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x86/bugs: Rename entry_ibpb() to write_ibpb()
There's nothing entry-specific about entry_ibpb(). In preparation for calling it from elsewhere, rename it to write_ibpb(). Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1e54ace131e79b760de3fe828264e26d0896e3ac.1744148254.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
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@ -17,7 +17,8 @@
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.pushsection .noinstr.text, "ax"
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SYM_FUNC_START(entry_ibpb)
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/* Clobbers AX, CX, DX */
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SYM_FUNC_START(write_ibpb)
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ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
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movl $MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, %ecx
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movl $PRED_CMD_IBPB, %eax
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@ -27,9 +28,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(entry_ibpb)
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/* Make sure IBPB clears return stack preductions too. */
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FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %rax, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET
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RET
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SYM_FUNC_END(entry_ibpb)
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SYM_FUNC_END(write_ibpb)
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/* For KVM */
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(entry_ibpb);
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(write_ibpb);
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.popsection
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@ -269,7 +269,7 @@
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* typically has NO_MELTDOWN).
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*
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* While retbleed_untrain_ret() doesn't clobber anything but requires stack,
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* entry_ibpb() will clobber AX, CX, DX.
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* write_ibpb() will clobber AX, CX, DX.
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*
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* As such, this must be placed after every *SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 at a point
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* where we have a stack but before any RET instruction.
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@ -279,7 +279,7 @@
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VALIDATE_UNRET_END
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CALL_UNTRAIN_RET
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ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \
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"call entry_ibpb", \ibpb_feature, \
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"call write_ibpb", \ibpb_feature, \
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__stringify(\call_depth_insns), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH
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#endif
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.endm
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@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ extern void srso_return_thunk(void);
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extern void srso_alias_return_thunk(void);
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extern void entry_untrain_ret(void);
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extern void entry_ibpb(void);
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extern void write_ibpb(void);
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
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extern void clear_bhb_loop(void);
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@ -1142,7 +1142,7 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
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setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
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/*
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* There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
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* There is no need for RSB filling: write_ibpb() ensures
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* all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
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* regardless of IBPB implementation.
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*/
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@ -2676,7 +2676,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
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setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
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/*
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* There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
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* There is no need for RSB filling: write_ibpb() ensures
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* all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
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* regardless of IBPB implementation.
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*/
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@ -2701,7 +2701,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
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srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
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/*
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* There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
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* There is no need for RSB filling: write_ibpb() ensures
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* all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
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* regardless of IBPB implementation.
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*/
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