE, 0);
|
||||
htmtype, H_HTM_OP_DUMP_SYSPROC_CONF, virt_to_phys(htm_info_data),
|
||||
PAGE_SIZE, be64_to_cpu(info_offset));
|
||||
|
||||
ret = htm_return_check(rc);
|
||||
if (ret <= 0) {
|
||||
|
|
@ -301,15 +386,17 @@ static ssize_t htminfo_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
|
|||
* So total count to copy is:
|
||||
* 32 bytes (for first 5 fields) + (number of HTM entries * entry size)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
num_entries = htm_info_buf + 0x10;
|
||||
num_entries = htm_info_data + 0x10;
|
||||
to_copy = 32 + (be64_to_cpu(*num_entries) * 16);
|
||||
return simple_read_from_buffer(ubuf, count, ppos, htm_info_buf, to_copy);
|
||||
|
||||
*ppos += to_copy;
|
||||
return simple_read_from_buffer(ubuf, count, &offset, htm_info_data, to_copy);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static ssize_t htmcaps_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
|
||||
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
|
||||
{
|
||||
void *htm_caps_buf = filp->private_data;
|
||||
void *htm_caps_data = filp->private_data;
|
||||
long rc, ret;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
|
|
@ -319,7 +406,7 @@ static ssize_t htmcaps_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
|
|||
* and zero
|
||||
*/
|
||||
rc = htm_hcall_wrapper(htmflags, nodeindex, nodalchipindex, coreindexonchip,
|
||||
htmtype, H_HTM_OP_CAPABILITIES, virt_to_phys(htm_caps_buf),
|
||||
htmtype, H_HTM_OP_CAPABILITIES, virt_to_phys(htm_caps_data),
|
||||
0x80, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
ret = htm_return_check(rc);
|
||||
|
|
@ -328,7 +415,7 @@ static ssize_t htmcaps_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
|
|||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return simple_read_from_buffer(ubuf, count, ppos, htm_caps_buf, 0x80);
|
||||
return simple_read_from_buffer(ubuf, count, ppos, htm_caps_data, 0x80);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static const struct file_operations htminfo_fops = {
|
||||
|
|
@ -457,9 +544,17 @@ static int htmdump_init_debugfs(void)
|
|||
return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Memory to present HTM system memory configuration */
|
||||
htm_mem_buf = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
|
||||
if (!htm_mem_buf) {
|
||||
pr_err("Failed to allocate htm mem buf\n");
|
||||
return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
debugfs_create_file("htmstatus", 0400, htmdump_debugfs_dir, htm_status_buf, &htmstatus_fops);
|
||||
debugfs_create_file("htminfo", 0400, htmdump_debugfs_dir, htm_info_buf, &htminfo_fops);
|
||||
debugfs_create_file("htmcaps", 0400, htmdump_debugfs_dir, htm_caps_buf, &htmcaps_fops);
|
||||
debugfs_create_file("htmsystem_mem", 0400, htmdump_debugfs_dir, htm_mem_buf, &htmsystem_mem_fops);
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -482,6 +577,10 @@ static void __exit htmdump_exit(void)
|
|||
{
|
||||
debugfs_remove_recursive(htmdump_debugfs_dir);
|
||||
kfree(htm_buf);
|
||||
kfree(htm_status_buf);
|
||||
kfree(htm_info_buf);
|
||||
kfree(htm_caps_buf);
|
||||
kfree(htm_mem_buf);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
module_init(htmdump_init);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -190,33 +190,34 @@ static int hvpipe_rtas_recv_msg(char __user *buf, int size)
|
|||
return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ret = rtas_ibm_receive_hvpipe_msg(work_area, &srcID,
|
||||
&bytes_written);
|
||||
if (!ret) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Recv HVPIPE RTAS is successful.
|
||||
* When releasing FD or no one is waiting on the
|
||||
* specific source, issue recv HVPIPE RTAS call
|
||||
* so that pipe is not blocked - this func is called
|
||||
* with NULL buf.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (buf) {
|
||||
if (size < bytes_written) {
|
||||
pr_err("Received the payload size = %d, but the buffer size = %d\n",
|
||||
bytes_written, size);
|
||||
bytes_written = size;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret = copy_to_user(buf,
|
||||
rtas_work_area_raw_buf(work_area),
|
||||
bytes_written);
|
||||
if (!ret)
|
||||
ret = bytes_written;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
pr_err("ibm,receive-hvpipe-msg failed with %d\n",
|
||||
ret);
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Recv HVPIPE RTAS is successful.
