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lib/crypto: arm64/aes: Remove obsolete chunking logic

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Since commit aefbab8e77 ("arm64: fpsimd: Preserve/restore kernel mode
NEON at context switch"), kernel-mode NEON sections have been
preemptible on arm64.  And since commit 7dadeaa6e8 ("sched: Further
restrict the preemption modes"), voluntary preemption is no longer
supported on arm64 either.  Therefore, there's no longer any need to
limit the length of kernel-mode NEON sections on arm64.

Simplify the AES-CBC-MAC code accordingly.

Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260401000548.133151-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Eric Biggers 2026-03-31 17:05:40 -07:00
parent 8aeeb5255d
commit 11d6bc70ff
4 changed files with 23 additions and 39 deletions
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13
arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c
View File

@ -101,16 +101,11 @@ static u32 ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(u8 mac[], u8 const in[], u32 abytes,
u32 blocks = abytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
if (macp == AES_BLOCK_SIZE || (!macp && blocks > 0)) {
u32 rem = ce_aes_mac_update(in, rk, rounds, blocks, mac,
macp, enc_after);
u32 adv = (blocks - rem) * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
ce_aes_mac_update(in, rk, rounds, blocks, mac, macp,
enc_after);
macp = enc_after ? 0 : AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
in += adv;
abytes -= adv;
if (unlikely(rem))
macp = 0;
in += blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
abytes -= blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
} else {
u32 l = min(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - macp, abytes);

6
include/crypto/aes.h
View File

@ -230,9 +230,9 @@ asmlinkage void ce_aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[],
asmlinkage void ce_aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[],
u32 const rk1[], int rounds,
int blocks, u8 iv[], u32 const rk2[]);
asmlinkage size_t ce_aes_mac_update(u8 const in[], u32 const rk[], int rounds,
size_t blocks, u8 dg[], int enc_before,
int enc_after);
asmlinkage void ce_aes_mac_update(u8 const in[], u32 const rk[], int rounds,
size_t blocks, u8 dg[], int enc_before,
int enc_after);
#elif defined(CONFIG_PPC)
void ppc_expand_key_128(u32 *key_enc, const u8 *key);
void ppc_expand_key_192(u32 *key_enc, const u8 *key);

8
lib/crypto/arm64/aes-modes.S
View File

@ -817,9 +817,9 @@ AES_FUNC_END(aes_xts_decrypt)
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_CBC_MACS)
/*
* size_t aes_mac_update(u8 const in[], u32 const rk[], int rounds,
* size_t blocks, u8 dg[], int enc_before,
* int enc_after);
* void aes_mac_update(u8 const in[], u32 const rk[], int rounds,
* size_t blocks, u8 dg[], int enc_before,
* int enc_after);
*/
AES_FUNC_START(aes_mac_update)
ld1 {v0.16b}, [x4] /* get dg */
@ -844,7 +844,6 @@ AES_FUNC_START(aes_mac_update)
cbz w5, .Lmacout
encrypt_block v0, w2, x1, x7, w8
st1 {v0.16b}, [x4] /* return dg */
cond_yield .Lmacout, x7, x8
b .Lmacloop4x
.Lmac1x:
add x3, x3, #4
@ -863,7 +862,6 @@ AES_FUNC_START(aes_mac_update)
.Lmacout:
st1 {v0.16b}, [x4] /* return dg */
mov x0, x3
ret
AES_FUNC_END(aes_mac_update)
#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_CBC_MACS */

35
lib/crypto/arm64/aes.h
View File

@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ asmlinkage void __aes_ce_decrypt(const u32 inv_rk[], u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
asmlinkage u32 __aes_ce_sub(u32 l);
asmlinkage void __aes_ce_invert(struct aes_block *out,
const struct aes_block *in);
asmlinkage size_t neon_aes_mac_update(u8 const in[], u32 const rk[], int rounds,
size_t blocks, u8 dg[], int enc_before,
int enc_after);
asmlinkage void neon_aes_mac_update(u8 const in[], u32 const rk[], int rounds,
size_t blocks, u8 dg[], int enc_before,
int enc_after);
/*
* Expand an AES key using the crypto extensions if supported and usable or
@ -192,25 +192,16 @@ static bool aes_cbcmac_blocks_arch(u8 h[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
bool enc_after)
{
if (static_branch_likely(&have_neon) && likely(may_use_simd())) {
do {
size_t rem;
scoped_ksimd() {
if (static_branch_likely(&have_aes))
rem = ce_aes_mac_update(
data, key->k.rndkeys,
key->nrounds, nblocks, h,
enc_before, enc_after);
else
rem = neon_aes_mac_update(
data, key->k.rndkeys,
key->nrounds, nblocks, h,
enc_before, enc_after);
}
data += (nblocks - rem) * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
nblocks = rem;
enc_before = false;
} while (nblocks);
scoped_ksimd() {
if (static_branch_likely(&have_aes))
ce_aes_mac_update(data, key->k.rndkeys,
key->nrounds, nblocks, h,
enc_before, enc_after);
else
neon_aes_mac_update(data, key->k.rndkeys,
key->nrounds, nblocks, h,
enc_before, enc_after);
}
return true;
}
return false;