From 05762c5bc1cfdcac36747994fde2c04387a457f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Frank Sorenson Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 16:33:52 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] smb: client: fix next_buffer UAF and NextCommand bounds in compound PDUs Fix several related bounds checking and pointer lifecycle issues in receive_encrypted_standard()'s handling of compound encrypted frames: - Clear next_buffer after assigning it to server->bigbuf. A stale next_buffer pointer can lead to a use-after-free on subsequent error paths. - Update pdu_length to the decrypted plaintext size (buf_size). Using the pre-decryption length allows NextCommand to point into stale ciphertext residue. - Reject next_cmd values smaller than MID_HEADER_SIZE(server). - Fix an integer overflow in the upper bound check by verifying pdu_length - next_cmd < MID_HEADER_SIZE(server), ensuring the trailing slice is large enough for a header. Fixes: b24df3e30cbf ("cifs: update receive_encrypted_standard to handle compounded responses") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Frank Sorenson Reviewed-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara --- fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c index cb4fd09f996e..fcf7033889c7 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c @@ -5365,6 +5365,7 @@ receive_encrypted_standard(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, length = decrypt_raw_data(server, buf, buf_size, NULL, false); if (length) return length; + pdu_length = buf_size; next_is_large = server->large_buf; one_more: @@ -5377,8 +5378,15 @@ receive_encrypted_standard(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, } if (next_cmd) { - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(next_cmd > pdu_length)) + if (next_cmd < MID_HEADER_SIZE(server) || + next_cmd > pdu_length || + pdu_length - next_cmd < MID_HEADER_SIZE(server)) { + unsigned int max_next = pdu_length > (unsigned int)MID_HEADER_SIZE(server) ? + pdu_length - (unsigned int)MID_HEADER_SIZE(server) : 0; + cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "invalid NextCommand offset %u out of range [%zu, %u]\n", + next_cmd, MID_HEADER_SIZE(server), max_next); return -1; + } if (next_is_large) next_buffer = (char *)cifs_buf_get(); else @@ -5414,6 +5422,7 @@ receive_encrypted_standard(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, server->bigbuf = buf = next_buffer; else server->smallbuf = buf = next_buffer; + next_buffer = NULL; goto one_more; } else if (ret != 0) { /*