|
||||
* When releasing FD or no one is waiting on the
|
||||
* specific source, issue recv HVPIPE RTAS call
|
||||
* so that pipe is not blocked - this func is called
|
||||
* with NULL buf.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
ret = rtas_ibm_receive_hvpipe_msg(work_area, &srcID, &bytes_written);
|
||||
if (ret) {
|
||||
pr_err("ibm,receive-hvpipe-msg failed with %d\n", ret);
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!buf)
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
if (size < bytes_written) {
|
||||
pr_err("Received the payload size = %d, but the buffer size = %d\n",
|
||||
bytes_written, size);
|
||||
bytes_written = size;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (copy_to_user(buf, rtas_work_area_raw_buf(work_area), bytes_written))
|
||||
ret = -EFAULT;
|
||||
else
|
||||
ret = bytes_written;
|
||||
|
||||
out:
|
||||
rtas_work_area_free(work_area);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -327,8 +328,8 @@ static ssize_t papr_hvpipe_handle_read(struct file *file,
|
|||
{
|
||||
|
||||
struct hvpipe_source_info *src_info = file->private_data;
|
||||
struct papr_hvpipe_hdr hdr;
|
||||
long ret;
|
||||
struct papr_hvpipe_hdr hdr = {};
|
||||
ssize_t ret = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Return -ENXIO during migration
|
||||
|
|
@ -376,7 +377,7 @@ static ssize_t papr_hvpipe_handle_read(struct file *file,
|
|||
|
||||
ret = copy_to_user(buf, &hdr, HVPIPE_HDR_LEN);
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
return -EFAULT;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Message event has payload, so get the payload with
|
||||
|
|
@ -385,19 +386,23 @@ static ssize_t papr_hvpipe_handle_read(struct file *file,
|
|||
if (hdr.flags & HVPIPE_MSG_AVAILABLE) {
|
||||
ret = hvpipe_rtas_recv_msg(buf + HVPIPE_HDR_LEN,
|
||||
size - HVPIPE_HDR_LEN);
|
||||
if (ret > 0) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Always clear MSG_AVAILABLE once the RTAS call has drained
|
||||
* the message, regardless of whether copy_to_user succeeded.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (ret >= 0 || ret == -EFAULT)
|
||||
src_info->hvpipe_status &= ~HVPIPE_MSG_AVAILABLE;
|
||||
ret += HVPIPE_HDR_LEN;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if (hdr.flags & HVPIPE_LOST_CONNECTION) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Hypervisor is closing the pipe for the specific
|
||||
* source. So notify user space.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
src_info->hvpipe_status &= ~HVPIPE_LOST_CONNECTION;
|
||||
ret = HVPIPE_HDR_LEN;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (ret >= 0)
|
||||
ret += HVPIPE_HDR_LEN;
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -444,16 +449,18 @@ static int papr_hvpipe_handle_release(struct inode *inode,
|
|||
struct file *file)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct hvpipe_source_info *src_info;
|
||||
unsigned long flags;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Hold the lock, remove source from src_list, reset the
|
||||
* hvpipe status and release the lock to prevent any race
|
||||
* with message event IRQ.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
spin_lock(&hvpipe_src_list_lock);
|
||||
spin_lock_irqsave(&hvpipe_src_list_lock, flags);
|
||||
src_info = file->private_data;
|
||||
list_del(&src_info->list);
|
||||
file->private_data = NULL;
|
||||
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hvpipe_src_list_lock, flags);
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If the pipe for this specific source has any pending
|
||||
* payload, issue recv HVPIPE RTAS so that pipe will not
|
||||
|
|
@ -461,10 +468,8 @@ static int papr_hvpipe_handle_release(struct inode *inode,
|
|||
*/
|
||||
if (src_info->hvpipe_status & HVPIPE_MSG_AVAILABLE) {
|
||||
src_info->hvpipe_status = 0;
|
||||
spin_unlock(&hvpipe_src_list_lock);
|
||||
hvpipe_rtas_recv_msg(NULL, 0);
|
||||
} else
|
||||
spin_unlock(&hvpipe_src_list_lock);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
kfree(src_info);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
|
@ -479,50 +484,53 @@ static const struct file_operations papr_hvpipe_handle_ops = {
|
|||
|
||||
static int papr_hvpipe_dev_create_handle(u32 srcID)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct hvpipe_source_info *src_info __free(kfree) = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
spin_lock(&hvpipe_src_list_lock);
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Do not allow more than one process communicates with
|
||||
* each source.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
src_info = hvpipe_find_source(srcID);
|
||||
if (src_info) {
|
||||
spin_unlock(&hvpipe_src_list_lock);
|
||||
pr_err("pid(%d) is already using the source(%d)\n",
|
||||
src_info->tsk->pid, srcID);
|
||||
return -EALREADY;
|
||||
}
|
||||
spin_unlock(&hvpipe_src_list_lock);
|
||||
struct hvpipe_source_info *src_info;
|
||||
int fd;
|
||||
unsigned long flags;
|
||||
|
||||
src_info = kzalloc_obj(*src_info, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
|
||||
if (!src_info)
|
||||
return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
|
||||
src_info->srcID = srcID;
|
||||
src_info->tsk = current;
|
||||
init_waitqueue_head(&src_info->recv_wqh);
|
||||
|
||||
FD_PREPARE(fdf, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC,
|
||||
anon_inode_getfile("[papr-hvpipe]", &papr_hvpipe_handle_ops,
|
||||
(void *)src_info, O_RDWR));
|
||||
if (fdf.err)
|
||||
return fdf.err;
|
||||
|
||||
retain_and_null_ptr(src_info);
|
||||
spin_lock(&hvpipe_src_list_lock);
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If two processes are executing ioctl() for the same
|
||||
* source ID concurrently, prevent the second process to
|
||||
* acquire FD.
