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x86/mm/fault: Allow stack access below %rsp
The current x86 page fault handler allows stack access below the stack
pointer if it is no more than 64k+256 bytes. Any access beyond the 64k+
limit will cause a segmentation fault.
The gcc -fstack-check option generates code to probe the stack for
large stack allocation to see if the stack is accessible. The newer gcc
does that while updating the %rsp simultaneously. Older gcc's like gcc4
doesn't do that. As a result, an application compiled with an old gcc
and the -fstack-check option may fail to start at all:
$ cat test.c
int main() {
char tmp[1024*128];
printf("### ok\n");
return 0;
}
$ gcc -fstack-check -g -o test test.c
$ ./test
Segmentation fault
The old binary was working in older kernels where expand_stack() was
somehow called before the check. But it is not working in newer kernels.
Besides, the 64k+ limit check is kind of crude and will not catch a
lot of mistakes that userspace applications may be misbehaving anyway.
I think the kernel isn't the right place for this kind of tests. We
should leave it to userspace instrumentation tools to perform them.
The 64k+ limit check is now removed to just let expand_stack() decide
if a segmentation fault should happen, when the RLIMIT_STACK limit is
exceeded, for example.
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1541535149-31963-1-git-send-email-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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parent
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@ -1380,18 +1380,6 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
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bad_area(regs, sw_error_code, address);
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return;
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}
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if (sw_error_code & X86_PF_USER) {
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/*
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* Accessing the stack below %sp is always a bug.
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* The large cushion allows instructions like enter
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* and pusha to work. ("enter $65535, $31" pushes
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* 32 pointers and then decrements %sp by 65535.)
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*/
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if (unlikely(address + 65536 + 32 * sizeof(unsigned long) < regs->sp)) {
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bad_area(regs, sw_error_code, address);
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return;
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}
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}
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if (unlikely(expand_stack(vma, address))) {
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bad_area(regs, sw_error_code, address);
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return;
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