|
||||
* Do not allow more than one process communicates with
|
||||
* each source.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
spin_lock_irqsave(&hvpipe_src_list_lock, flags);
|
||||
if (hvpipe_find_source(srcID)) {
|
||||
spin_unlock(&hvpipe_src_list_lock);
|
||||
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hvpipe_src_list_lock, flags);
|
||||
pr_err("pid(%s:%d) could not get the source(%d)\n",
|
||||
current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), srcID);
|
||||
kfree(src_info);
|
||||
return -EALREADY;
|
||||
}
|
||||
list_add(&src_info->list, &hvpipe_src_list);
|
||||
spin_unlock(&hvpipe_src_list_lock);
|
||||
return fd_publish(fdf);
|
||||
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hvpipe_src_list_lock, flags);
|
||||
|
||||
fd = FD_ADD(O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC,
|
||||
anon_inode_getfile("[papr-hvpipe]", &papr_hvpipe_handle_ops,
|
||||
(void *)src_info, O_RDWR));
|
||||
if (fd < 0) {
|
||||
spin_lock_irqsave(&hvpipe_src_list_lock, flags);
|
||||
list_del(&src_info->list);
|
||||
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hvpipe_src_list_lock, flags);
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* if we fail to add FD, that means no userspace program is
|
||||
* polling. In that case if there is a msg pending because the
|
||||
* interrupt was fired after the src_info was added to the
|
||||
* global list, then let's consume it here, to unblock the
|
||||
* hvpipe
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (src_info->hvpipe_status & HVPIPE_MSG_AVAILABLE)
|
||||
hvpipe_rtas_recv_msg(NULL, 0);
|
||||
kfree(src_info);
|
||||
return fd;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return fd;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
|
|
@ -685,20 +693,19 @@ static int __init enable_hvpipe_IRQ(void)
|
|||
struct device_node *np;
|
||||
|
||||
hvpipe_check_exception_token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_CHECK_EXCEPTION);
|
||||
if (hvpipe_check_exception_token == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE)
|
||||
if (hvpipe_check_exception_token == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE)
|
||||
return -ENODEV;
|
||||
|
||||
/* hvpipe events */
|
||||
np = of_find_node_by_path("/event-sources/ibm,hvpipe-msg-events");
|
||||
if (np != NULL) {
|
||||
request_event_sources_irqs(np, hvpipe_event_interrupt,
|
||||
"HPIPE_EVENT");
|
||||
of_node_put(np);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
pr_err("Can not enable hvpipe event IRQ\n");
|
||||
if (!np) {
|
||||
pr_err("No device node found, could not enable hvpipe event IRQ\n");
|
||||
return -ENODEV;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
request_event_sources_irqs(np, hvpipe_event_interrupt, "HPIPE_EVENT");
|
||||
of_node_put(np);
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -775,23 +782,29 @@ static int __init papr_hvpipe_init(void)
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ret = enable_hvpipe_IRQ();
|
||||
if (!ret) {
|
||||
ret = set_hvpipe_sys_param(1);
|
||||
if (!ret)
|
||||
ret = misc_register(&papr_hvpipe_dev);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
goto out_wq;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ret) {
|
||||
pr_info("hvpipe feature is enabled\n");
|
||||
hvpipe_feature = true;
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret = misc_register(&papr_hvpipe_dev);
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
goto out_wq;
|
||||
|
||||
pr_err("hvpipe feature is not enabled %d\n", ret);
|
||||
ret = set_hvpipe_sys_param(1);
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
goto out_misc;
|
||||
|
||||
pr_info("hvpipe feature is enabled\n");
|
||||
hvpipe_feature = true;
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
out_misc:
|
||||
misc_deregister(&papr_hvpipe_dev);
|
||||
out_wq:
|
||||
destroy_workqueue(papr_hvpipe_wq);
|
||||
out:
|
||||
kfree(papr_hvpipe_work);
|
||||
papr_hvpipe_work = NULL;
|
||||
pr_err("hvpipe feature is not enabled %d\n", ret);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
machine_device_initcall(pseries, papr_hvpipe_init);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ struct hvpipe_source_info {
|
|||
u32 srcID;
|
||||
u32 hvpipe_status;
|
||||
wait_queue_head_t recv_wqh; /* wake up poll() waitq */
|
||||
struct task_struct *tsk;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -937,6 +937,28 @@ config RISCV_VECTOR_MISALIGNED
|
|||
help
|
||||
Enable detecting support for vector misaligned loads and stores.
|
||||
|
||||
config RISCV_SBI_FWFT_DELEGATE_MISALIGNED
|
||||
bool "Request firmware delegation of unaligned access exceptions"
|
||||
depends on RISCV_SBI
|
||||
depends on NONPORTABLE
|
||||
help
|
||||
Use SBI FWFT to request delegation of load address misaligned and
|
||||
store address misaligned exceptions, if possible, and prefer Linux
|
||||
kernel emulation of these accesses to firmware emulation.
|
||||
|
||||
Unfortunately, Linux's emulation is still incomplete. Namely, it
|
||||
currently does not handle vector instructions and KVM guest accesses.
|
||||
On platforms where these accesses would have been handled by firmware,
|
||||
enabling this causes unexpected kernel oopses, userspaces crashes and
|
||||
KVM guest crashes. If you are sure that these are not a problem for
|
||||
your platform, you can say Y here, which may improve performance.
|
||||
|
||||
Saying N here will not worsen emulation support for unaligned accesses
|
||||
even in the case where the firmware also has incomplete support. It
|
||||
simply keeps the firmware's emulation enabled.
|
||||
|
||||
If you don't know what to do here, say N.
|
||||
|
||||
choice
|
||||
prompt "Unaligned Accesses Support"
|
||||
default RISCV_PROBE_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void mips_errata_patch_func(struct alt_entry *begin, struct alt_entry *end,
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
tmp = (1U << alt->patch_id);
|
||||
if (cpu_req_errata && tmp) {
|
||||
if (cpu_req_errata & tmp) {
|
||||
mutex_lock(&text_mutex);
|
||||
patch_text_nosync(ALT_OLD_PTR(alt), ALT_ALT_PTR(alt),
|
||||
alt->alt_len);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ static long compat_restore_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs,
|
|||
|
||||
/* sc_regs is structured the same as the start of pt_regs */
|
||||
err = __copy_from_user(&cregs, &sc->sc_regs, sizeof(sc->sc_regs));
|
||||
if (unlikely(err))
|
||||
return err;
|
||||
|
||||
cregs_to_regs(&cregs, regs);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
|
|||
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
|
||||
/* Copyright (C) 2023 Rivos Inc. */
|
||||
|
||||
#include <linux/cfi_types.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/linkage.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/asm.h>
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -9,7 +10,7 @@
|
|||
/* void __riscv_copy_words_unaligned(void *, const void *, size_t) */
|
||||
/* Performs a memcpy without aligning buffers, using word loads and stores. */
|
||||
/* Note: The size is truncated to a multiple of 8 * SZREG */
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_START(__riscv_copy_words_unaligned)
|
||||
SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(__riscv_copy_words_unaligned)
|
||||
andi a4, a2, ~((8*SZREG)-1)
|
||||
beqz a4, 2f
|
||||
add a3, a1, a4
|
||||
|
|
@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__riscv_copy_words_unaligned)
|
|||
/* void __riscv_copy_bytes_unaligned(void *, const void *, size_t) */
|
||||
/* Performs a memcpy without aligning buffers, using only byte accesses. */
|
||||
/* Note: The size is truncated to a multiple of 8 */
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_START(__riscv_copy_bytes_unaligned)
|
||||
SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(__riscv_copy_bytes_unaligned)
|
||||
andi a4, a2, ~(8-1)
|
||||
beqz a4, 2f
|
||||
add a3, a1, a4
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -896,10 +896,8 @@ static void __init riscv_fill_hwcap_from_isa_string(unsigned long *isa2hwcap)
|
|||
* CPU cores with the ratified spec will contain non-zero
|
||||
* marchid.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (acpi_disabled && boot_vendorid == THEAD_VENDOR_ID && boot_archid == 0x0) {
|
||||
this_hwcap &= ~isa2hwcap[RISCV_ISA_EXT_v];
|
||||
if (acpi_disabled && boot_vendorid == THEAD_VENDOR_ID && boot_archid == 0x0)
|
||||
clear_bit(RISCV_ISA_EXT_v, source_isa);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
riscv_resolve_isa(source_isa, isainfo->isa, &this_hwcap, isa2hwcap);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1104,16 +1102,16 @@ early_param("riscv_isa_fallback", riscv_isa_fallback_setup);
|
|||
void __init riscv_fill_hwcap(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
char print_str[NUM_ALPHA_EXTS + 1];
|
||||
unsigned long isa2hwcap[26] = {0};
|
||||
unsigned long isa2hwcap[RISCV_ISA_EXT_BASE] = {0};
|
||||
int i, j;
|
||||
|
||||
isa2hwcap['i' - 'a'] = COMPAT_HWCAP_ISA_I;
|
||||
isa2hwcap['m' - 'a'] = COMPAT_HWCAP_ISA_M;
|
||||
isa2hwcap['a' - 'a'] = COMPAT_HWCAP_ISA_A;
|
||||
isa2hwcap['f' - 'a'] = COMPAT_HWCAP_ISA_F;
|
||||
isa2hwcap['d' - 'a'] = COMPAT_HWCAP_ISA_D;
|
||||
isa2hwcap['c' - 'a'] = COMPAT_HWCAP_ISA_C;
|
||||
isa2hwcap['v' - 'a'] = COMPAT_HWCAP_ISA_V;
|
||||
isa2hwcap[RISCV_ISA_EXT_i] = COMPAT_HWCAP_ISA_I;
|
||||
isa2hwcap[RISCV_ISA_EXT_m] = COMPAT_HWCAP_ISA_M;
|
||||
isa2hwcap[RISCV_ISA_EXT_a] = COMPAT_HWCAP_ISA_A;
|
||||
isa2hwcap[RISCV_ISA_EXT_f] = COMPAT_HWCAP_ISA_F;
|
||||
isa2hwcap[RISCV_ISA_EXT_d] = COMPAT_HWCAP_ISA_D;
|
||||
isa2hwcap[RISCV_ISA_EXT_c] = COMPAT_HWCAP_ISA_C;
|
||||
isa2hwcap[RISCV_ISA_EXT_v] = COMPAT_HWCAP_ISA_V;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!acpi_disabled) {
|
||||
riscv_fill_hwcap_from_isa_string(isa2hwcap);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -577,8 +577,8 @@ static int compat_riscv_gpr_set(struct task_struct *target,
|
|||
struct compat_user_regs_struct cregs;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, &cregs, 0, -1);
|
||||
|
||||
cregs_to_regs(&cregs, task_pt_regs(target));
|
||||
if (!ret)
|
||||
cregs_to_regs(&cregs, task_pt_regs(target));
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ static int cpu_online_check_unaligned_access_emulated(unsigned int cpu)
|
|||
|
||||
static bool misaligned_traps_delegated;
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_SBI
|
||||
#if defined(CONFIG_RISCV_SBI_FWFT_DELEGATE_MISALIGNED)
|
||||
|
||||
static int cpu_online_sbi_unaligned_setup(unsigned int cpu)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -109,15 +109,16 @@ void set_indir_lp_lock(struct task_struct *task, bool lock)
|
|||
task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ufcfi_locked = lock;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If size is 0, then to be compatible with regular stack we want it to be as big as
|
||||
* regular stack. Else PAGE_ALIGN it and return back
|
||||
* The shadow stack only stores the return address and not any variables
|
||||
* this should be more than sufficient for most applications.
|
||||
* Else PAGE_ALIGN it and return back
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static unsigned long calc_shstk_size(unsigned long size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (size)
|
||||
return PAGE_ALIGN(size);
|
||||
|
||||
return PAGE_ALIGN(min_t(unsigned long long, rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK), SZ_4G));
|
||||
return PAGE_ALIGN(min(rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK) / 2, SZ_2G));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
|
|||
/* Copyright (C) 2024 Rivos Inc. */
|
||||
|
||||
#include <linux/args.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/cfi_types.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/linkage.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/asm.h>
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -16,7 +17,7 @@
|
|||
/* void __riscv_copy_vec_words_unaligned(void *, const void *, size_t) */
|
||||
/* Performs a memcpy without aligning buffers, using word loads and stores. */
|
||||
/* Note: The size is truncated to a multiple of WORD_EEW */
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_START(__riscv_copy_vec_words_unaligned)
|
||||
SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(__riscv_copy_vec_words_unaligned)
|
||||
andi a4, a2, ~(WORD_EEW-1)
|
||||
beqz a4, 2f
|
||||
add a3, a1, a4
|
||||
|
|
@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__riscv_copy_vec_words_unaligned)
|
|||
/* void __riscv_copy_vec_bytes_unaligned(void *, const void *, size_t) */
|
||||
/* Performs a memcpy without aligning buffers, using only byte accesses. */
|
||||
/* Note: The size is truncated to a multiple of 8 */
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_START(__riscv_copy_vec_bytes_unaligned)
|
||||
SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(__riscv_copy_vec_bytes_unaligned)
|
||||
andi a4, a2, ~(8-1)
|
||||
beqz a4, 2f
|
||||
add a3, a1, a4
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -792,6 +792,27 @@ static void __init set_mmap_rnd_bits_max(void)
|
|||
mmap_rnd_bits_max = MMAP_VA_BITS - PAGE_SHIFT - 3;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static bool __init is_vaddr_valid(unsigned long va)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned long up = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
switch (satp_mode) {
|
||||
case SATP_MODE_39:
|
||||
up = 1UL << 38;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case SATP_MODE_48:
|
||||
up = 1UL << 47;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case SATP_MODE_57:
|
||||
up = 1UL << 56;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return (va < up) || (va >= (ULONG_MAX - up + 1));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* There is a simple way to determine if 4-level is supported by the
|
||||
* underlying hardware: establish 1:1 mapping in 4-level page table mode
|
||||
|
|
@ -833,6 +854,9 @@ static __init void set_satp_mode(uintptr_t dtb_pa)
|
|||
set_satp_mode_pmd + PMD_SIZE,
|
||||
PMD_SIZE, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
|
||||
retry:
|
||||
if (!is_vaddr_valid(set_satp_mode_pmd))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
create_pgd_mapping(early_pg_dir,
|
||||
set_satp_mode_pmd,
|
||||
pgtable_l5_enabled ?
|
||||
|
|
@ -855,6 +879,7 @@ static __init void set_satp_mode(uintptr_t dtb_pa)
|
|||
disable_pgtable_l4();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
out:
|
||||
memset(early_pg_dir, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
|
||||
memset(early_p4d, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
|
||||
memset(early_pud, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -3310,8 +3310,7 @@ static void aen_host_forward(unsigned long si)
|
|||
struct zpci_gaite *gaite;
|
||||
struct kvm *kvm;
|
||||
|
||||
gaite = (struct zpci_gaite *)aift->gait +
|
||||
(si * sizeof(struct zpci_gaite));
|
||||
gaite = aift->gait + si;
|
||||
if (gaite->count == 0)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
if (gaite->aisb != 0)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ static int kvm_zpci_set_airq(struct zpci_dev *zdev)
|
|||
fib.fmt0.noi = airq_iv_end(zdev->aibv);
|
||||
fib.fmt0.aibv = virt_to_phys(zdev->aibv->vector);
|
||||
fib.fmt0.aibvo = 0;
|
||||
fib.fmt0.aisb = virt_to_phys(aift->sbv->vector + (zdev->aisb / 64) * 8);
|
||||
fib.fmt0.aisb = virt_to_phys(aift->sbv->vector) + (zdev->aisb / 64) * 8;
|
||||
fib.fmt0.aisbo = zdev->aisb & 63;
|
||||
fib.gd = zdev->gisa;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -290,8 +290,7 @@ static int kvm_s390_pci_aif_enable(struct zpci_dev *zdev, struct zpci_fib *fib,
|
|||
phys_to_virt(fib->fmt0.aibv));
|
||||
|
||||
spin_lock_irq(&aift->gait_lock);
|
||||
gaite = (struct zpci_gaite *)aift->gait + (zdev->aisb *
|
||||
sizeof(struct zpci_gaite));
|
||||
gaite = aift->gait + zdev->aisb;
|
||||
|
||||
/* If assist not requested, host will get all alerts */
|
||||
if (assist)
|
||||
|
|
@ -309,7 +308,7 @@ static int kvm_s390_pci_aif_enable(struct zpci_dev *zdev, struct zpci_fib *fib,
|
|||
|
||||
/* Update guest FIB for re-issue */
|
||||
fib->fmt0.aisbo = zdev->aisb & 63;
|
||||
fib->fmt0.aisb = virt_to_phys(aift->sbv->vector + (zdev->aisb / 64) * 8);
|
||||
fib->fmt0.aisb = virt_to_phys(aift->sbv->vector) + (zdev->aisb / 64) * 8;
|
||||
fib->fmt0.isc = gisc;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Save some guest fib values in the host for later use */
|
||||
|
|
@ -357,8 +356,7 @@ static int kvm_s390_pci_aif_disable(struct zpci_dev *zdev, bool force)
|
|||
if (zdev->kzdev->fib.fmt0.aibv == 0)
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
spin_lock_irq(&aift->gait_lock);
|
||||
gaite = (struct zpci_gaite *)aift->gait + (zdev->aisb *
|
||||
sizeof(struct zpci_gaite));
|
||||
gaite = aift->gait + zdev->aisb;
|
||||
isc = gaite->gisc;
|
||||
gaite->count--;
|
||||
if (gaite->count == 0) {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1294,13 +1294,16 @@ int x86_perf_rdpmc_index(struct perf_event *event)
|
|||
return event->hw.event_base_rdpmc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline int match_prev_assignment(struct hw_perf_event *hwc,
|
||||
static inline int match_prev_assignment(struct perf_event *event,
|
||||
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc,
|
||||
int i)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
|
||||
|
||||
return hwc->idx == cpuc->assign[i] &&
|
||||
hwc->last_cpu == smp_processor_id() &&
|
||||
hwc->last_tag == cpuc->tags[i];
|
||||
hwc->last_cpu == smp_processor_id() &&
|
||||
hwc->last_tag == cpuc->tags[i] &&
|
||||
!is_acr_event_group(event);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void x86_pmu_start(struct perf_event *event, int flags);
|
||||
|
|
@ -1346,7 +1349,7 @@ static void x86_pmu_enable(struct pmu *pmu)
|
|||
* - no other event has used the counter since
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (hwc->idx == -1 ||
|
||||
match_prev_assignment(hwc, cpuc, i))
|
||||
match_prev_assignment(event, cpuc, i))
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
|
|
@ -1367,7 +1370,7 @@ static void x86_pmu_enable(struct pmu *pmu)
|
|||
event = cpuc->event_list[i];
|
||||
hwc = &event->hw;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!match_prev_assignment(hwc, cpuc, i))
|
||||
if (!match_prev_assignment(event, cpuc, i))
|
||||
x86_assign_hw_event(event, cpuc, i);
|
||||
else if (i < n_running)
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -3118,11 +3118,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_fixed(struct perf_event *event)
|
|||
intel_set_masks(event, idx);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Enable IRQ generation (0x8), if not PEBS,
|
||||
* and enable ring-3 counting (0x2) and ring-0 counting (0x1)
|
||||
* if requested:
|
||||
* Enable IRQ generation (0x8), if not PEBS or self-reloaded
|
||||
* ACR event, and enable ring-3 counting (0x2) and ring-0
|
||||
* counting (0x1) if requested:
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!event->attr.precise_ip)
|
||||
if (!event->attr.precise_ip && !is_acr_self_reload_event(event))
|
||||
bits |= INTEL_FIXED_0_ENABLE_PMI;
|
||||
if (hwc->config & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_USR)
|
||||
bits |= INTEL_FIXED_0_USER;
|
||||
|
|
@ -3306,6 +3306,15 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_event(struct perf_event *event)
|
|||
intel_set_masks(event, idx);
|
||||
static_call_cond(intel_pmu_enable_acr_event)(event);
|
||||
static_call_cond(intel_pmu_enable_event_ext)(event);
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* For self-reloaded ACR event, don't enable PMI since
|
||||
* HW won't set overflow bit in GLOBAL_STATUS. Otherwise,
|
||||
* the PMI would be recognized as a suspicious NMI.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (is_acr_self_reload_event(event))
|
||||
hwc->config &= ~ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_INT;
|
||||
else if (!event->attr.precise_ip)
|
||||
hwc->config |= ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_INT;
|
||||
__x86_pmu_enable_event(hwc, enable_mask);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED ... INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED_BTS - 1:
|
||||
|
|
@ -3332,23 +3341,41 @@ static void intel_pmu_enable_event(struct perf_event *event)
|
|||
static void intel_pmu_acr_late_setup(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct perf_event *event, *leader;
|
||||
int i, j, idx;
|
||||
int i, j, k, bit, idx;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* FIXME: ACR mask parsing relies on cpuc->event_list[] (active events only).
|
||||
* Disabling an ACR event causes bit-shifting errors in the acr_mask of
|
||||
* remaining group members. As ACR sampling requires all events to be active,
|
||||
* this limitation is acceptable for now. Revisit if independent event toggling
|
||||
* is required.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < cpuc->n_events; i++) {
|
||||
leader = cpuc->event_list[i];
|
||||
if (!is_acr_event_group(leader))
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
|
||||
/* The ACR events must be contiguous. */
|
||||
/* Find the last event of the ACR group. */
|
||||
for (j = i; j < cpuc->n_events; j++) {
|
||||
event = cpuc->event_list[j];
|
||||
if (event->group_leader != leader->group_leader)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
for_each_set_bit(idx, (unsigned long *)&event->attr.config2, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX) {
|
||||
if (i + idx >= cpuc->n_events ||
|
||||
!is_acr_event_group(cpuc->event_list[i + idx]))
|
||||
return;
|
||||
__set_bit(cpuc->assign[i + idx], (unsigned long *)&event->hw.config1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Translate the user-space ACR mask (attr.config2) into the physical
|
||||
* counter bitmask (hw.config1) for each ACR event in the group.
|
||||
* NOTE: ACR event contiguity is guaranteed by intel_pmu_hw_config().
|
||||
*/
|
||||
for (k = i; k < j; k++) {
|
||||
event = cpuc->event_list[k];
|
||||
event->hw.config1 = 0;
|
||||
for_each_set_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)&event->attr.config2, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX) {
|
||||
idx = i + bit;
|
||||
/* Event index of ACR group must locate in [i, j). */
|
||||
if (idx >= j || !is_acr_event_group(cpuc->event_list[idx]))
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
__set_bit(cpuc->assign[idx], (unsigned long *)&event->hw.config1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
i = j - 1;
|
||||
|
|
@ -7504,6 +7531,7 @@ static __always_inline void intel_pmu_init_pnc(struct pmu *pmu)
|
|||
hybrid(pmu, event_constraints) = intel_pnc_event_constraints;
|
||||
hybrid(pmu, pebs_constraints) = intel_pnc_pebs_event_constraints;
|
||||
hybrid(pmu, extra_regs) = intel_pnc_extra_regs;
|
||||
static_call_update(intel_pmu_enable_acr_event, intel_pmu_enable_acr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static __always_inline void intel_pmu_init_skt(struct pmu *pmu)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -137,6 +137,16 @@ static inline bool is_acr_event_group(struct perf_event *event)
|
|||
return check_leader_group(event->group_leader, PERF_X86_EVENT_ACR);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline bool is_acr_self_reload_event(struct perf_event *event)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
|
||||
|
||||
if (hwc->idx < 0)
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
return test_bit(hwc->idx, (unsigned long *)&hwc->config1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
struct amd_nb {
|
||||
int nb_id; /* NorthBridge id */
|
||||
int refcnt; /* reference count */
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -137,7 +137,8 @@ extern void __init efi_dump_pagetable(void);
|
|||
extern void __init efi_apply_memmap_quirks(void);
|
||||
extern int __init efi_reuse_config(u64 tables, int nr_tables);
|
||||
extern void efi_delete_dummy_variable(void);
|
||||
extern void efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault(unsigned long phys_addr);
|
||||
extern void efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault(unsigned long phys_addr,
|
||||
const struct pt_regs *regs);
|
||||
extern void efi_unmap_boot_services(void);
|
||||
|
||||
void arch_efi_call_virt_setup(void);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -803,9 +803,10 @@
|
|||
#define MSR_AMD64_LBR_SELECT 0xc000010e
|
||||
|
||||
/* Zen4 */
|
||||
#define MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG 0xc001102e
|
||||
#define MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG 0xc001102e
|
||||
#define MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_BP_SPEC_REDUCE_BIT 4
|
||||
#define MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_SHARED_BTB_FIX_BIT 5
|
||||
#define MSR_ZEN2_BP_CFG_BUG_FIX_BIT 33
|
||||
|
||||
/* Fam 19h MSRs */
|
||||
#define MSR_F19H_UMC_PERF_CTL 0xc0010800
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -88,19 +88,19 @@ static void amd_set_max_freq_ratio(void)
|
|||
|
||||
rc = cppc_get_perf_caps(0, &perf_caps);
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
pr_warn("Could not retrieve perf counters (%d)\n", rc);
|
||||
pr_debug("Could not retrieve perf counters (%d)\n", rc);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rc = amd_get_boost_ratio_numerator(0, &numerator);
|
||||
if (rc) {
|
||||
pr_warn("Could not retrieve highest performance (%d)\n", rc);
|
||||
pr_debug("Could not retrieve highest performance (%d)\n", rc);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
nominal_perf = perf_caps.nominal_perf;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!nominal_perf) {
|
||||
pr_warn("Could not retrieve nominal performance\n");
|
||||
pr_debug("Could not retrieve nominal performance\n");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -989,6 +989,9 @@ static void init_amd_zen2(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
|
|||
|
||||
/* Correct misconfigured CPUID on some clients. */
|
||||
clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_INVLPGB);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
|
||||
msr_set_bit(MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG, MSR_ZEN2_BP_CFG_BUG_FIX_BIT);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void init_amd_zen3(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -90,7 +90,6 @@ struct mca_config mca_cfg __read_mostly = {
|
|||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct mce_hw_err, hw_errs_seen);
|
||||
static unsigned long mce_need_notify;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* MCA banks polled by the period polling timer for corrected events.
|
||||
|
|
@ -152,8 +151,10 @@ EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(injectm);
|
|||
|
||||
void mce_log(struct mce_hw_err *err)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (mce_gen_pool_add(err))
|
||||
if (mce_gen_pool_add(err)) {
|
||||
pr_info(HW_ERR "Machine check events logged\n");
|
||||
irq_work_queue(&mce_irq_work);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mce_log);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -585,28 +586,6 @@ bool mce_is_correctable(struct mce *m)
|
|||
}
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mce_is_correctable);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Notify the user(s) about new machine check events.
|
||||
* Can be called from interrupt context, but not from machine check/NMI
|
||||
* context.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static bool mce_notify_irq(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Not more than two messages every minute */
|
||||
static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(ratelimit, 60*HZ, 2);
|
||||
|
||||
if (test_and_clear_bit(0, &mce_need_notify)) {
|
||||
mce_work_trigger();
|
||||
|
||||
if (__ratelimit(&ratelimit))
|
||||
pr_info(HW_ERR "Machine check events logged\n");
|
||||
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int mce_early_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val,
|
||||
void *data)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
|
@ -618,9 +597,7 @@ static int mce_early_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val,
|
|||
/* Emit the trace record: */
|
||||
trace_mce_record(err);
|
||||
|
||||
set_bit(0, &mce_need_notify);
|
||||
|
||||
mce_notify_irq();
|
||||
mce_work_trigger();
|
||||
|
||||
return NOTIFY_DONE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -1804,7 +1781,7 @@ static void mce_timer_fn(struct timer_list *t)
|
|||
* Alert userspace if needed. If we logged an MCE, reduce the polling
|
||||
* interval, otherwise increase the polling interval.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (mce_notify_irq())
|
||||
if (!mce_gen_pool_empty())
|
||||
iv = max(iv / 2, (unsigned long) HZ/100);
|
||||
else
|
||||
iv = min(iv * 2, round_jiffies_relative(check_interval * HZ));
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user